Governing nodal governance: The ‘anchoring’ of local security networks

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‘Shedding the structures of hierarchy may seem refreshing (in a normative, positive or symbolic sense), but constitutional authority (manifested in hierarchy) and the ‘fiscal spine’ of appropriated funds remain the structures within which relational and networked forms are enabled to flourish’ (Hill and Lynn 2005: 189).

Introduction
The organization of policing, and in a wider sense, security is undergoing considerable restructuration in western societies (Crawford 1999; Hughes and Edwards 2002; Crawford et al. 2005; Jones and Newburn 2006; Wood and Dupont 2006; Fleming and Wood 2006; Henry and Smith 2007). A key development is that the government is losing its previously taken-for-granted dominance over crime and disorder control under pressure of ‘polycentric’ or ‘networked’ agents and agencies. Accordingly, at the local level, police forces and municipalities find themselves in a ‘multilateralized’ environment of both organizational auspices authorizing security and policing and providers who supply executive personnel (Bayley and Shearing 2001). These auspices and providers do not necessarily overlap. It is, on the contrary, possible that a municipal authority (public) hires commercial security guards (private) to patrol the streets. Auspices and providers may have become separated. In this manner, the classical distinction between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’ has proved problematic (Jones and Newburn 1998; Kempa et al. 1999; Johnston 2000). Organizations have become part of ‘amorphous’ or ‘hybrid’ assemblages that feature different degrees of ‘publicness’ and ‘privateness’ (Dijkstra and Van der Meer 2003).

There is little controversy about such tendencies. In fact, governments, like the Dutch, overtly assert that ‘security is not a matter exclusively for the police. The police need partners and are therefore looking for ways of establishing worthwhile collaboration, for example through community policing’ (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2004: 8). This has resulted in the growth of multi-agency working in which the police and local government team up with businesses, not-profit organizations and (groups of) voluntary citizens (Terpstra 2008). To give a few illustrations: various cities have sought to strengthen their relations with citizens who,
together with police and municipal services, are actively responsible for safety and security. Other cities have created so-called Ketenunits (Chain Units) and Veiligheidshuizen (Security Houses) – which we discuss below – that consist of police and judicial services as well as welfare institutions and municipal bodies to promote effective communication and successful action. Elsewhere, there is a flourishing of covenants and other similar contracts (such as funding agreements) that should guarantee long-term partnership. Formalized cooperation has loomed large in the Netherlands. This is partly due to a political tradition – the famous Dutch Polder model – in which conflicts and divisions are offset by the existence of accommodation, cooperation, consensus-building and compromise (Andeweg and Irwin 2002; De Waard and Van Dijk 2009).

In this chapter, we will argue for an understanding of urban security governance that draws primarily from the Dutch situation, but has broader implications for assessing multilateral organizational landscapes elsewhere. Modern societies, it is argued, are going through a transition. With the rise of multilateral alliances and institutions, we currently move from a vertically (‘top down’) organized world to a more horizontally-oriented one wherein the state, the market and civil society inter-penetrate – a tendency which has fuelled a blurring of norms, values, interests, and working methods. This raises the question how such governance arrangements can be imagined and managed. Or put differently, how can we constitute order in a diffuse and chaotic world? In providing an answer, network theories come to the fore (Boutellier 2007). Discussing and evaluating such theories, this chapter first offers a brief description of Shearing’s ‘nodal governance’ thesis (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Wood and Shearing 2007) as a framework to capture what is happening to the organization of local security systems. Central to this framework is the assumption that a state-centred orchestration of governance is challenged by the proliferation of ‘public’, ‘private’ and ‘mixed’ auspices and providers of security. The subsequent section of the chapter explores Loader and Walker’s idea of ‘anchored pluralism’ (Loader and Walker 2006; 2007), rigorously criticizing the theoretical and normative assumptions underlying ‘nodal governance’. Their perspective fundamentally disagrees with the assertion that the state is ‘but one among many’ governing nodes. Instead of minimizing the state’s position, it acknowledges that police and municipal services have a leading role to play. Specifically in the field of policing, the state exercises (symbolic) authority in the sense that public police forces are closely associated with law enforcement, the maintenance
of (ontological) security and the constitution of national identities (Loader and Mulcahy 2003; Loader and Walker 2007).

