Dinsdag seminar

The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures.

Anna Khmelnitskaya (UT) with Peter Sudhölter from the University of Southern Denmark.


It is well-known that the prekernel on the class of TU games is uniquely determined by non-emptiness, Pareto efficiency, covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), the equal treatment property, the reduced game property (RGP), and its converse. We show that the prekernel on the class of TU games restricted to the connected coalitions with respect to communication structures may be axiomatized by suitably generalized axioms. Moreover, it is shown that the prenucleolus, the unique solution concept on the class of TU games that satisfies singlevaluedness, COV, anonymity, and RGP, may be characterized by suitably generalized versions of these axioms together with a property that is called ``independence of irrelevant connections''. This property requires that any element of the solution to a game with communication structure is an element of the solution to the game that allows unrestricted cooperation in all connected components, provided that each newly connected coalition is sufficiently charged, i.e., receives a sufficiently small worth. Both characterization results may be extended to games with conference structures.