Democratic transition | Political accountability and policy responsiveness of directly elected mayors in Indonesia
Yasmin Lurusati is a PhD student in the department Public Administration. (Co)Promotors are prof.dr. R. Torenvlied and dr. M.R.R. Ossewaarde from the faculty of Behavioural, Management and Social Sciences.
The idea of democracy is always accompanied by the hope for improvement in day-to-day governance, which ultimately impacts the enhancement of the quality of life for society. The study of democratic transitions examines how governments navigate the process of democratization and how these transformations shape accountability and responsiveness of elected leaders. Key aspects of political democratization include extending voting rights to all adult (male) citizens based on the principle of one man, one vote (political equality), and introducing competitive elections as a means to select political leaders. In the context of democratic transitions, political decentralization emerged as a significant pillar of reform.
The idea of democracy is always accompanied by the hope for improvement in day-to-day governance, which ultimately impacts the enhancement of the quality of life for society. The study of democratic transitions examines how governments navigate the process of democratization and how these transformations shape accountability and responsiveness of elected leaders. Key aspects of political democratization include extending voting rights to all adult (male) citizens based on the principle of one man, one vote (political equality), and introducing competitive elections as a means to select political leaders. In the context of democratic transitions, political decentralization emerged as a significant pillar of reform.
The introduction of local elections is a key reform often associated with political decentralization. Local elections play a crucial role in empowering citizens and enhancing democratic governance at the local level. Through local elections, citizens have the opportunity to directly elect their local government officials. This democratic process allows the people to have a say in selecting leaders who will make decisions and policies that directly affect their communities. The introduction of local elections promotes political accountability and policy responsiveness. Elected officials become directly answerable to the electorate, as they are chosen by the people they represent (e.g. Besley et al., 2005; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Costa-Font and Pons-Novell, 2007). This accountability ensures that local leaders are more inclined to be responsive to the needs and demands of their constituents to secure their support in future elections (e.g. Downs, 1957; Moreno-Jaimes 2007; Cleary 2007).
The introduction of local elections is a key reform often associated with political decentralization. Local elections play a crucial role in empowering citizens and enhancing democratic governance at the local level. Through local elections, citizens have the opportunity to directly elect their local government officials. This democratic process allows the people to have a say in selecting leaders who will make decisions and policies that directly affect their communities. The introduction of local elections promotes political accountability and policy responsiveness. Elected officials become directly answerable to the electorate, as they are chosen by the people they represent (e.g. Besley et al., 2005; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Costa-Font and Pons-Novell, 2007). This accountability ensures that local leaders are more inclined to be responsive to the needs and demands of their constituents to secure their support in future elections (e.g. Downs, 1957; Moreno-Jaimes 2007; Cleary 2007).
Before the transition to democracy in 1998, Indonesia was led by an authoritarian regime for 32 years. The institutional transition that Indonesia initiated in the late 1990s, following the Asian financial crisis, was a significant shift from centralistic and authoritarian rule towards a more decentralized and democratic governance structure. During this period, responsibilities and budgets were devolved to municipalities, and an essential change occurred in the way mayors were selected. Previously, mayors were appointed by the president and installed by the minister of home affairs. However, with the decentralization reforms, the selection process for mayors changed, and they started to be elected by local council members. This move aimed to enhance local political accountability and allow for a more democratic and participatory approach in choosing local leaders.
In 2005, another crucial step was taken in the democratization process with the introduction of direct elections of mayors. Under this new system, mayoral candidates are required to present a medium-term (five-year) development plan for their respective municipalities. This development plan serves as a policy platform, outlining the candidates' election pledges and intended actions during their mayoral term. Once elected, the development plan becomes a guiding framework for local decision-making and policy implementation throughout the five-year mayoral term. This approach ensures that the elected mayors have a clear mandate and a specific set of policies and objectives to fulfill during their tenure. By requiring candidates to present a development plan and linking it to their election pledges, Indonesia seeks to promote transparency, accountability, and a more coherent and goal-oriented approach to local governance. The plan provides a basis for assessing the performance of mayors and holding them accountable for their promises and policy outcomes. This approach also aligns with the broader goals of decentralization, as it empowers local leaders to have a greater say in shaping policies that address the specific needs and aspirations of their communities. By giving voters a direct role in selecting their mayors based on their policy proposals, the system fosters a more responsive and accountable local government.