Briefly illustrating a case-study of local security policies in the city of Eindhoven, the Netherlands, we describe the faults, failures and ambiguities underlying complex organizational networks. Given such problems, our contention is that governance structures need to be more ‘anchored’ and ‘directed’ than nodal theories presuppose. This critique of nodal governance is also in line with Braithwaite’s picture of a ‘responsive regulatory pyramid’ as a good strategy when cooperation between public, private and hybrid organizations fails (Braithwaite 2002). The analogy of his pyramid suggests that the effectiveness of coercive measures held as a last resort – ‘speaking softly and carrying big sticks’ (Braithwaite 1997) – does not have a corrosive effect on the voluntary and self-regulatory activities informed by persuasion, lower down the pyramid. In fact it implies that the effectiveness of ordering in the security field is dependent upon the credible capacity of escalation towards punitive and coercive measures. Only when local safety policies are set up systematically, and backed by solid state presence in the background, are nodal arrangements able to function to their full capacity. Building on Loader and Walker’s and Braithwaite’s ideas, we revisit the concept of ‘anchored pluralism’ and seek to restructure and advance some of its theoretical elements by introducing the metaphor of ‘team play’. In so doing, we seek to uncover the dynamics that underlie the governance of local security networks. The chapter closes with an attempt to provide some directions for future research.

**Nodal governance**

Over the past decade, Shearing and colleagues have introduced a new outlook on security and justice under conditions of ‘multilateral’ or ‘polycentric’ organizational networks. In so doing, they have created a theoretical approach that gives no *a priori* significance to state coordination of these networks. The centralizing aspirations of state governance have come under critique (Shearing 2005). Two trends are specifically detectable. First, in line with neo-liberal (or ‘new public management’) strategies, the state has increasingly placed emphasis on deregulation and the outsourcing (‘contracting out’) of public services: government authorities should be preoccupied with steering, not rowing, activities (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). As such, non-state agencies (businesses, citizens or the non-profit sector) have been activated to provide for
collective goods with state agencies serving as regulators ‘at a distance’ (Clarke and Newman 1997). The normative justification for this is not the weakening or ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Rhodes 1994), but enhancing its capacities to provide effective and efficient public service provision. Contradictory centralizing and decentralizing aspirations coexist and strengthen each other. Second, for another and equally important part, Shearing focuses on influential governance initiatives stemming from ‘strong’ (often corporate and transnational) actors. He lays emphasis on the phenomenon of ‘private governments’ (Macaulay 1986) engaged in promoting security (Shearing 2006). On this view, marked shifts in property relations have led to a rise in privately-owned but publicly-used spaces such as shopping malls, airport terminals and leisure parks (Shearing and Stenning 1981) which are strictly governed through corporate security interests and services. In accordance, Johnston and Shearing (2003: 146) speak of a ‘new morphology’ of security governance overthrowing traditional state-centred visions on domestic ordering functions. State-led orchestration of security and policing seems no more than a ‘historical hiccup’ (Shearing 2005: 62).

These two observations have led to the advocacy of a ‘nodal’ theory of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Wood and Shearing 2007). That is, we are witnessing a proliferation of nodes (or organizational sides of security) that leaves open for empirical enquiry whether they are public, private or hybrid in nature. Or being more precise, ‘nodes’ represent ‘institutions with a set of technologies, mentalities and resources — that mobilize the knowledge and capacity of members to manage the course of events. Nodes are normally but not essentially points on networks, but networks are a prime means through which nodes exert influence’ (Burris et al. 2005: 33). A node thus may have a territorial basis such as a shopping mall or (gated) residential area, but it could also be some sort of physical or virtual community like a religious congregation or a group of like-minded strangers populating a chat-room in cyberspace (Crawford 2003a; Wall 2007). In this regard, a node is most often, but not necessarily, part of broader relationships with others; ‘nodes may not come together to form networks at all’ (Wood and Shearing 2007: 26). Subsequently, Wood and Shearing (2007) stress that the purposes and ‘mentalities’ – that is, the mental and cognitive frames that shape how individuals and organizations see the world and act accordingly (Stenning in Johnston & Shearing 2003: 29) – of nodes may differ greatly from each other in terms of legal conduct. Although we normally think of ‘regular’ nodes that operate within the ambit of the law, it is equally possible that deviant nodes form ‘dark
networks’ (Raab and Milward 2003) such as mafia syndicates involved in criminal activities. Finally, a node is often a formalized institutional expression (an organization or a subdivision of an organization), but may also come as an informal (voluntary) grouping. People can be permanently located in one or more nodes, but they can also switch between boundaries as ‘nodes may fall and/or cut across one another’ (Button 2008: 15). Van Dijk (2006) even argues that it is possible to take individual persons linked by networks as the basic units of nodalized settings.

