

**UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.**

# **Objectives in European foreign aid**

A case study of France and Sweden

**Bachelor's Thesis**

Katja Hanny Müller (s0175188)  
European Studies

Supervisor: Dr. Shawn Donnelly

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## Table of Abbreviations

ADF	African Development Fund
AFD	Agence Française de Développement [French Development Agency]
CICID	Comité interministériel de la coopération internationale et du développement [Interministerial Committee of International Development Cooperation]
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
GNI	Gross national income
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MIC	Middle Income Countries
MOFA	French Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MS	Member states
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic co-operation and Development
SME	Small and medium enterprises
UN	United Nations
ZSP	Zone de solidarité prioritaire [Area of prioritized solidarity]

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# 1

## Introduction

*This chapter introduces the topic of development aid by providing a definition and giving practical as well as theoretical insights into development aid. It also presents the approach that this research will take to analysing the national objectives in development aid.*

## **1.1 Introduction**

The European Union (EU) is one of the most important actors in development cooperation both in terms of volume and in the number of partner countries. Together with the member states (MS), the Community provides sixty percent of the world-wide Official Development Assistance and more than two-thirds of total aid in the form of grants. Foreign aid is discussed extensively in the literature by scholars from various theoretical backgrounds (European Union, 2010). However, a vast majority of studies choose as unit of analysis one single recipient or a group of recipients such as the Mediterranean countries (Holden, 2008) or Sub-Saharan Africa (Carbone, 2008; Olsen, 2008; Sachs, et al., 2004) and then examine why they receive aid from particular donor countries. Many others concentrate on the effectiveness of aid (Banerjee & He, 2008; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008). Evaluating effectiveness before looking at the objectives in foreign aid, however, means the taking of the second step before the first one. Therefore, this research concentrates on the objectives in foreign aid. For the field of European Union Studies, examining the effect of foreign aid in the recipient countries is less interesting. Instead, this research looks at aid from the perspective of the donor countries and poses the following research question: *To what extent are the objectives of national foreign aid of the MS of Sweden and France in coherence with one another?* Examining the objectives in national foreign aid is relevant both practically and academically. Foreign aid belongs to one of the principal values of the European Union. Therefore, it is important to find out in how far the EU is able to implement foreign aid. Especially in times of financial crisis it is important to governments that tax money is spent efficiently. However, many studies take the second step before the first step and evaluate effectiveness before looking at the objectives. Since this study will look at the coherence between the national foreign aid policies of the MS, it might provide insight into the question of whether an effective common EU policy is possible or not. Only if MS agree on common objectives can there be an efficient outcome at the EU level (whether these align with the preferences of the recipient countries is an entirely different matter). Beside the efficiency aspect, there is also the question of power. The EU's role in the world is in particular being assessed in terms of unity in external relations. Its leading role would be much more recognized if MS were to speak with one voice.

This chapter will be structured in the following way. First, the definition of foreign aid to be used throughout this thesis is given, and then the question of why countries give foreign aid will be answered in order to turn to the objectives in foreign aid. Thereafter, foreign aid in the European Union will be presented. In the methodological part, the research design will be explained, followed by the case selection, the operationalization and a hypothesis.

## **1.2 Foreign aid**

When one thinks of foreign aid, the first thing that comes to mind is rich countries giving money to help the people in poor countries. In other words, foreign aid designates the “*worldwide redistribution of resources to far-away peoples and places*” (Martens, 2005, p.645). This view of aid emphasizes the human capability of feeling empathy with others deprived of the essential resources that the donor himself possesses even though the recipients do not belong to his immediate family or group of kinship (Carr, McAuliffe, & MacLachlan, 1998).

However, the most commonly used official definition, which will also be used in this study, is provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or more specifically by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The OECD defines aid in terms of Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Official Aid in the form of grants or loans to countries named on the DAC’s list of aid recipients. The difference between ODA and Official Aid lies in the classification of the gross national income (GNI) of the recipients. In the former case the recipients are listed in Part I of the DAC list with the Least Developed Countries (LDC) and in the latter in part II with other low income countries. Furthermore, the OECD sets three conditions for aid flows. Funds have to come from the official sector with the main objective of promoting economic development and come at concessional financial terms. Technical assistance is included whereas flows for military purposes are not. Obviously foreign aid stemming from NGOs or private associations is also not included (OECD, 2010a). Concrete examples for ODA are debt relief, humanitarian aid or special assistance (for instance in the case of natural catastrophes), bilateral development projects, technical cooperation or multilateral aid (Martens, 2005).

