Operations Research seminar

Operations Research seminar

Centrality rewarding Shapley and Myerson values for undirected graph games  

Anna Khmelnitskaya, Saint-Petersburg State University

Abstract:

We introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. In cooperative games without restrictions on cooperation the classical Shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition among the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, however it does not take into account the role of the players when communication between the players is restricted. Existing values for communication graph games such as the Myerson value and the average tree solution only consider the worths of connected coalitions and only in this way they respect the communication restrictions. They do not take into account the position of a player in the graph, which implies that in the unanimity game on the grand coalition all players are treated equally when the graph is connected, and so, the players with more central position in the graph get the same payoff, as players which are not central. The two new values take into account the position of a player in the graph in a sense that in unanimity games players that do not generate worth but are needed to connect worth generating players are treated similar to the latter players, and in the unanimity game on the grand coalition they assign larger shares to more central in the graph players. For both newly introduced values we provide axiomatic characterization on the class of connected cycle-free graph games.

Joint work with Gerard van der Laan (VU University Amsterdam) and Dolf Talman (Tilburg University).