Corine Laan, UT-EWI-SOR
Security forces are often deployed to protect networks that are threatened by multiple intruders. To select the best deployment strategy, we create and analyze an interdiction game that considers multiple simultaneous threats. To this end, we consider a queueing network with negative customers. Intruders route through the network as regular customers, while interdictors arrive at specific nodes as negative customers. When an interdictor arrives at a node in which an intruder is present, the intruder is removed from the network. Intruders and interdictors compete over the value of this network, which is the throughput of the intruders that are not intercepted by interdictors. Intruders attempt to maximize this throughput by deciding on their route through the network, while the interdictors aim to minimize the throughput by deciding on their arrival rate at each node. We analyze this game and characterize optimal strategies. For special cases, we obtain explicit formulas to evaluate these optimal strategies.