Donors’ and recipients’ preferences are not always aligned and recipients usually cannot participate in the formulation of aid objectives, since they do not live in the same political constituency. This often results in a lack of feedback from recipients (Banerjee & He, 2008). The definition of the DAC, an association of donor countries, was chosen, bearing in mind that it is donors who determine the objectives in ODA.

## **1.3 Why do countries give foreign aid?**

In view of these problems, the question as to why countries give aid at all arises. In order to answer this question one has to look at the interests behind the objectives. On the one hand donors can have economic or geopolitical interests (Holdar, 1995). On the other, one should not forget that foreign aid is primarily a response to world poverty out of humanitarian and ethical concern (Lumsdaine, 1993). The apparently opposed motives of self-interest and altruism for giving aid will be discussed in two following sections.

### **1.3.1 Self-interest**

Scholars from the realist school claim that foreign aid is part of the foreign policy of a state and therefore is made in a setting where the primary motivation is to pursue the own national interest. Lumsdaine (1993) affirms that about one third of aid serves donors' commercial or geopolitical goals (Lumsdaine, 1993). Shah (2010), for instance, argues that foreign aid comes with a price of its own for the developing nations, because donor countries tend to pursue their own economic interests under the guise of aid. He states that rich country protectionism denies market access for products from poor countries, while aid is being used as a lever to open recipients' markets for the products of donors. Furthermore, he supposes that aid is being tied to conditions that force the recipients to use overpriced goods and services from donor countries (Shah, 2010). The geopolitical interests involved in foreign aid can be very diverse. They include, for example, the maintenance of colonial ties, the ensuring of access to strategically important regions or natural resources and the spreading of the donors' own ideological system in form of values or instruments (Stokke, 1989). In consequence, aid does not always go to the poorest in the greatest need of it.

### **1.3.2 Altruism**

Realism entails an exclusion of morality from politics. Yet, if aid were given purely out of political interest, those donors with a strong political interest in the developing countries should have stronger aid programmes. And if it were given purely for the purpose of colonial ties, aid should come mainly from the former colonial powers, eventually falling off as these ties weaken with time. But according to scholars from the humanist school foreign aid is not only about power. They claim that in principle aid is altruistically aiming to help poor people in other countries (Busby, 2007; Stokke, 1989). The appearance of foreign aid flows from industrialized countries in the 70s when decolonisation saw its peak, cannot solely be explained by "*individual or collective economic and political interests of the donor countries*" (Lumsdaine, 1993). Instead Lumsdaine suggests that the real bases were humanitarian and egalitarian concerns combined with an internationalism which held that all states should get the chance to make progress towards a better life.

### **1.3.3 Conclusion**

The realist and humanitarian interests behind foreign aid as presented above should be seen as ideal-types since there is no entirely realist or humanist state; rather there are hybrids with differently balanced interests. From this it follows that the different interests translate into different objectives in national foreign aid. Most authors in the literature on foreign aid also agree on the fact that objectives differ not only between different donor countries, but within donor countries themselves there also exist different ideas about foreign aid. Martens (2005), for instance, affirms that the assumption of congruent objectives in foreign aid is unrealistic. In short, foreign

aid seems to be delivered in a fragmented fashion, this being due to different national aid policies.

#### 1.3.4 Norms

As already hinted above, foreign aid does not only arise from the interests of hard institutions such as nation-states. An increasing amount of studies has found international politics to be guided by soft institutions such as humanist norms and principles, thus having an impact on the objectives of foreign aid (Wiener, 2009). In order to clarify the role of norms in the formulation of aid objectives further, this section concentrates on norms in international politics and especially on norm contestation.

Lumsdaine (1993) holds that norms influence international politics in three ways: 1. Through the transfer of domestic political conceptions to the international realm (attitudes toward poverty in the social welfare state paved the way toward foreign aid) 2. Through social and moral dialogue (interactions with other peoples also influences aid policies) and 3. Through normative meanings in international regimes and practices (the objective of helping those in need caused changes in foreign-aid policy, moving away from donor-interest to humanitarian aid)

The definition of norms by Elgstrom as “*shared standards of appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors*” (Elgstrom, 2000) will be used in this research. This definition entails that norms contain prior assumptions about who the main subjects are (including the public, as the subject of the public interest) and what their legitimate interests are. In this context it is useful to introduce the concept of ‘advocacy coalitions’ by Sabatier (Sabatier, 1998) which designates networks of activists characterized by certain principles and values that are central to their actions. These moral activists conduct norms spread through moral persuasion which causes changes in preferences or interests and ultimately in behaviour (Elgstrom, 2000). Examples for causes defended by moral activists are environmental and resource protection, human rights, democracy and gender equality. Whether issues can easily arise from bottom-up pressure or not depends on the political strength of the advocacy movement, on the tradition of social dialogue and of course on the number of gatekeepers.

