Partisanship, candidate evaluations, and prospective voting

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Abstract

This article argues that in Europe partisanship is best conceptualised in terms of evaluation instead of identification. This follows in part from the fact that the position of partisanship in the funnel of causality differs between parliamentary and presidential systems. Moreover, the conceptualisation proposed (on the basis of the social-psychological notion of attitudes) overcomes various problems associated with the party identification concept. Empirical analyses of four Dutch parliamentary elections indicate that partisanship can then be distinguished meaningfully from vote choice. Although most voters cast a sincere vote, each year discrepancies between party preferences and vote choice were observed. These could be partly accounted for by the impact of candidate evaluations and prospective considerations concerning the future government.

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1. Introduction

Since the Michigan scholars introduced the concept of party identification (Belknap and Campbell, 1952; Campbell et al., 1954, 1960), partisanship has been
central in electoral research. Some have argued that the party identification concept cannot be exported to the European context, or that at least its meaning differs substantially (Shively, 1972; Thomassen, 1976). This paper defends the position that in Europe, too, partisanship should be central in any model of voting. It shares the view of the Michigan scholars that to understand why people vote as they do we need to understand what goes on in their mind, and that voters' feelings towards political parties are of paramount importance. What distinguishes this paper from their work is its focus on the European institutional context. The seminal Michigan studies were directed at modelling electoral choice in a two-party presidential system. In Europe multi-party parliamentary systems are the rule (Lijphart, 1999). This paper discusses the implications in terms of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of partisanship, how the impact of partisanship on vote choice has to be modelled, and which additional concepts need to be included in a model of voting.

2. Conceptualisation of partisanship

2.1. Partisanship in the United States and Europe

The Michigan scholars regarded voters' feelings towards the Democratic and Republican Party as the key to understanding the stability in the outcome of various consecutive US presidential elections. Those feelings were conceptualised in terms of party identification, which was supposed to indicate how strongly voters identify with either party. Direction and intensity of partisanship were jointly represented by a seven-point scale, ranging from strong Democrats to strong Republicans, which was constructed on the basis of three well-known questions.1

Party identification is still considered a key concept in electoral research (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Green et al., 2002), but the concept and measure have received substantial criticism (for a review, refer to Weisberg, 1999). In the vast amount of literature on partisanship a number of recurring themes can be identified, such as the ‘dimensionality’ of partisanship (Weisberg, 1980; Greene, 1999), the supposed stability of party identification (Fiorina, 1981), the impact of party identification on vote choice (Nie et al., 1976; Miller, 1991; Bartels, 2000; Fiorina, 2002), the impact of negative feelings (Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Richardson, 1991), and question wording (Weisberg, 1999).

These topics have also received attention in European electoral research, which has resulted in doubt about the usefulness of the party identification concept in that context. A one-dimensional view of partisanship is by definition problematic in multi-party systems, which are common in Europe. Therefore, a distinction has usually been made between direction of identification and intensity of identification,

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1 These questions are: ‘Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?’; ‘Would you call yourself a strong Republican (or Democrat) or a not very strong Republican (or Democrat)?’; and ‘Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?’. 
thus abandoning the one-dimensional view (Thomassen, 1976; Katz, 1979). Furthermore, Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) found that in the Netherlands voters frequently identified with more than one party, which clearly is at odds with a one-dimensional view of partisanship. Stability of party identification has also been debated. In Europe, party identification appeared less stable than in the United States (LeDuc, 1981; Holmberg, 1994). In the Netherlands and Germany party identification appeared even less stable than vote choice (Thomassen, 1976; Richardson, 1991). The main reason why party identification has been regarded not useful in the European context, however, lies in its relationship with vote choice. This was so strong, that it was doubted whether party identification could be distinguished meaningfully from vote choice; they ‘travelled together’ and were thus regarded ‘too close for comfort’ (Holmberg, 1994).

There are two related themes that have perhaps not received as much attention as those listed above, but which are vitally important: the conceptualisation of party identification in relation to underlying psychological theory, and the theoretical function of the concept.

2.2. Identification versus evaluation

Campbell et al. (1960: 121) stated that the party identification concept was based on reference group theory and small group studies. The idea that partisanship has to be conceived of in terms of group belonging, analogous to religious and other forms of social identity, is central in various treatments of the concept (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Green et al., 2002). Greene (1999), for example, linked party identification explicitly to social identity theory. In this view, political parties are groups to which voters may belong, and for whom this group belonging may be more or less central to their self-concept. If one views partisanship as identification, this should be reflected in the measures used. The traditional ‘root question’ appears to concern the self-concept and can well be linked to the idea of identification. However, it is difficult to argue the same with respect to the follow-up question asked to Independents (Miller, 1991). Whether measures of partisanship used in European electoral research concern identification, may in various cases be doubted (see Holmberg, 1994; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Weisberg, 1999).