Within assorted nodes, security is shaped by complex arrangements of agents and agencies (ranging from the public police to private security companies and active citizens) that constantly interact and struggle with each other. This position, Shearing (2007: 252) argues, ‘makes no claim about the relative influence of different nodes in shaping the flow of events at any space-time moment’. The nodal model should be regarded as analytically neutral. Yet, despite such self-proclaimed neutrality, a close reading of Shearing’s work reveals subtle claims that verge upon state-sceptic ideas and ideals. In particular, Shearing and his colleagues position themselves as ‘left-wing’ interpreters of Friedrich von Hayek, a political philosopher who compellingly accounted ‘the epistemological limits on human organization and planning’ and appreciated markets rather than governments ‘as a means of bridging order to complex systems by coordinating diffused knowledge and capacity’ (Burris et al. 2005: 32). From a Hayekian perspective, social actions should be governed by micro-processes of spontaneously evolving equilibria, not by public bureaucracies lacking the capacity and knowledge to deliver ‘intelligent’ security services to local communities. Nonetheless, Shearing remains hesitant about neo-liberal sentiments leaving things to an unregulated ‘free market’ as this will inevitably grant better resourced nodes power advantages over weaker ones (Burris et al. 2008: 33). His political agenda therefore is to reshape governance in ways that will benefit poor populations (Shearing and Wood 2003). This is necessary, because the poor are at greater objective risk of becoming crime victims. Furthermore, within a free market context, security deficits may arise owing to inequalities in access to resources. Consequently, policing budgets should be allocated in such ways as to motivate and enable marginalized groups to specify their own desired security systems, and hence provide them with voice, choice and self-direction in nodal arenas.
Anchored pluralism

Shearing’s nodal governance-thesis has been applauded and advanced (Button 2008), but has also met strong criticism in the literature (Loader and Walker 2005). We will briefly discuss such criticisms arguing that, although there is considerable merit in thinking critically about the challenges governance structures pose, the role occupied by the state is still distinctive. Some years ago, Crawford (1999) and Jones and Newburn (2002) took the lead in questioning to what degree current transformations in policing and security should be interpreted as a decisive break with the past – something which is assumed by Shearing and others (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Johnston and Shearing 2003). Instead of understanding the dispersal of policing authorities and providers as something unseen and unheard of, Jones and Newburn choose to locate changes in a wider context of historical processes (see also Rawlings 2003; Zedner 2006). As they observe, taking a long-term view on pluralisation and privatization, ‘policing provision has become less rather than more fragmented. In particular, repeated reorganization over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has seen a massive decline in the total number of constabularies and bodies of constables’ (Jones and Newburn 2002: 136). Thus, while some of the changes are, to a certain degree, undeniable and far-reaching, it is a mistake to easily herald ‘a watershed’ (Bayley and Shearing 1996: 585) in the evolution and organization of contemporary crime control. This kind of reasoning tends to overlook consistencies and continuities that still exist in the authorization and provision of policing. There is no inevitability about the future direction of public-private partnerships and network management that will affect security systems around the world.

In a more recent publication, Jones (2007) questions the practical implications of nodal governance theories. If state agencies have really lost their privileged position, concerns arise about where to locate the responsibility for monitoring and regulating security networks. For example, who would, in absence of a regulatory state, protect the rights of unpopular (poor) communities and who would take the final decision on a just and fair allocation of policing budgets? Which bodies would serve as a ‘last resort’ in upholding public order and how is it possible to counter organized crime that cut across local communities without any public police intervention? Indeed, Shearing’s line of reasoning ‘reveals that the state in fact continues to assume a far from insignificant role in their preferred conception of security’ (Loader and Walker 2006: 177). Moreover, as Roberts (2005: 16) points out, the representation of negotiated metropolitan orders (like
private governments) does not signal a move, as it were, from public to private ‘logics’ – i.e., from ‘command and control’ to ‘inducement’. The centralized legal order of the state rather permits and encourages the proliferation of autonomous localities (and their ‘house rules’) to the extent to which they are licensed. Redefined state ambitions in the regulation of society do not, therefore, mean a withdrawal of government institutions per se. We have no reason to assume a paradigmatic shift away from ‘vertical’ to ‘horizontal’ modes of governance – let alone that public administration is shrinking or ceasing. Quite the reverse, contemporary political and social engineering in favour of ‘smarter’ governing capacities have not resulted in deregulation, but rather an expansion in regulatory systems, which straddle the classic public-private dichotomy. As such, public authorities, at least in the field of policing and security, are rather redrawing and extending than withdrawing powers (Crawford 2006a: 471). ‘The more hierarchal patterns of governance’, as Kooiman (2003: 11) puts it, ‘are not yet out of date’.