A practical framework for the analysis of norms in international relations has been provided by the social constructivist Antje Wiener with her theory on norm contestation. Her theory says that at the national level there is a link between the formal validity and the social recognition of norms. However, in the European Union characterized by multilevel governance, national norms are transferred to international contexts, where that link might not hold anymore. Therefore, when opposing kinds of norms dominate in the different MS, they will clash at the international level. This is what she calls norm contestation (Wiener, 2009).

The process of norm contestation is thus a battle over which norm will be dominant. In any given policy institution, there is a tendency for the parties to fight

over what will be the dominant norm. Not only in norm contestation but in any given policy situation, assuming there is agreement of some kind, one party may win or a compromise may be made. The outcome depending on the degree to which norms were consistent with one another can lead to extensive cooperation or a lack of agreement when the parties' positions are too far apart. Contestation may live on by one party succeeding at embedding one norm in one institution, and another party succeeding at embedding another norm in another institution. This is why EU-level, national development agencies and private development agencies might have differing principles and standards. Elgstrom is applying the same idea in a case study on the norms of gender mainstreaming and environmental protection and found considerable norm contestation in EU foreign aid (Elgstrom, 2000).

#### ***1.4 Foreign Aid in the European Union***

After having explained why donors give foreign aid, this section provides some information about foreign aid in the European Union (EU). First, attention will be directed to the second kind of aid fragmentation that exists in the EU, second it will be explained in how far foreign aid policy is embedded in the EU and what its objectives are. The following sections deal with aid efficiency in the EU and what is being done for more coherence.

Today the majority of the EU's 27 member states (MS) are aid donors. But beside the fragmentation of different national aid policies, the multi-level governance in the EU induces an additional kind of fragmentation, this being on account of the fact that next to the national aid programmes of the MS, the European Commission has its own aid programme. One single policy area is thus dealt with simultaneously at the national and supranational levels being divided into national foreign aid that is naturally under MS control and EU foreign aid which is channelled through the Commission's agency EuropAid. However, targeting is at least done at EU level. In the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) the UN set a target of 0.7 per cent of GNI spending for development aid to be reached by 2015. On the way to that goal the EU aimed at the intermediary target of 0.56 per cent by 2010. This year is a key year, it being on the midpoint between the commitments in 2005 and the 2015 target.

The beginning of development cooperation at the EU level was marked by the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which laid down shared competences between the Commission and the Council for this policy field (EUHES, 2007). Up to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, foreign aid used to be in the intergovernmental Pillar II covering Common Foreign and Security Policy where the Council had to decide with unanimity (European Commission, 2007). This suggests an intergovernmental interpretation of EU foreign aid policy where states are the primary actors in the integration process. According to the theory of intergovernmentalism, the different MS' positions are thus aggregated at EU level and lead to a compromise with very general objectives (Moravcsik, 1998). The positions of

the individual member states are being ‘watered-down’, while power resources decide how much influence an individual MS has on the outcome (Moravcsik, 1998, pp.62-63). However, Ginsberg & Smith (2007) representing the supranationalist school argue that in spite of the formal intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy, “*it became far more institutionalized and more closely attached to other aspects of European integration, both functional and institutional*” (Ginsberg & Smith, 2007, p.8). Amongst others, achieving sustainable development and the combat against global poverty were adopted as objectives of the Lisbon agenda with the result that development assistance became a core value of European identity. Thus, depending on the perspective taken by the author EU multilateral aid can be seen as intergovernmental or supranational.

In the year 2000 along with the declaration of the UN Millenium Development Goals, EU foreign aid has been streamlined into a limited number of priority areas with the overriding principles of eradicating poverty and integrating the partner countries better into the global economy (European Commission, 2009). However, just as national foreign aid, the Commission’s aid programme is embedded in the EU’s foreign policy. At the EU level not only security goals such as combating terrorism, preventing state failure, regional conflict and illegal migration but also economic goals are sought to be realized through foreign aid (Ginsberg & Smith, 2007). Some authors criticize the EU for trying to export its ‘recipe for success’ to developing countries. Dearden, for instance, holds in his article on EU-ACP relations that regional integration and EU partnership are overemphasized at the expense of development goals (Dearden, 2008).

