

## **Constitutional Politics in the European Union**

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The development of the European Union entered into a new phase with the establishment of the constitutional convention in 2002. Previous treaty reforms were dominated by intergovernmental conferences and surrounded by secrecy. In contrast, the Convention on the Future of Europe was holding public debates and consisted of a majority of parliamentarians. Thus, the Convention provided a unique opportunity to study the institutional preferences of political actors in the European Union.

Using data on the delegates' reform positions and saliencies, we were able to investigate whether discussions were characterized by conflicts between representatives from small and larger countries, new and old member states, or with a parliamentarian, governmental or supranational background. The data set used covers 85 per cent of the positions of full members of the Convention on 23 key issues. Our analysis shows that reform preferences differ between delegates from member states and accession countries, smaller and larger countries, and for delegates from different institutions. The cleavages are particularly relevant for institutional topics such as the reform of the Council.

For more details consult:

König, Thomas, Warntjen, Andreas and Simone Burkhart  
The European Convention: Consensus without Unity?  
In: König/Hug. Policy-Making Processes and the European Constitution  
London, Routledge, 2006