Despite the series of institutional changes that transformed Indonesia from one of the most centralized and authoritarian governance systems to one of the most decentralized ones, it is important to recognize that this process did not necessarily result in a full-blown democratization of the country. Even after 18 years of transitioning towards local governance by elected mayors, Indonesia continues to grapple with deep-rooted issues, including a corrupt political-bureaucratic system that is influenced and controlled by powerful oligarchs from political and business elites (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2018). Scholars and researchers have pointed out that corruption remains a significant challenge in Indonesia's governance system, despite the decentralization reforms. The capture of political and bureaucratic institutions by elites hampers effective governance and misallocates accountability and responsiveness away from citizens and towards these networks of powerful individuals (Mietzner, 2009; Hadiz & Robison, 2004; Hadiz, 2010; Nordholt & Van Klinken, 2007; Malley, 2000; Aspinall & Berenschot, 2018). Public dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs is evident, as the misallocation of accountability and responsiveness is seen to favor the interests of the oligarchs over the needs and aspirations of the general population. This has led to concerns that political decentralization has merely transferred the corrupt system inherited from previous administrations, such as the Soekarno and Soeharto eras, to the local level (Mietzner, 2009; Hadiz & Robison, 2004; Hadiz, 2010; Nordholt & Van Klinken, 2007; Malley, 2000; Aspinall & Berenschot, 2018). Authors have argued that the legacy of corruption and vested interests continues to exert influence in the country's decentralized governance structure (Lewis & Hendrawan, 2019; Lewis et al., 2020). Despite the introduction of direct mayoral elections and development plans as policy platforms, the grip of corruption and elite capture at the local level remains a significant obstacle to achieving meaningful democratization and effective governance.
Against this backdrop, political accountability in this study is defined in twofold: mayoral accountability towards, first, majority of the people, and second, the increase in public spending. Moreover, the definition of policy responsiveness is defined as the responsiveness of mayors towards, first, the needs of the people, and second, the improvement in societal outcomes. This study primarily aims to examine the impact of the introduction of directly mayoral elections on mayoral political accountability and policy responsiveness.
Hence, four independent sub-research questions have been undertaken. The first sub-research question explores formal institutional development of mayoral political accountability and policy responsiveness since independence to date. The second sub-research question focuses on the impact of the introduction of directly elected mayors on public spending and societal outcomes. Subsequently, the third sub-research question investigates the impact of directly elected mayors on the redistribution of public spending and societal outcomes incorporating three key conditioning factors: political competition, the veto-power of economic elites, and local state capacity. Finally, the fourth sub-research question examines the fulfilment of mayoral election pledges on the improvement of societal outcomes particularly in health domain. The further detailed objectives of each sub-research question are discussed below.
With this background, the novelty of this thesis is presented in four aspects. First, an integrated analysis of the impact of the introduction of direct mayoral elections on local public spending and local societal outcomes. The design of the analysis served as the initial step in developing our comprehension of the intricate relationship between public spending and societal outcomes. This was particularly relevant in the context of Indonesia, where we aimed to explore the persistence of clientelist and patronage-based practices following the implementation of mayoral direct elections. Second, a conditional model of democratic redistribution, incorporating three key conditioning factors: political competition, the veto-power of economic elites, and local state capacity. Third, a qualitative congruency of mayoral election pledges and the fulfilment of the pledges. Fourth, a combination of mixed methods of qualitative of the content analysis of the laws, mayoral election pledges, and the fulfilment of mayoral election pledges and quantitative of statistical analysis.
Chapter 2 traces the development of Indonesia's formal legal and institutional frameworks shaping political accountability and policy responsiveness of mayors over time. Using over 800 coded legal text fragments, it reconstructs how laws have evolved across political eras to define the roles, responsibilities, and oversight mechanisms for local executives. Beyond legal texts, the chapter also examines practical implementation, offering a multi-layered analysis that connects institutional design with real-world governance outcomes. This contributes to our understanding of how decentralization reforms have reshaped local governance in Indonesia.
Chapter 3 presents an integrated analysis of how direct mayoral elections influence both municipal spending patterns and societal outcomes such as education and health. It highlights that democratization affects governance quality not only through spending priorities but also through service delivery outcomes. Importantly, the study also finds that clientelist practices may persist despite democratization, and it investigates how these practices mediate the link between spending and societal outcomes. The findings underscore the need to consider informal institutions when evaluating democratic reforms.
Chapter 4 develops a conditional model explaining how political competition, elite veto power, and local state capacity jointly shape redistributive spending across Indonesian municipalities. The study finds that the effectiveness of redistribution policies depends on the interplay of these factors: strong political competition and capable local governments enhance redistribution. This model provides a nuanced framework for understanding variation in redistribution outcomes in decentralized and transitioning democracies.
Through a qualitative analysis of mayoral pledges in four Central and East Java municipalities (2012–2021), chapter 5 finds that mayors are more likely to fulfill pledges in their second term, often motivated by ambitions for higher office. Pledge fulfillment is also shaped by institutional alignment, legislative support, and policy continuity. The findings challenge classic mandate theory by showing that accountability and responsiveness are shaped by pragmatic considerations, institutional constraints, and career incentives. The study calls for institutional designs that maintain accountability even in non-renewable terms. Together, these studies provide a comprehensive, multi-method assessment of how formal institutions, democratization mechanisms, political incentives, and contextual factors shape local governance in Indonesia. The research offers valuable insights for both academic debates and policy-making in transitioning democracies.