#### **1.4.1 Efficiency**

In view of the two kinds of fragmentation in the EU, the question arises as to whether this is efficient. In their study about donor fragmentation Knack and Rahman (2008) claim that incoherence in bilateral objectives leads to inefficiencies where donors could be working against one another, and ‘fashionable’ sectors or countries receive too much while others are not covered. There are thus several efficiency reasons speaking in favour of more cooperation at the EU level. First of all, transaction costs can be reduced for example by abolishing parallel implementation structures. Furthermore, collective action can facilitate economies of scale and scope (Martens, 2005). In addition to the transaction costs savings, inefficient allocation becomes evident and thereby redundancy or the neglect of sectors or recipients can be prevented. According to Knack and Rahman (2008) the current fragmentation in aid policy has led to multiple and conflicting objectives. Increased cooperation in the form of common priority-setting would lead to more coherence in foreign aid. However, in spite of the efficiency aspect, states have to consider that an increase in cooperation goes hand in hand with a partial loss of their control over the usage of funds. This could also mean a loss of the conditionality mechanism that states hold in bilateral aid (Martens, 2005). In sum, there is a trade-off in development aid related to efficiency.

One single agency dealing with all foreign aid would be more efficient; however the loss of control for the individual MS incur costs on them preventing that MS agree on moving their bilateral aid programs to the EU level.

#### **1.4.2 Coherence**

Now that fragmentation has been indentified as a crucial contributor to ineffectiveness within the EU, this section will present the actions the EU has taken to foster coherence in foreign aid. To begin with, for the purpose of this study coherence will be defined as a state of a logical, orderly and consistent relation between the bilateral foreign aid objectives of the member states. In the OECD peer review on development cooperation in the European Community from 2002, the authors admit that progress in coordination and harmonisation remains well below what is possible calling the EU a ‘timid giant’ with big resources but little visibility (OECD, 2002, p.135). The fact that there is little to no coordination between the bilateral aid programmes of the MS is also confirmed in the literature (Holdar, 1995). However, the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the European Code of Conduct on Complementarity concluded in 2005 and 2007 respectively, were supposed to deal with the coordination problems between the different bilateral aid programmes. They are working towards more task-or labour-division (Council of the EU, 2009, Annex I) and, beside that, propagate the increased use of consistent country systems (Annex II) and technical cooperation (Annex III). By division of labour it is understoof that donors limit themselves to those sectors in which they have a comparative advantage and concentrate on fewer recipient countries as for instance in the Fast Track Initiative (Council of the EU, 2009, p.5-6). Though this probably will not lead to more coherence, in contrary it means an increased specification.

#### **1.5 Research question**

This thesis will concentrate on the topic of coherence in foreign aid and will analyse and compare MS domestic foreign aid policies in order to be able to give a judgement on whether more cooperation in a sense of a common EU policy and common instruments is possible. This leads to the following research question:

*To what extent are the objectives of national foreign aid of the MS of Sweden and France in coherence with one another?*

The relevance should thus be seen in the context of the wider theoretical framework of European integration. The role played by domestic objectives in European integration in foreign aid has so far been neglected by the literature. Looking at how coherent objectives actually are, on can obtain an indication regarding the direction in which foreign aid policy will be moving, towards more or less European

cooperation. It might thus be possible to say something about the outcomes of subsequent EU level negotiations on the topic of foreign aid.

## ***1.6 Methodological choices***

### **1.6.1 Design**

The study will be descriptive with the focus on what the objectives in foreign aid are, how they have changed, which are the priorities among these objectives and in how far they are compatible with one another. It will be a case study with two cases with the level of analysis being MS of the European Union. The objectives in the national foreign aid of these two cases will be analysed and compared to each other in terms of their coherence employing the EU level as a context. The study will consist of a quantitative part which will compare OECD data on the two cases in chapters two and three and a qualitative document analysis where I will extract the main objectives of foreign aid using foreign policy documents of the MS. For Sweden, I will make use of documents from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Agency and for France I will use documents from the French Ministry for European and Foreign Affairs and the Agence Française de Développement.

### **1.6.2 Why France and Sweden?**

Owing to the small scope of this study, this case study will be limited to two MS. Ultimately, the aim is to reveal whether or not more European cooperation in foreign aid is possible. Thus it is sensible to choose among the 27 EU MS those that have the most opposing views on development aid because they would form the biggest obstacle to more coherence. Therefore, I chose MS as different as possible on different dimensions that could play a role in determining the objectives in foreign policy. As cases, I have decided to choose the MS of France and Sweden because I expect them to have very differing views on foreign aid. The reasons for that will be laid out in the following section about the welfare state model.