Reflecting on debates surrounding nodal governance, Loader and Walker (2006: 194) have introduced the concept of ‘anchored pluralism’ to describe the necessity of state presence in the governance of security. Although they initially deploy this concept in a normative sense, the authors also present relevant analytical clues to identify and assess the distinctive anchoring points states have in steering plural organizational networks. To begin with, Loader and others argue that the state is engaged in crafting social identities through its symbolic power and cultural authority (Loader and Mulcahy 2003). It does so in creating an atmosphere of empathic familiarity and attachment which are inexorably connected with our human senses of safety and security. Public policing represents an ‘irreducibly social’ good indispensable for the generation of solidarity among people (Loader and Walker 2001). A second point relates to the state’s capability to assure an accurate (re)allocation of collective resources by enabling agents and agencies, whether state-based or not, to alleviate feelings of ontological security and anxiety. This can take the form of policing, but we can also think of housing, health services and education. In addition, the state may be concerned with mobilizing resources that are able ‘to engage in ‘joined-up’ thinking about and ‘joined-up’ funding of the right mix of policies’ (Loader and Walker 2007: 185). It encourages channels for deliberation so that policies are being shaped on the basis of democratic participation and consideration of good arguments. This enhances public perceptions of state legitimacy and concerns the vary standing of security as a ‘thick’ social good between
organizations and (groups) of citizens with numerous and ostensibly conflicting interests and preferences.

As such, the state stimulates credible commitments among individuals and organizations which whom it envelops relationships. Clearly, this is best done in a latent mode wherein the state invests in anticipation and persuasion. Nevertheless, public authorities, including the police, are at all times capable of residing to overriding (physical) strength as an *ultimum remedium*. ‘The ordering and resourcing infrastructure’, Loader and Walker (2007: 192) underline, ‘needs some kind of coercive underpinning in the final instance for reasons which bear upon effectiveness and reliability of delivery in general without influencing the detailed enforceability of any particular operation’. This assumes state priority in the regulation of nodal security networks. Policing and security cannot be left to the unfettered ‘invisible hand’ of capitalist economies, because, at a certain stage, these solutions will inevitably derail into eroding the sense of belonging people have to political communities – a downward spiral incurring alienation and, in turn, fuelling the use of ever more defensive technologies that fracture society into competitive markets and tribes (Loader 2006: 217). In summary, then, the state, in the senses set out before, has a pivotal position in overcoming difficulties of effective partnership working between state, market and civil society agencies. Municipal, police and judicial authorities perform vital cultural and ordering work in ‘governing the good of security’. Turning theoretical debates into empirical reality, we would like to illustrate the case of ambiguous and failing local safety politics in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. Drawing on such observations, we suggest that nodal security networks cannot do without state anchoring to function and perform well.

**Local safety policies in Eindhoven**

The city of Eindhoven is situated in the province of Brabant and is the fifth largest city in the Netherlands with some 210,000 inhabitants. One of the current authors (Boutellier) was member of an independent auditing commission evaluating the city’s security politics.¹ The establishment of this commission had a tangible reason. For two succeeding years, Eindhoven was rated the most unsafe city in the Netherlands on the ‘crime index’ published by *Algemeen Dagblad*, a popular Dutch newspaper (with

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¹ The other members were Joop van Riessen (former chief constable in Amsterdam) and Professor Cyrille Fijnaut (chair).
354,000 subscriptions). In response, its new burgomaster asked the commission to analyze crime figures, judge the policy-making processes and offer advice on how to improve the situation. The commission started in July 2008 and presented its final report *Veel te winnen!* (Much to gain!) in November 2008 (Fijnaut et al. 2008). During this time, thirty respondents were interviewed, ranging from the burgomaster to civil servants, from the police chief to street cops and from social professionals to ordinary citizens. In addition, the commission organized ten expert sessions on location. Its members visited the prostitution zone, the football stadium of PSV, the night-life district and other problem areas. Furthermore, the commission studied 95 documents of all kinds and initiated a separate research unit to conduct quantitative analyses. The commission’s final report covered chapters on actual crime problems and the institutional architecture of crime-related policies. In this regard, they granted special attention to the *Veiligheidshuis* (Security House), a relatively new phenomenon in the Netherlands.