Partisanship may also be conceived of in terms of another social psychological concept: attitudes (Greene, 2002). Although disagreements on the definition of attitudes have continually existed (McGuire, 1985: 239–240), some common element can be recognised in definitions proposed by leading scholars. The concept as introduced originally (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1958[1918]: 22–23) was not very psychological, but it was in the 1930s, when attitudes became viewed as an individual’s readiness to respond favourably or unfavourably towards a particular object (Allport, 1935: 804–810; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975: 6). Rosenberg and Hovland (1960: 5) argued that such responses fall in three categories: affective, cognitive, and behavioural. They furthermore concluded that for most researchers ‘evaluation of the affective component has been central’. This was confirmed by other scholars (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975: 11–13; Petty and Cacioppo, 1996: 7). The notions of
‘evaluation’ and ‘affect’ have since been regarded synonymous, or at least have been treated as such (see Rosenberg and Hovland, 1960: 5; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975: 11). In the 1980s and 1990s the notion of evaluation is arguably the most central element in definitions of attitudes (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986: 25; Fazio, 1990: 81). Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993: 1) authoritative definition speaks about ‘a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor’. The fact that in later definitions the notion of affect is not explicitly included does not reflect a change in conceptualisation, but results from the fact that today this term is mostly reserved for moods and emotions (Ajzen, 2001: 29).

Whereas in American electoral research feelings towards parties have usually been conceptualised and operationalised in terms of identification, feelings towards candidates have in terms of evaluation. This can be seen clearly in the common terminology of party identification and candidate evaluation. The idea that candidate evaluations are affective phenomena is reflected in their measurements. The widely used ‘feeling thermometer’ asks respondents to rate individual candidates in terms of a ‘warm or favorable feeling’ or ‘cold or unfavorable feeling’. Feelings towards parties may be conceptualised in the same way as feelings towards candidates: in terms of (affective) evaluations of the individual parties. The feeling thermometer may then be considered preferable for operationalising partisanship.

2.3. Theoretical function of the concept

Partisanship may be conceptualised in terms of identification as well as evaluation. Which conceptualisation one prefers will depend on how one views political parties (as groups to which voters may belong, or as organisations that voters may like or dislike), as well as on the theoretical function of partisanship. When party identification was introduced by Belknap and Campbell (1952), its function was to explain voters’ opinions on issues of foreign policy. The authors posited that voters adopt opinions advocated by the groups they identify with, in particular the political party they feel attached to. In The Voter Decides (1954) the function of the concept was a different one, namely to explain voting behaviour. Party identification was considered one of three forces (in addition to candidate orientation and issue orientation) that direct voters towards either a Republican or a Democratic vote. In The American Voter (1960) party identification was no longer seen as a direct determinant of vote choice, but as a relatively stable long-term factor that influences short-term factors upon which vote choices are based. This was specified in terms of the ‘funnel of causality’. Voting behaviour was seen as a direct consequence of attitudes towards candidates, policies, and group benefits. These attitudes are largely influenced by voters’ party identification, which in turn is determined by social characteristics, which are located in the mouth of the funnel. Hence, the theoretical function of party identification was to explain particular attitudes and to explain how social characteristics influence vote choice. Furthermore, the concept also served to explain the stability in vote choice across elections, at the individual as well as the aggregate level (Converse, 1966). Given these facts, it is no surprise that partisanship was conceptualised in terms of identification rather than evaluation.
In European electoral research the function of partisanship has been different, which follows from the institutional context. In parliamentary elections the competition is not primarily between candidates, but between parties. Voters' feelings towards those parties may then be hypothesised to be a direct determinant of vote choice. This means that in Europe partisanship has a different function than in Belknap and Campbell's (1952) article and in *The American Voter*. An important implication is that the appropriate analogy is not that between feelings of European voters towards parties and feelings of American voters towards *parties*, but between feelings of European voters towards parties and feelings of American voters towards *candidates*. These are the direct determinants of vote choice. Applying an American model of voting to Europe then implies that partisanship should be conceptualised and operationalised in the same way as in the United States feelings towards candidates have been: in terms of evaluation (Markus and Converse, 1979; Rahn et al., 1990). An additional advantage is that this overcomes various problems associated with the party identification concept (multiple partisanship, impact of negative feelings).

3. Modelling vote choice

3.1. The sincere vote model

If partisanship is conceptualised as proposed above—in terms of evaluations, in line with the social-psychological notion of attitudes—voting may be regarded as the end result of a two-stage process. The first stage is that of the formation and change of party evaluations. This stage could be viewed as one of continuous information-processing on the basis of which voters update their evaluations. Such a view is in line with the idea that partisanship operates as a running tally (Fiorina, 1981), with the on-line model of candidate evaluations (Lodge et al., 1989), and with social-psychological models of attitude change (Petty and Wegener, 1999; Chen and Chaiken, 1999). The second stage, which has vote choice as dependent variable and party evaluations as independent variables, may be viewed as a process of decision-making.

This paper proposes to model the second stage in terms of two models. One concerns the impact of partisanship on voting behaviour and is referred to as the sincere vote model (Fig. 1). This model is based on the idea that it is essential to distinguish between four concepts: party evaluations, party preferences, voting intentions, and voting behaviour (Rosema, 2004). The plea to distinguish between these concepts is based on a number of observations derived from research on attitude—behaviour models (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).