#### **1.6.2.1 Welfare state model**

Welfare states are based on social solidarity which means to commit oneself to a common good out of responsibility for the whole group (Kleinmann, 2002). For foreign aid policy it is important to which degree this solidarity extends to developing countries. This can be made clear applying the particularist-universalist divide often used in human rights studies. MS were selected to be different on this dimension. Furthermore, they were selected in a way that they are representative for one specific group of countries using the typology of welfare states by Esping-Andersen (1990). This improves the generalizability of the study, since the results might then allow the making of inferences about other countries with similar welfare state regimes. The

following two sections present Sweden and France as belonging to one type of welfare states and talk about specific norms arising from this typology that could play a role in their respective foreign aid policies.

#### ***1.6.2.1.1 Sweden***

Sweden is part of the group of social-democratic Nordic welfare states, as are Norway, Finland, Denmark and to some extent the Netherlands. There are some differences between these countries; for instance, Norway and Finland have a lower expenditure for social policies than Sweden and Denmark. Furthermore, there are differences in assumed gender roles. However, one can safely say that the Scandinavian countries are still quite homogeneous (Kleinmann, 2002).

Social solidarity manifests itself in many aspects of Swedish society. Kleinmann (2002) for instance, claims that Sweden is characterized by very high levels of social services and benefits even for manual workers. According to Kleinmann Sweden has undergone a de-commodification of labour meaning the reduced reliance on the market through its generous provision of social rights. Another aspect of the Nordic welfare state based upon an organic social solidarity with a functional distinction of roles is corporatism. It describes an interest group system where pressure groups are organised in formal government structures. The coordinated, compromise-oriented corporatist interest group system is characterized by a small number of associations which represent their members in a wide array of formal decision-making and consultative government, leading to binding policies on all parties (Newton & Van Deth, 2005). In Lijphart's index of plurality Sweden scores 0.5 from a minimum of zero and a maximum of four. Sweden is thus a classical example for corporatism (Lijphart, 1999). The interest group system of states is incorporated in Lijphart's two-dimensional pattern of consensus and majoritarian democracy. Interestingly, Lijphart finds that consensus democracies outperform majoritarian democracies with regard to quality and democratic representation but also in what he calls 'kindness and gentleness of public policy' for which he uses foreign aid as one of the indicators for a 'kind and gentle' foreign policy. As can be seen from Figure 1.1 Sweden is classified as a consensus democracy on the executives-party dimension, whereas it is majoritarian on the federal-unitary dimension. When it comes to domestic norms, Sweden being a social democratic welfare state, is also a particularly good example of social justice. In the Aristotelian view justice is seen as a principle of proportionate action. Social justice is then a distributive principle: it concerns the proportions in which people should contribute to and receive things from society. It begins with the presumption of equality. Unless there are good reasons for not doing so people should be treated equally.

It is recognized in the literature that Sweden is a particularly good example of the principle of universality which denotes the universal applicability of social solidarity (Kautto, Fritzell, Hvinden, Kvist, & Uusitalo, 2001). If the normative view holds,

which is probable due to the principle of universality, it can be assumed that norms like social solidarity and justice that play such a strong role within Swedish society itself will also have an impact on foreign policy and development assistance in particular. They will then translate into Sweden's objectives in foreign aid policy. Objectives arising from social justice, social solidarity and corporatism could, for example, be the promotion of human rights as well as social equality and civil society dialogue.

#### ***1.6.2.1.2 France***

France is classified by Kleinmann as a strongly identity-based, conservative welfare state where social rights are deeply enshrined, however, preserving status differences. Conservative regimes are usually based on the principle of subsidiarity, which in this case means that solidarity is ordered hierarchically, giving a primary role to family and church and a secondary role to the state. Furthermore, redistribution takes place horizontally rather than vertically. Other conservative welfare states include Germany, Italy and Austria. In many aspects, however, France forms an exception, for instance, concerning childcare which is defamilialized and even compulsory for older children in form of a preschool (Rauch, 2007).