Over the past decade, Security Houses have emerged in several cities throughout the Netherlands. In one building, they represent a physical arrangement of the main parties involved in security issues and crime problems, bringing together the police, municipal bodies and the prosecution service. By early 2009, there were 26 Security Houses across the Netherlands, with the government aspiring to create a network of 40 houses in forthcoming years. The institutionalization of Security Houses results from experiments with ‘neighbourhood justice’ during the 1990s (Boutellier 2001). In certain urban areas, *Justitie in de Buurt* (Neighborhood Justice) offices were established that aimed for a problem-oriented approach in response to criminal justice matters. These experiments evolved to more integrated organizational networks, which apart from the prosecution and probation services, involve agencies such as mental health care, addiction services, social work, victim aid, and local municipal authorities. Security Houses focus especially on juvenile delinquency and frequent offenders, though they also tend to concentrate on thematic issues (such as addiction and violence). Case meetings in which representatives of several organizations participate to decide on suitable intervention strategies for individual offenders or specific situations represent a weighty policy instrument. In Eindhoven, the Security House consists of no less than 18 organizations in the areas of policing, criminal justice, housing, welfare work, child care, and community development. As expressed through these new institutions, security
policies have genuinely evolved into horizontally organized (or ‘networked’) arrangements.

After analyzing the crime data in Eindhoven, the auditing commission concluded that it would be wrong to underestimate and trivialize the seriousness of security problems. Even though several respondents tended to nuance media reports on crime, statistical resources unequivocally showed that Eindhoven occupies a top ranking position in relation to crime rates relative to comparable Dutch cities. To give an example, Statistics Netherlands (CBS)\(^2\) registered 150 crimes (of which 10 per cent were violent crimes) per 100,000 inhabitants over the 2005-2007 period – a number that ranks just below Amsterdam and Rotterdam, both of which are triple the size of Eindhoven. In addition, the auditing commission thoroughly considered the architecture of Eindhoven’s security system. It found that the typically Dutch ‘triangle’ – an institutionalized tripartite consultation between the burgomaster, the police superintendent and the chief public prosecutor – set up to govern local policing and security policies (Wintle 1996; Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2004) – was virtually absent in Eindhoven. None of the three administrators were able to steer local networks effectively.

A major reason for this flaw in the governance of security was the fragmented infrastructure of administrative offices responsible for crime and disorder reduction. On the municipal level, responsibilities were divided among the burgomaster (head of public order) and an alderman (head of ‘integrated’ safety policy).\(^3\) This alderman chaired the Security House committee which also included a senior member of the public prosecution service (but not the chief public prosecutor himself).\(^4\) Traditionally, municipal police services, being subdivisions of larger police regions,\(^5\) are headed by one superintendent in the Netherlands. He or she is in charge of daily police work. Yet, in Eindhoven, not one but two police chiefs were heading the force – none of whom had clear tasks and responsibilities. The whole force was essentially divided into six separate departments, each with their own commanders, priority settings and annual

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\(^2\) See on Internet: www.cbs.nl
\(^3\) In the Netherlands, the burgomaster (appointed by Royal degree), together with the aldermen, form the executive branch of municipalities. There is a uniform pattern of local Boards (Colleges van Burgemeester en Wethouders), with the burgomaster serving as head of public order (see Morlan, 1964). The observation that responsibilities for public order where divided among the burgomaster and an alderman makes Eindhoven an exceptional case.
\(^4\) In the Dutch criminal justice system the public prosecution not the police lead in criminal investigations.
\(^5\) The police service in the Netherlands is divided into 25 regional forces (supplemented by a further national force). By contrast, the prosecution office is divided into 19 offices (arrondisementsparketten).
reports. In effect, although the governance ‘triangle’ should formally take the lead in crime policy issues, the actual political power was in the hands of the Security House committee. This led to the auditing commission’s conclusion that Eindhoven suffered from a ‘disabled triangle’ as a result of a ‘burgomaster who shares his core responsibilities with an alderman’, a ‘very weak position of the public prosecution service’ and a ‘divided police force’ (Fijnaut et al. 2008: 29). Local security policies appeared to float free from any vertically-organized anchoring mechanism that might hold the ‘family’ (Johnston 2007) of agents and agencies together.