The phenomenon to be explained is voting behaviour, a vote cast by a certain individual in a specific election for (a candidate of) a particular party. Hence, the model defines electoral choice in terms of parties voted for. The single most important concept to explain voting behaviour, according to the model, is that of party evaluations. To specify how these determine voting behaviour, two additional concepts are included: party preferences and voting intentions. What matters is
which party is evaluated most positively. This is captured by the notion of a party preference. By comparing voters’ party evaluations, their party preferences can be determined. The party preference corresponds with the party (or parties) that a voter evaluates most positively. So, voters are said to prefer a party if they like it better than any other. Party evaluations and party preferences also exist outside the electoral context. The distinction made between evaluations and preferences builds on the idea that the impact of attitudes on behaviour should be analysed on the basis of a so-called within-subject analysis (Davidson and Morrison, 1983).

When voters are faced with an election, they form a voting intention in accordance with their party preference. A voting intention concerns the plan to vote for (a candidate of) a particular party in a specific upcoming election. Voting intentions are election-specific phenomena. The distinction between party preferences and voting intentions builds on the distinction made in attitude—behaviour research between attitudes towards objects and attitudes towards behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977, 1980), and that made in neuroscience between the emotion system and the motivational system (LeDoux, 2002: 237). At what moment voters decide, and thus form a voting intention, may vary across them. Some may decide long in advance, whereas others may not know for whom to vote until they stand in the polling booth. When voters cast their vote, the only thing they do is transform the existing voting intention into voting behaviour. At that moment, voters do not have to weigh all kinds of information about the parties. Instead, they only have to recall for which party they intended to vote and vote accordingly. The resulting
expectation that voters will vote for the party they evaluate most positively, may be referred to as the *sincere vote hypothesis*.\(^2\)

Some additional remarks need to be made. First, a distinction can be made between single and multiple party preferences. If voters evaluate one party more positively than all others, we speak of a single party preference. If voters evaluate two or more parties most positively, we speak of a multiple party preference. Whether voters have a single or multiple party preference has an important implication for the explanatory power of the model: it only results in a unique prediction concerning voting intentions (and voting behaviour) for voters with a single party preference.

Second, a distinction can be made between direction and strength of party preferences. The directional component concerns the question *which* party is evaluated most positively, whereas the strength component concerns the question *how much* this party is evaluated more positively than other parties. This paper defines the strength of the party preference as the degree to which the best-liked party is evaluated more positively than the second-best liked party.\(^3\)

Third, variables that are not specified in the model (exogenous variables) are assumed to influence voting behaviour primarily through their impact on party evaluations. In some cases, however, such variables may surpass the impact of party evaluations and thus influence voting intentions or voting behaviour directly. The notion of a strategic vote, which may be defined as a vote for a party that is not liked best motivated by the desire of a particular outcome at the aggregate level, provides a clear example. But voters may also have other reasons to vote for a non-preferred party. For example, they may decide on the basis of their evaluations of the candidates. This means that a vote that is not sincere, need not be strategic. In the following the opposite of a sincere vote is therefore referred to as an ‘insincere vote’. In a similar way one can distinguish between a sincere and insincere voting intention. Note that the notions sincere and insincere are used merely as analytical constructs and do not involve any moral judgement.

Fourth, and finally, party evaluations, party preferences, and voting intentions may change across time. This implies that voting intentions, once established, are not fixed. During the campaign voters may reconsider their voting intention and change it. The model suggests that this can be expected if, due to changes in party evaluations, voters’ party preferences change. Consequently, if voting intentions are measured some time before the election, discrepancies may occur in the voting intention—voting behaviour relationship.

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\(^2\) A vote is defined as ‘sincere’ if it is cast for the choice option that is evaluated most positively (i.e. the preferred choice option); choice options are defined in this paper in terms of parties.

\(^3\) Other possibilities would be to use the evaluation score of the best-liked party, to compare that evaluation score to the evaluation score awarded to the least-liked party, or to compare it to the average evaluation score of all other parties.
3.2. A heuristic model of voting

The sincere vote model suggests that two main tasks of electoral researchers are to examine the relationships between party evaluations, party preferences, voting intentions, and voting behaviour, and to explain insincere voting. Why voters may vote insincerely can be clarified by focusing on the alternative choice mechanisms they may employ (Rosema, 2004). This paper addresses this matter in terms of a model that combines four.

The view presented is based on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that people’s information-processing ability and willingness is limited. Consequently, when individuals make a judgement, they rely on a limited amount of information and use simple judgement rules, or short cuts (Kahneman et al., 1982; Popkin, 1991). Voters do not weigh all pros and cons involved in their choice, but rely on simple decision rules, or heuristics (Sniderman et al., 1991; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). The second assumption concerns the number of heuristics. Models of voting usually assume that all voters make up their mind in the same way and consequently fit one single causal structure. An alternative view would be that voters may decide in several ways. We could refer to this idea as the assumption of causal heterogeneity (Rivers, 1988; Sniderman et al., 1991). According to the resulting perspective, voters may decide for whom to vote by using several heuristics, and different voters may use different ones. Note that the sincere vote model matches the first assumption—the choice mechanism involved fits the notion of heuristics—but not the second assumption: the sincere vote model includes only one decision rule.