France's welfare state can best be described by the notions of solidarity and insertion. Insertion means that the republican state actively promotes integration and assimilation into a clearly defined monolithic French identity (Kleinmann, 2002). The big difference between Swedish and French solidarity is, however, that French solidarity lacks the principle of universalism. On the universalism-particularism divide, France can be classified as particularist. Particularism means that no principles or norms can be universally relevant since their applicability depends on the local setting (Redondo, 2005). Instead, French solidarity is exclusive since it is confined to one specific group, the French nation. Even within that group, according to Redondo, in recent years the emphasis has shifted towards 'active solidarity', which puts more stress on individual responsibility. France has a pluralist interest group system. In pluralism interest groups are loosely and less centrally organised than in corporatism leading to a competitive and uncoordinated role of interest groups in decision-making (Lijphart, 1999). In Lijphart's classification of consensus and majoritarian democracy, France is majoritarian on both dimensions (see figure 1.1). It can be assumed that for objectives in foreign aid the federal-unitary dimension does not matter. Therefore, in the case selection this variable is kept constant. However, the executives-parties dimension does matter in decision-making in foreign aid.

The same as for Sweden applies to France: if the normative view is decisive, the particularities France's type of welfare state will translate into specific objectives for foreign aid. Examples could be the emphasis on gender equality and education. Taking into account the particularist nature of French solidarity, however, it is likely that foreign aid will concentrate on francophone developing countries since they are closer to French identity than others.




Figure 1.1 *The two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy. Reproduced from (Lijphart, 1999, p. 248)*

### 1.6.3 Operationalization

Coherence should be seen as a continuum ranging from no to complete coherence. However in order to facilitate the analysis it will be coded using the three categories: collusion, co-existence and collision as illustrated in figure 1.2. The member states are displayed as bars whereas the EU is shown as a circle. The MS' bars exceed the EU's circle because I assume that the MS' objectives are going beyond the EU's objectives. However, it is more important to mark the position of the bars toward each other. Objectives will be categorised as colluding when there is at least a partial overlap. In the ideal case of maximum coherence they are completely congruent, which will be called harmonization. If objectives do not overlap but also do not run counter to each other, they co-exist, meaning that it is possible to bridge the gap effectively with coordination at the EU level. This can be done, for instance, through the division of tasks and implies a medium level of coherence. Finally, when objectives are irreconcilably far apart, there is collusion leading to a conflict between two opposing objectives. This means that a basis for an effective EU policy coordination is lacking due to the conflicting nature of the MS' objectives, and there is no coherence at all.




Figure 1.2 *Coherence in bilateral foreign aid objectives*

#### 1.6.4 Hypothesis

The literature review showed that in the EU at the national level there is both normative and institutional diversity which manifests itself in the form of different groups of welfare states. If these different social norms are translating into the foreign policy and, also into foreign aid objectives, there is the potential of norm collision at the multilateral level. Thereby, European cooperation and coherence are limited. As was explained in the case selection, France and Sweden are likely to be two good examples for showing this collision. In accordance with the operationalisation of coherence I expect to find mostly colliding and some co-existing objectives in the foreign aid policies of Sweden and France which would mean that there is little coherence. This hypothesis will be rejected in case that I will mainly find collusion.

#### 1.7 Conclusion

In the first part, this chapter gave a practical overview of development aid, and relevant theories were presented. In the second part, it laid out the methodological choices that were made for this research on the whole. The following two chapters will compare the development aid of the two cases both quantitatively and qualitatively. This comparison is followed by an analysis of the national objectives in foreign aid policy in order to conclude with a chapter on the coherence between France's and Sweden's bilateral aid policies.



# 2

## Aid generosity

*This chapter first gives a general characterization of two opposing approaches to foreign aid in order to extract from them quantitative categories that can be useful for the description and analysis of the generosity of different systems of foreign aid.*

## **2.1 Introduction**

In the previous chapter which served as an introduction, I have looked at different aspects of foreign aid. This chapter will use the humanism-realism divide in order to classify different national aid systems according to their generosity. The first part presents Stokke's four categories, the second part explains how they will be made measurable and, in the third part, this is applied to Sweden and France followed by a conclusion.

## **2.2 Stokke's Humane and Realist Internationalism; A review**

A useful distinction between different aid policies of the Nordic countries as well as Canada was conceived by Stokke (1989). According to him different bilateral aid policies can be distinguished using the dimension of humanist and realist internationalism. He further subdivides humanist internationalism into radical, reform and liberal humanism. The specific characteristics of humane and realist internationalism are summarized in Table 2-I.