As a consequence, in the view of the commission, the governance and enforcement of public order was ‘out of hand’. An illuminating example is the management of Eindhoven’s night-time economy, the Stratumseind area in particular. This street contains 56 pubs and bars located within only 400 meters. It attracts some 40,000 visitors every weekend (starting at Thursday evening) creating a ‘social pressure cooker’ of potential violence and disorder. Given the nature of the security challenges, such an urban node deserves a thoroughly governed, security system composed of public and private organizations, including, among others, the police and judicial apparatus, city supervisors, prevention teams, and social workers. In its absence, however, the notion of a ‘disintegrated safety policy’ might better describe the state of affairs in Stratumseind (and elsewhere). There were a lot of initiatives and projects, with hardly any streamlining and coordination. The commission therefore recommended reinstituting a ‘vigorous triangle to set ambitious but realistic security policies’; the police, prosecution service and municipality should aspire to reaffirm their command and control over Eindhoven’s poorly organized and managed local security networks. The Security House, in this vein, was to be subordinated to the governance triangle, as it constitutes little more than an executive office.

Whether recommendations will have the intended effect of lowering crime rates or not, the Eindhoven case illustrates how state agencies still need to fulfil an effective and democratically legitimated anchoring function. In this respect, Eindhoven is an atypical case as governance triangles (involving local authorities, police forces and judicial services) seem to function quite well in the Netherlands. The Commission’s recommendation to organize a clearer division of labour and coordination was welcomed as a means to take control over local organizational networks in Eindhoven.

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6 This ‘most crowded drinking street of the Netherlands’ was a shopping street twenty years ago, indicating a booming emergence of the ‘night time economy’. 
After all, in the field of security, the police, in close consultation with the municipality and criminal justice system, remain the *ultimum remedium* when all else fail. They are the ultimate symbolic power that ‘brings to mind (and stomach) sensations of order, authority and protection’ (Loader 1997: 8), sensations which are prerequisites for the regulation of nodal partnerships, the confirmation of legitimacy and commitment, the mobilization of ‘third parties’ and the democratic participation of direct stakeholders. The challenge is to set up local security policies and networks more systematically.

What we intend here is to discuss how such configuration of public and private spheres can be depicted or might be imagined. Ideally, as Braithwaite (1997; 2002) sets out, governance arrangements function as a sort of incremental ‘regulatory pyramid’ with at the base numerous preventative bodies (welfare work, addiction service, youth care, health care) and fewer repressive and punishing institutions (police, criminal justice) higher upwards. He is describing this pyramid as a hierarchy of regulatory tools for inducing compliance – ranging through persuasion, inducements or incentives, and sanctions. We now imply that a series of institutions and professionals use different sets of foregoing tools in their roles as, for example, police officer, youth mentor and social worker. To translate this idea into a governance framework, we will present a ‘team play’ metaphor that stresses the highly dynamic environment in which security governance takes place. In so doing, we focus on the organizational assemblages associated with the steering of public-private networks, ultimately having the credible capacity of escalation to formal criminal law when dialogue and cooperation fall short.

**Directed governance**

One of the central areas in contemporary criminology is how to think practically of a ‘virtuous state’, facing the task of anchoring and governing nodal security provision. Against the background of Eindhoven’s Security House, we present a strategy of directed (self-)governance. Within this strategy, it is crucial to keep in mind that penal law serves as a last resort in reaction to crime and disorder. In the criminal justice response, the sense of right and wrong is confirmed, while the hope of improvement is kept alive. Under present-day circumstances, criminal justice increasingly derives its credibility from its normative position against the background of a declining instrumental function. At the moment that markets and communities occupy a growing proportion of security governance, the position of judicial apparatus has to be carefully stipulated against other actors in the policy field (Boutellier 2004). In addition to
guaranteeing a satisfying level of security, criminal justice holds a vital interest in legal equality and legal protection. It has to set adequate normative guidelines for mastering democratically anchored security policies at the local level.