On the basis of attitude—behaviour research and studies of voting at least four heuristics can be identified. In the first heuristic, voters’ evaluations of the incumbent government are the key to their choice. The corresponding decision rule is simple: if voters are satisfied with the performance of the government, they vote for them; if they are dissatisfied, they support the opposition. This choice mechanism may be referred to as the incumbent approval heuristic. It is related to the notions of reward and punishment (Key, 1966) and retrospective voting (Fiorina, 1981), and links up with the accountability function of elections (Powell, 2000). If the government consists of a coalition of parties, the heuristic cannot be applied as easily as otherwise, but voters may still use it. They may credit (or blame) one particular party, or may use the heuristic to eliminate one or more parties from the choice set (Tversky, 1972).

In the second heuristic, the relevant evaluations are those of the competing parties. This choice mechanism may be referred to as the party preference heuristic. It implies that voters do not think in terms of accountability (or reward and punishment), but simply vote for the party they like best. This heuristic is closely related to the sincere vote hypothesis, and most models of voting assume—explicitly or implicitly—that voters decide in this way.

Although elections in Europe are presumably more about parties than candidates, voters’ feelings about the latter may also play a role. Candidate evaluations may

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4 A third task, which goes beyond the scope of this paper, involves explaining party evaluations.
influence vote choice in two ways: directly and indirectly (King, 2002). In the latter case, candidate evaluations have an impact on party evaluations (or incumbent approval), and affect voters’ choices through those evaluations. In that case candidate evaluations do not enter the choice mechanism. Another possibility is that voters decide on the basis of their evaluations of the candidates—either local candidates or party leaders. The corresponding choice mechanism, according to which voters choose (the party of) the candidate they like best, may be referred to as the candidate preference heuristic.

According to the fourth heuristic, the evaluations upon which voters base their choice are not those of particular ‘objects’ (governments, parties, or candidates), but those of particular ‘prospects’ concerning the outcome of the election. The heuristic builds on the idea that decision-making is goal-oriented and that behaviour is instrumental. It assumes that voters think about what the effect of their behaviour might be, at the aggregate level, and decide on the basis of their evaluations of those prospects. This choice mechanism may be referred to as the election outcome preference heuristic. It is related to the notion of prospective voting, and links up with the mandate function of elections (Powell, 2000). It is also closely related to attitude—behaviour models that focus on consequences of the behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), expected utility models of decision-making (Hastie, 2001), and neuroscience research on emotions and decision-making (Damasio, 1994: 167).

Prospects upon which voters may base their choice, can take various forms. First, voters may prefer the prospect of a government by one particular party and therefore vote for that party. In multi-party systems voters may think that to bring about their favourite government coalition, they best vote for a particular party. Another possibility is that voters cast their vote as if the central question is who becomes prime minister. Voters may also focus on the outcome of the election in terms of the number of seats a party gets, as whether a party becomes largest or not, or as whether a party passes the electoral threshold. Furthermore, election outcomes may also be defined in terms of policies, although presumably policy preferences usually affect vote choices only indirectly (through evaluations of parties, candidates, and governments). Finally, voters may also focus on the outcome of an election at the constituency level in terms of the local candidate who gets elected. In each instance, voters may also base their choice on aversions of particular outcomes.

How prospect evaluations, incumbent approval (or government evaluation), party evaluations, and candidate evaluations can be fit into a single model, is shown in Fig. 2. The model, which is referred to as a heuristic model of voting, states that a vote choice may originate in any of the four phenomena distinguished. This fits the principle of causal heterogeneity. Additionally, the model states that evaluations of governments, parties, and candidates may influence vote choice indirectly, namely through their impact on prospect evaluations.

Various phenomena that have often been used to explain vote choice are not included in the model. This does not mean that they are unimportant or need not be studied. What it means, is that they are not supposed to influence vote choice directly. Any influence of such phenomena on vote choice is assumed to be mediated
by the concepts in the model. Therefore, they are not included and referred to as exogenous variables.

The heuristic model of voting is related to the sincere vote model in a number of ways. First, the heuristic model indicates that party evaluations may influence vote choice directly (through the use of the party preference heuristic), as well as indirectly (through their impact on prospect evaluations and the use of the election outcome preference heuristic). This view is in line with attitude—behaviour research in which it is assumed that attitudes sometimes result in certain behaviour without further deliberation, but in other instances through a more deliberate reasoning process (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Second, the heuristic model indicates what more there is to voting than simply expressing one’s party preference. Consequently, the heuristic model can be used to explain insincere voting. Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions may result if evaluations of governments, candidates, or prospects direct voters towards another party than the one they evaluate most positively. Finally, the sincere vote model indicates how the concepts in the heuristic model have to be focused on: evaluations in terms of resulting preferences, and vote choice in terms of intentions and behaviour.