For all kinds of humane internationalism, foreign aid is motivated by compassion since "*citizens of industrialized nations have moral obligations towards people and events beyond their borders*" (Stokke, 1989, p.10). It can thus be linked to a cosmopolitan worldview and values such as the respect for human rights and refraining from the use of force. Radical humanism strives for full economic, social and political equity and self-reliant, sustainable economic growth. Reform internationalism seeks to improve equity and social economic justice. Finally, liberal internationalism wants to attain development through economic growth which means, in practice, aid through trade and private sector development. Humanism does not necessarily see a contradiction between altruistic and egoistic motivations, since there are overlaps between the donor and recipient interests. The ethical philosophy calls this 'enlightened self-interest'. It is the balance between these altruistic and egoistic motivations that distinguishes between the three categories - radical, reform and liberal humanism. Radical humanism places the most stress on altruism, since the need in developing countries takes absolute precedence over one's own interests. Reform humanism emphasizes mutual benefit across borders and liberal humanism focuses on employment, the expansion of trade and investment opportunities in foreign aid. In contrast to that, realist internationalism claims that states only pursue their own interests leaving little room for the disbursement of foreign aid based on universal moral principles (Donnelly, 2000).

The stance of the four approaches on the role of the state in development, on the international aid system and aid agencies also differs. Radical humanism strongly favours state intervention if it is in line with its objectives, but it is sceptical of the international aid system and demands a radical restructuring. It prefers UN agencies (due to the representation of recipients) against institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Reform humanism is also in favour of state and inter-state interventions.

However, it is reform-oriented as the name already says and seeks to gradually improve existing structures. Thereby, it supports aid through all existing aid channels (multilateral and bilateral agencies and NGOs) but preferring channels with idealistic purposes aiming to foster social justice and equality. Administrative structures with a strong responsibility for foreign affairs will be dominant. Liberal humanism prefers the multilateral trading system instead of state interference and therefore also favours multilateral agencies (development banks and the UN) versus bilateral agencies providing social services. It is thus system-oriented and thinks that aid should aim at the common interests of rich and poor countries. Dominant actors are domestic economic interest groups (Stokke, 1989). In realism the international realm is anarchic and dominated by the strongest states so that multilateral agencies barely exist. It takes a state-centric view so that in foreign aid non-state actors have a negligible role. It is sceptical towards ideals transcending the nation-state. Thus, foreign aid policy is being utilized for power politics and the current political party or leaders are the dominant actors (Donnelly, 2000).

**Table 2-I** Characteristics of Humane and Realist Internationalism

	<b>objectives</b>	<b>motivation (self-interest)</b>	<b>role of state in aid</b>	<b>view of aid system</b>	<b>aid agencies</b>
<b>radical (humanism)</b>	full economic, social and political equity, self-reliant, sustainable economic growth, human rights	very small (need in developing countries takes absolute precedence over own interests)	strongly favours state intervention if in line with its objectives	sceptical, needs radical restructuring	favours UN agencies (representation of recipients) against institutions like IMF and Worldbank)
<b>reform (humanism)</b>	improved equity and social economic justice, human rights	small (mutual benefit across borders)	pro state and inter-state interventions	reform-oriented, gradualist → improve existing structures	aid through multilateral and bilateral agencies and NGOs
<b>liberal (humanism)</b>	development through economic growth → aid through trade, private sector development, human rights	moderate (employment, expansion of trade, investment opportunities)	multilateral trading system, against state interference	system-oriented aid should aim at the common interests of rich and poor countries	favours multilateral agencies (development banks and the UN), against bilateral agencies providing social services
<b>realism</b>	find new markets secure sphere of influence	strong (geostrategic and economic interest)	states pursue their own interest	anarchic	no multilateral agencies

In sum, the dominant socio- political values identified with the welfare state are expected if decisive to result in generous development assistance (large volume on favourable terms) directed to LDCs and will aim to foster social justice and equity, whereas if national economic pressure groups and power politics are decisive I expect a much less generous assistance (small volume on unfavourable terms) directed to MICs aiming to increase investment, trading opportunities or geostrategic influence. So, how can national aid policies be described with reference to realism and humanism and its offshoots? An operationalization follows in the next section.

### 2.3 Measurement of Stokke's categories

One of the main distinguishing features between humane and realist internationalism is the generosity at which donors give aid. The differences in aid generosity between countries may be illustrated by their overall macro level performance in foreign aid. I have chosen five major policy dimensions as indicators: aid volume (both as percentage of GNI and total), the financial terms (grant-element and tying), the bilateral aid component and their choice of main recipients. The operationalization is visualized in Table 2-II where each approach to development aid is assigned a certain range of the indicator, taking the DAC average as a point of reference.