The emergence of networked governance has had a great impact on the context and functioning of criminal justice institutions. Today’s criminal justice system operates from an angle of expedience. It intervenes at places where and moments when a line has to be drawn. This trend is not automatically restricted to supervision and order maintenance activities as criminal law has opened up beyond the conventional realm of police and judicial actors. Education, youth care and subsequent welfare organizations also realize that the demand for protection is of growing relevance to their own work, whereas the police and judicial authorities increasingly define themselves in terms of social objectives that are broader than maintaining public order and enforcing the law.

As the Security House example demonstrates, the different bodies try to make a move to more focused activities as necessitated by problem-oriented approaches. Visualizing these developments, the governance of security can be thought of as a team (for example, a football team) working outwards in functional lines (Figure 1).

The public prosecutor, like a goalkeeper, stands at the deepest end of the field receiving loads of balls (i.e. criminal cases) directed towards him. However, for reasons of overload, the keeper tries to combine forces with a line of ‘risk-managing institutions’ – institutions of which security is a defining element (in a third line, from the front) – putting the police in a leading position. Connections between the police and private actors (such as contracted security guards, city supervisors and bouncers) can be bolstered for both reinforcing and preventive purposes. At the same time, ‘civic institutions’ – institutions of which security is a secondary element relative to their socializing function – consisting of for example youth care, community work, education and addiction services surround the ‘risk-managing’ institutions mentioned before (constituting a second line). These institutions have a pedagogic objective in guiding moral consciousness among people, for example through the deployment of ‘contracts’ and ‘agreements’ (Crawford 2003b) in the regulation of anti-social behaviour. Their core tasks are to support and assist people, instil ethics and correct deviancy. The forefront players, finally, are everyday citizens and their social activities (constituting
the front line). It is at this crossroad of informal relationship where the government may facilitate civic engagement by reinforcing the ‘social web’ since face-to-face contacts are arguably much more effective in correcting intolerable behaviour than the hoax of surveillance cameras, security staff and police officers population our cities. Within the theory of ‘anchored pluralism’, state agencies bear a crucial role in facilitating – in ‘backing’ and ‘coaching’ to use the team play metaphor – the various levels of governance. Explicitly the police are in a unique position to play the ‘libero role’ (Boutellier 2005) – free floating – and serve society with preventative practices as well as repressive interferences. Their objective is to strike an optimal balance between firm but fair and restrained action – a practice Kinsey et al. (1986) describe as ‘minimal policing’.

Research agenda

Like in many governance debates (most notably those surrounding ‘nodal’ and ‘anchored’ positions), the descriptive and normative elements in our team play metaphor are not always easy to disentangle (Crawford 2006a). By articulating principles of order within a contradictory and contested setting (i.e., thinking of security governance in terms of functional lines), we inevitably move back and forth between empirical findings one the one and diagnostic recommendations on the other hand. Nonetheless, the directed governance model outlined above offers a starting point for systematically describing, analyzing and evaluating the highly dynamic, contradictory and volatile nature of nodal security arrangements. The Eindhoven case only serves as an illustration of the need for state regulation in the management of networked assemblages – an illustration that calls for more in-depth research. In order to do so, exhaustive data needs to be gathered on the following themes. First, we should address a comprehensive ‘mapping’ (Dupont 2006) of auspices and providers operating together in security networks. Who are the actors that participate in divergent networks, where do they concentrate, what do they do, and how to they relate to one another? In answering the foregoing questions, classification might usefully focus around the lines of risk-managing institutions, civic institutions and social bonds of citizenship. A second and related point is to provide an overview of communications involved in developing, activating and maintaining security networkers. Whom is communicating with whom, how frequent are contacts and what is the nature of relationships? Are
contacts informal (‘old boys’ networks’) or formal (official meetings, including agendas and minutes)?

Third, the analysis should cover the strategies, technologies, mentalities and practices existing in networked security governance (Stenning in Johnston and Shearing 2003: 22-30; Wood 2006; Wood and Shearing 2007; Button 2008). What are the purposes of actors, what are their deeper considerations and how do they ‘problematize’ the things which they are supposed to do? Who is designing and implementing policies and who is executing them? What are the physical tools (e.g., weapons, surveillance devices), legal tools (e.g., powers to fine or arrest), symbolic tools (e.g., public respect, authority and legitimacy) and personal tools (e.g., education, training, physique or charisma) actors have? (Stenning 2000) How is a security network really being shaped, sustained and governed? Is there an overriding climate governing a network or is everything achieved through conflict-mediation and consensus-building?