4. An analysis of four Dutch parliamentary elections

The sincere vote model, as well as the explanations for insincere voting derived from the heuristic model, will be tested in the context of four Dutch parliamentary elections. These elections may be considered particularly interesting, because the Netherlands has been known for its special position with respect to partisanship (Thomassen, 1976; LeDuc, 1981; Holmberg, 1994; Miller and Shanks, 1996: 117). The fact that party identification could hardly be distinguished from vote choice is not
surprising, if one realises that coalition governments do not facilitate the use of the incumbent approval heuristic (Downs, 1957), proportional representation provides little incentive for strategic voting (Cox, 1997), and parties with long histories leave less room for candidate influence (King, 2002). These are precisely the characteristics of the Dutch political system (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002), which makes the Netherlands an excellent case for this study. If partisanship can be distinguished from vote choice there, this will boost our confidence that it can anywhere.

The following analyses are based on data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES). The years 1986, 1994, 1998, and 2002 have been selected for the simple reason that the corresponding surveys included party evaluation measures. The main part of the DPES consisted of two face-to-face interviews with a sample of more than 1000 voters. A first wave of interviews was held in the weeks preceding the election, while a second wave was held shortly after. Party evaluations, candidate evaluations, government satisfaction, coalition preferences, and voting intentions were assessed in the pre-election interview, actual voting behaviour in the post-election interview (for question wordings, see Appendix A).

4.1. A test of the sincere vote model

If the sincere vote model has empirical validity, we should find that voters' party evaluations form party preferences that predict fairly accurately their voting intentions, which in turn predict fairly accurately their actual voting behaviour. Consequently, we also expect that party evaluations predict voting behaviour fairly accurately, at least if focused on in terms of the party preferences they constitute. However, we do not expect the relationships between party preferences, voting intentions, and voting behaviour to be perfect, for the reasons outlined above. Furthermore, we expect the various relationships to be strongest among voters who have a relatively strong preference for a particular party.

When voters were interviewed before the election, virtually all could say how much they liked the major parties: with respect to the Christian Democrats (CDA), Labour Party (PvdA), Liberal Party (VVD), and List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) this figure varied between 95 and 99%. With respect to the other parties the figure varied between 63 and 98%. Consequently, for virtually all voters a measure concerning the direction of their party preference could be created. Additionally, a four-point scale has been constructed that indicates the strength of the party preference. Each

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5 The corresponding data files have been deposited at the Steinmetz Archive in Amsterdam, but can also be obtained from several other social science data archives. Documentation on the studies can be found in Van der Eijk et al. (1986), Anker and Oppenhuis (1994), Aarts et al. (1999), and Irwin et al. (2005). The analyses of 2002 are based on a preliminary data file, the documentation of which should become available soon too.

6 In the analyses evaluation scores have been rounded to multiples of ten, in order to facilitate comparisons across years. Due to differences in the format of the scale shown to respondents on a card, the number who made use of other values than multiples of ten differed substantially across the four surveys. The strength measure has been transformed into a four-point scale by collapsing all values of 30 and above.
year a majority of voters (between 63 and 79%) intended to vote and knew for whom.

The number of voters with a sincere voting intention, that is, voters who preferred to vote for the party they evaluated most positively, was high in each year (Table 1). Between 86 and 93% had voting intentions that were, as expected, in line with their party preferences. These findings provide fairly strong support for the hypothesis that voters form voting intentions in accordance with their party preferences. At the same time, however, the findings suggest that party preferences and voting intentions can be distinguished. After all, up to 14% of the voters preferred to vote for a party they did not like best.

Unsurprisingly, the chance of a sincere voting intention was largest among voters whose preference for their favourite party was strong. The fact that voters with a multiple party preference were not those least likely to have a sincere voting intention does not come unexpected either: the more parties voters like well, the larger the chance that they will prefer to vote for one of those parties.

According to the sincere vote model, voting intentions in turn determine voting behaviour. Figures concerning how strongly voting intentions and voting behaviour were related are rather stable (Table 2).7 In each election, about 85% of the voters cast their vote for the party they already preferred to vote for some time before the election, while about 15% apparently changed their mind and ultimately voted for another party than the one they initially intended to support. So, although some voters changed their mind, in general the voting intentions predicted voting behaviour fairly accurately. Hence, the findings provide fairly strong support for the hypothesis that on election day voters simply vote according to a previously formed voting intention. At the same time, they suggest that explaining voting behaviour on the basis of information collected in a pre-election interview is problematic for a substantial minority of voters; after all, at that time they still preferred to vote for another party than the one they ultimately supported. Again, strength of the party preference played the hypothesised role. Voters with strong preferences were most likely to stick to their intentions; voters with multiple party preferences were least likely to do so.

The findings presented so far concern voters who, when interviewed before the election, knew for whom they wanted to vote. Each year, however, approximately 25% of the voters were still undecided at that moment. For these voters the party preference-voting intention and voting intention-voting behaviour relationship could not be examined. For them another expectation can be formulated. We may expect that between the moment of interview and the moment they stood in the polling booth, these voters formed a voting intention in accordance with their party preferences, and on election day voted accordingly. Consequently, we expect them to have voted in accordance with their party preferences.

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7 The Ns differ between the various tables mainly due to panel mortality and missing data.
In each election, a majority of the undecided voters cast their vote in accordance with their party preference (Table 3). However, the number who did decreased from 81% in 1986 to 54% in 2002. So, while in the mid-1980s voting behaviour of undecided voters could be predicted fairly accurately on the basis of their party preferences, in the latest elections it could not. This implies that either these voters decided on the basis of considerations other than how much they liked the various parties, or they relatively often changed their party evaluations (and voted sincerely).

One may wonder to what extent voters who knew for whom to vote earlier voted in line with their party preferences, and consequently how well voting behaviour of the electorate as a whole could be explained on the basis of voters’ party evaluations. In other words, how strong is the support for the sincere vote model when it comes to explaining voting behaviour on the basis of party evaluations for the electorate as a whole? To answer that question, it is important to take into account whether voters had a single or multiple party preference.

Table 4 shows that the number of voters whose voting behaviour could be predicted correctly on the basis of their party preferences decreased from 68% in 1986 to 46% in 2002. Many other voters also voted sincerely (between 17 and 29%), but their choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Party preference strength and sincere voting intentions (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong party preference</td>
<td>98 (336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate party preference</td>
<td>95 (270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak party preference</td>
<td>86 (335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple party preference</td>
<td>91 (186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All voters (weighted mean)</td>
<td>93 (1127)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reading example: In 1986, of all voters with a strong party preference 98% had a sincere voting intention. The weighted mean, which indicates the number of all voters who had a sincere voting intention, equalled 93%. Note: Figures between parentheses indicate the number of observations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Party preference strength and voting behaviour as intended (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong party preference</td>
<td>93 (266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate party preference</td>
<td>90 (226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak party preference</td>
<td>86 (274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple party preference</td>
<td>73 (165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All voters (weighted mean)</td>
<td>87 (931)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reading example: In 1986, of all voters with a strong party preference 93% voted as they intended when interviewed before the election. The weighted mean, which indicates the number of all voters who voted as intended, equalled 87%. Note: Figures between parentheses indicate the number of observations.
could not be predicted accurately since they evaluated at least two parties equally positively. Finally, the number of voters who voted insincerely increased from 15% in 1986 to 26% in 2002. Hence, although overall the support for the sincere vote model is fairly strong, across the years its explanatory power declined.

4.2. Explaining insincere voting

On the basis of these findings two questions arise: why did some voters (intend to) vote for parties they did not evaluate most positively, and why did some voters change their mind about for whom to vote. The sincere vote model itself provides a possible explanation for the latter fact. During the campaign, voters may have processed information that made them evaluate one or more parties differently, which may have resulted in a change in their party preference, which in turn may have resulted in a change in their voting intention. Unfortunately, the DPES data are not well suited to test this hypothesis. The other question may be analysed on the basis of the heuristic model of voting. Perhaps voters who voted insincerely made use of another heuristic.

One factor that may account for discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions is voters’ feelings towards the candidates of the competing parties. In the Netherlands, the candidates of paramount importance are undoubtedly those heading the lists—the party leaders. Party leader evaluations may have ‘negative’ as well as ‘positive’ effects. On the negative side, voters may be repelled from their party preference by a negative evaluation of that party’s leader. On the positive side, voters may be attracted towards another party than their party preference by a positive evaluation of that other party’s leader. These effects can be examined on the basis of two measures concerning evaluation scores awarded to party leaders: one that indicates the evaluation of the leader of the preferred party, and one that indicates the evaluation of the best-liked leader of the non-preferred parties.

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8 A third question, which goes beyond the scope of this paper, concerns how voters with multiple party preferences choose between those parties.

9 It is worth noting that although the relationships between party leader evaluations and party evaluations are strong, they are not so strong that the evaluations cannot be distinguished (Irwin and Van Holsteyn, 1999).
Another factor that may have played a role is voters’ evaluation of the incumbent government. If voters decide on the basis of incumbent approval, this may explain insincere voting. This would imply that either voters evaluated a government party most positively, but did not prefer to vote for them because they were dissatisfied with the government; or they liked an opposition party best, but preferred to vote for a party of the government they were satisfied with. Whether this happened can be examined by distinguishing three groups of voters. By combining voters’ government satisfaction (satisfied or dissatisfied) and their party preference (government party or opposition party), four categories result. Two of these categories involve a ‘match’ between government satisfaction and party preferences, while the other two involve a ‘mismatch’. Voters who were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, as well as voters with a multiple party preference that included both a government party and an opposition party, jointly form a third group. Insincere voting may be hypothesised to occur relatively often among voters who belonged to the second group (this group comprised between 10 and 14% of the voters).