The key question, then, is whether partners are central to coordinating and directing organizational networks. Who is steering at the local level? Whilst there may not exist a monopoly on coercive force in South Africa, the country Shearing comes from, it goes much too far to say that in an European (Dutch) setting ‘there are literally no functions performed by the public police […] that are not also performed by non-state agencies – sometimes with state support and other times contrary to the state’ (Singh and Kempa 2007: 303). Public authorities – the police, public prosecution services and municipalities in particular – continue to serve an explicitly symbolic and leading function in the Netherlands. A final point is the democratic prospect of networked governance (Bogason and Musso 2006; Stenning 2009). The upcoming of local organizational networks, predominantly security networks, can pose promises as well as threats to accountability mechanisms, the meeting of public interests and preferences, and other democratic principles. Although networks come with opportunities of deliberation, improved flexibility and enhanced effectiveness, we must not turn a blind eye to perils regarding transparency, equality and (human) rights.

At this point, Crawford (2006a: 469) warns us that ‘the notion of a regulatory pyramid does not address the problem of the shifting sands that lie beneath it and the capacity of the pyramid to sink deeper into its social foundations; intensifying the extent of regulation, lowering the threshold of intervention over behaviour and conduct and the formalization of previous informal responses’. Indeed, security driven-policy may have a troublesome flipside of ‘defining deviance up’ (Krauthammer 1993; Van Swaanningen
Conclusion

Contemporary security policies have propelled in contradictory directions, where alongside the traditional police and criminal apparatus, a plethora of supplementary public as well as private experts have mushroomed in the Netherlands. Unlike what Shearing (2005; 2006; 2007) and his fellow theorists propose, the emergence of such agents and agencies does not imply that the state has lost its priority in the governance of security. Though the state is not always benign (as government bodies have their own professional interests to serve) and sometimes struggles with solving local problems given its remoteness, lack of specific knowledge and limited capacity, markets and communities are still too precarious to take on responsibilities alone. It is only the state that holds the unique position to set binding guidelines so that democratic governance can be guaranteed at the local level. Security policies, as Loader and Walker (2007) stipulate, need to be secured.

Empirically illustrating Loader and Walker’s approach, we commented on how security policies in the Dutch city of Eindhoven have evolved over recent years. These comments are not based on scientific research, but on a recently released auditing commission report. Notwithstanding, we think the situation sketched is relevant for academic debates about the governance of security as outlined above. It shows that if a ‘vertical’ superstructure – in the Netherlands, a triangle of police, municipal and judicial officials – is lacking, submerged security networks of risk-managing and civic organizations start to collapse. A state-based meta-authority is paramount for setting
and determining policy agendas, and governing the direction and implementation of policies. Democratically anchored safety policies presume political primacy as a *conditio sine qua non* for widespread commitment.

We imagined the ordering of local security networks in terms of directed governance. In this model, criminal justice is the last anchoring point for good standing between citizens and the potentially threatening world surrounding them (Loader 1997). Penal laws, on the one hand, confirm the legal standard and, on the other hand, promote the development of local safety. Good synergy between the criminal justice service and the police, in turn, can help to reinforce community work. Proper state backup and assistance stimulates welfare organizations, youth care services and institutions in the field of education to regain space to conduct their normative tasks. Here, the moral consciousness among people can be strengthened (though not superimposed). This, for example, means facilitating volunteer work, advising parents and upbringing children so that the social fabric of civil society keeps running; security problems, after all, start and end with people themselves. Perceived as such, as Skinns (2008: 318) notes, a prominent role of the state is paramount ‘because it retains a sense that security is a public good, rather than it being a private good to be purchased by those who can afford it or a matter to be resolved in a fractious manner as a result of parochialism, the exclusion of dissenting voices or those unable to shout the loudest’. Although absolute sovereign state power over crime control policies is an (authoritarian) myth (Garland 1996), undirected nodal governance is destined for confusion and malfunction.

**References**


Figure 1: Directed Governance Model

Citizens

Civic Institutions

Risk-Managing Institutions

Criminal Justice