A final reason why voters might have preferred to vote for a party they did not like best, may be found in the impact of prospect evaluations. Arguably, in the Netherlands the most important prospective consideration concerns the government to be formed after the election. In the DPES voters were asked which parties they thought should participate in the new cabinet. What is interesting in particular, is that some voters (between 10 and 15%) mentioned solely parties that did not belong to their party preference. In 1986 and 1994 this could be the result of the question format, because voters were asked to choose between the four major parties. In 1998 and 2002, however, this methodological issue played no role and similar proportions of voters preferred a coalition that did not include the party they evaluated most positively. Apparently, when they think about what government should be formed after the election, some voters do not think of the parties they like best. It should be no surprise that this happened relatively often among voters who liked a small party best. If coalition preferences account for discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions, voters who mentioned only non-preferred parties are expected to show such discrepancies often.

The relative importance of each factor, as well as the degree to which they collectively explain insincere voting intentions, has been examined by performing logistic regression analyses. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether voters had a sincere or insincere voting intention. The impact of candidate evaluations is assessed on the basis of one measure that indicates the

### Table 4
Number of voters who voted sincerely and insincerely (%)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted sincerely (single party preference)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted sincerely (multiple party preference)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted insincerely</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(1192)</td>
<td>(1282)</td>
<td>(1596)</td>
<td>(1505)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
evaluation of the leader of the preferred party, and another measure that indicates the evaluation of the best-liked leader of the non-preferred parties. The impact of government satisfaction is examined on the basis of two dummy variables that indicate whether voters showed a ‘match’ or a ‘mismatch’ between government satisfaction and party preference. The impact of coalition preferences is examined on the basis of a dummy variable that indicates whether the coalition preference included the party preference (at least partly) or not. Additionally, two variables are included to control for possible effects of differences in evaluations of preferred parties and differences in the strength of party preferences.

The proportion of voters whose voting intention could be classified correctly (as either sincere or insincere) on the basis of the models varied between 86 and 93% (Table 5). These proportions may seem large, but one should take into account that similar numbers of voters had sincere voting intentions. Consequently, these figures are not very suitable to judge the explanatory power of the models. A more appropriate measure is the amount of explained variance (as indicated by Nagelkerke $R^2$). The value of this measure varied between 0.17 and 0.28, which means that the various phenomena collectively go a fairly long way in explaining insincere voting intentions.

At least equally interesting is whether, and how much, each phenomenon contributed to the explanation. Party leader evaluations had the hypothesised impact in three of the four years. In 1986 no significant effect was found, but this may be a methodological artefact resulting from the fact that voters were only asked to evaluate the leaders of the four major parties. Since 1994, party leader evaluations clearly had an impact. The better voters liked the leader of the preferred party, the smaller the chance on an insincere voting intention (indicated by the negative sign of the $b$-values); and the better voters liked a leader of the non-preferred parties, the larger the chance on an insincere voting intention. Government satisfaction, on the other hand, had no significant impact on insincere voting intentions. Apparently, reward and punishment of the incumbent government did not play a role, at least not in a way that surpassed the effect of the other factors. Finally, in each election coalition preferences influenced insincere voting intentions significantly. If voters’ coalition preference did not include their party preference, the chance of an insincere voting intention was considerably larger.

The final question is to what extent insincere voting intentions were in line with coalition preferences, party leader preferences, and incumbent approval. Table 6 shows that about nine out of ten insincere voting intentions can be understood from the perspective of at least one other heuristic. About a third of the insincere voting intentions could be understood from the perspective of only one heuristic. Mostly, this concerned the coalition preference heuristic. In the other cases either two or all three heuristics could have done the trick. In virtually each instance this included the coalition preference. Hence, on the whole the analyses provide strong support for the

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10 For voters with a multiple party preference the highest score awarded to any of the leaders of the preferred parties is used. For voters who did not evaluate the leader of the preferred party or the leaders of non-preferred parties, the mean evaluation score awarded to the corresponding leader in that survey has been used.
hypothesis that prospective considerations concerning the future government coalition are the primary reason why some voters preferred to vote insincerely. Incumbent approval and party leader preferences, on the other hand, played only a minor role.

5. Conclusions

The findings presented imply that partisanship can be distinguished meaningfully from vote choice, if it is conceptualised on the basis of the social-psychological concept of attitudes: in terms of evaluations of individual parties. The analyses on the basis of four Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies have shown that of all voters who had decided for whom to vote a couple of weeks before the election, up to about 15% preferred to vote for a party they did not like best. Among ‘undecided voters’ so-called ‘insincere voting’ was even more common. This means that although partisanship goes a long way in explaining vote choice, it does not go the whole way. This in turn suggests that the traditional measures of partisanship (which were related

Table 5
A multivariate model of insincere voting intentions (results of logistic regression analysis)

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect party leader evaluations</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation leader preferred party</td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$-0.006$</td>
<td>$-0.024$</td>
<td>$-0.024$</td>
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<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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<td>Evaluation leader non-preferred parties</td>
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<td>$0.005$</td>
<td>$0.048$</td>
<td>$0.019$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect government satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Match’ with party preference</td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$-0.46$</td>
<td>$-0.12$</td>
<td>$0.08$</td>
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<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Mismatch’ with party preference</td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$0.01$</td>
<td>$0.51$</td>
<td>$0.31$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Effect coalition preferences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Party preference not included</td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$2.78$</td>
<td>$1.89$</td>
<td>$1.81$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation of party preference</td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$-0.019$</td>
<td>$-0.041$</td>
<td>$0.007$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of party preference</td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$-0.016$</td>
<td>$-0.019$</td>
<td>$-0.019$</td>
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<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>$-1.09$</td>
<td>$-1.30$</td>
<td>$-2.31$</td>
<td>$-1.77$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Correct predictions (%)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance (Nagelkerke $R^2$)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($N$)</td>
<td>(1127)</td>
<td>(1091)</td>
<td>(1396)</td>
<td>(1426)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
to vote choice more strongly), might well be ‘contaminated’ by whom voters (intend to) vote for.

Prospective considerations as well as candidate evaluations accounted for some of the discrepancies found between the party (or parties) voters evaluated most positively and the party they preferred to vote for. Feelings towards party leaders had two effects: voters were more likely to prefer to vote insincerely if they liked the leader of their favourite party worse, as well as if they liked a leader of the non-preferred parties better. Preferences concerning the government coalition to be formed after the election, however, had the strongest impact. These were the primary reason why some voters preferred to vote insincerely. This means that contrary to the idea that ‘strategic voting fades out in multimember districts when the district magnitude gets above five’ (Cox, 1997: 122), strategic voting also occurs in multi-party systems with proportional representation and coalition governments.

A final important implication is that explaining voting behaviour on the basis of information about voters that is collected in a pre-election interview some weeks before an election is problematic. Not only had about 25% of the voters not yet made up their mind at that time; of those who had already decided, about 15% apparently changed their mind, since they voted for another party than the one they initially intended to vote for. A plausible explanation is that voters’ feelings towards at least some of the parties changed substantially in this period. The typical design of election surveys, which follows the seminal Michigan studies, is badly suited to examine such changes. This means that the Michigan approach is arguably in need of adjustment not only theoretically, but also methodologically.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in Edinburgh, Scotland, 28 March-2 April 2003. I am grateful to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition preference</th>
<th>Incumbent approval</th>
<th>Leader preference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>24 17 13 13 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
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<td>23 7 25 20 20</td>
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<tr>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1 1 2 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10 7 13 6 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Total (N)            |                    | 100 100 100 100 100 | (82) (87) (186) (204) (559)

Reading example: In 1986, of the 82 insincere voting intentions 24% was in line with voters’ coalition preference, incumbent approval, and party leader preference; 23% of the insincere voting intentions was in line with voters’ coalition preference and incumbent approval, but not with their party leader preference.
participants of the workshop on modelling electoral choice in Europe in the twenty-first century for their useful comments. Furthermore, I would like to thank Galen Irwin and Joop van Holsteyn, who encouraged me start the Ph.D. project upon which this paper is based and whose valuable comments on draft manuscripts have been highly appreciated.

Appendix A. Question wordings

Question wordings below are from the documentation of the 1998 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (Aarts et al., 1999). In other surveys similar questions were asked, although the wording sometimes differed slightly. For details refer to the official DPES documentation (see footnote 5).

A.1. Operationalisation of party evaluations

‘There are many political parties in our country. I would like to know from you how sympathetic you find these parties. You can give each party a score between 0 and 100. The more sympathetic you find a party, the higher the score you give. A score of 50 means that you find a party neither sympathetic nor unsympathetic. If you don’t know a party, please feel free to say so. First we take the Labour Party. Which score would you give the Labour Party?’

A.2. Operationalisation of candidate evaluations

‘I would also like to know how sympathetic you find the following politicians. If you don’t know a politician, please feel free to say so. First Wim Kok. Which score would you give him?’

A.3. Operationalisation of coalition preference

‘After the elections for the Second Chamber, a new cabinet must be formed. In the Netherlands, a cabinet is mostly formed by different parties. According to you which parties should be part of the next cabinet?” (If only one party mentioned:) ‘Are there perhaps parties which according to you should be part of this cabinet as well?’

(Note: in 1986 and 1994 voters could choose only from the four major parties.)

A.4. Operationalisation of government satisfaction

‘With the help of this card, could you indicate how satisfied you are in general with what the government has done during the past four years?’—‘very satisfied’, ‘satisfied’, ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’, ‘dissatisfied’, or ‘very dissatisfied’.
A.5. Operationalisation of voting intention

‘As you may know, elections for the Second Chamber will be held in May of this year. Do you intend to vote or not, or don’t you know yet?’ (If yes:) ‘Which party do you intend to vote for on May 6?’

A.6. Operationalisation of voting behaviour (post-election interview)

‘Did you vote in the parliamentary election on May 6?’ (If yes:) ‘Which party did you vote for?’

References