**Table 2-II** Generosity of aid disbursements operationalized

	<b>Financial conditions of aid</b>				
	<i>Volume of ODA in 2009 (in % of GNI)</i>	<i>Grant-element of bilateral ODA volume in 2008 (in %)</i>	<i>Degree of tying aid in percent of total bilateral ODA in 2008 (in %)</i>	<i>Bilateral aid component in 2008 (in % of total ODA)</i>	<b>Main recipients (as % share of bilateral ODA allocated to MICs)</b>
<b>DAC average</b>	0.31	83.7	12.5	73	
<b>radical (humanism)</b>	very high (>0.8)	very high (100)	very low (0-5)	low (<50)	< 1/4
<b>reform (humanism)</b>	high (0.5-0.8)	high (95- < 100)	low (5-10)	medium (50-70)	1/4 - 1/2
<b>liberal (humanism)</b>	medium (0.2-0.5)	medium (80-95)	medium (10-15)	high (70-90)	1/2 - 3/4
<b>realism</b>	<i>very low (&lt;0.2)</i>	<i>low (&lt;80)</i>	<i>high (&gt;15)</i>	<i>very high (&gt;90)</i>	> 3/4

\* DAC average score extracted from (Deutscher, 2010)

It follows intuitively from the previous section that on the one hand, radical humanism and, to a lesser extent, reform humanism will allocate a large aid volume on favourable terms mainly via multilateral channels to LDCs. On the other hand, liberal humanism and, to a greater extent, realism will allocate a smaller aid volume on rather unfavourable terms mainly bilaterally to MICs. In the following the choice of the

indicator ranges for the different approaches will be justified in more detail. For all indicators the ranges for the categories will be set so that the DAC average lies within the range for liberal humanism, thus taking the DAC average as a point of reference.

### **2.3.1 Volume of ODA**

Motivated by altruism, radical humanism and reform humanism to a lesser extent will display a large aid volume of ODA, whereas liberal humanism and realism will have smaller volumes being motivated more by their own national interest. This means that aid volume must decrease when moving from radical, reform and liberal humanism towards realism. Measuring aid volume in total numbers could mean to wrongfully underestimate a country's aid volume with a small GNI and vice versa to overestimate a country's aid volume with a big GNI. The percentage share of GNI thus seems to be a better measure of aid volume. The very high aid volume of radical humanism will be conceptualized as more than 0.8 percent. ODA in reform humanism is high (set as ranging from 0.5 to 0.8 percent). The medium aid volume of liberal humanism is set to between 0.2 to 0.5 percent. Realism has a very low aid volume (set below 0.2 percent).

### **2.3.2 Financial Conditions**

ODA in radical and reform humanism is more generous than that of liberal humanism and realism. Thus again moving from radical, reform and liberal humanism towards realism, the financial conditions of aid should become less favourable for recipients. The conceptualization of the financial conditions will be two- fold. First, there is the grant-element and second the degree of tying of bilateral ODA both measured in percent. Radical humanism gives all of its aid as grants. Reform humanism is committed to giving a high percentage as grants (range set between 95 to just below 100) and liberal humanism allocates a medium share of ODA as grants (set between 80 and 95 percent). The grant share for realism is low (set below 80 percent). The degree of tied aid measured in percentage of total bilateral ODA in 2008 is conceptualized as ranging from very low, low, medium to high, each span increasing by 5 percentage points respectively starting from 0 to 5 for radical humanism, via 5 to 10 for reform humanism, 10 to 15 for liberal humanism to more than 15 percent for realism.

### **2.3.3 Bilateral Aid Component**

Radical and reform humanism display a large multilateral aid component, whereas liberal humanism will emphasize bilateral aid. In order to preserve control over and flexibility for its funds, realism almost exclusively disburses bilateral aid. The data are measured in percentage share of total ODA. A low bilateral aid component as in radical humanism is set below 50 percent. With a medium percentage reform humanism spans from 50 to 70 percent and liberal humanism from 70 to 90 with a

relatively high percentage. Realism's very high share of bilateral aid is set to be above 90 percent.

### 2.3.4 Choice of Main Recipients

Radical humanism disburses aid to poor countries and/or poor social groups, and reform humanism does so too in essence. In liberal humanism, however, aid recipients are considered from a commercial point of view rather than choosing poor economies. In realism, strategically important countries will be chosen for aid. Moving from radical, reform and liberal humanism towards realism the share of MICs recipients will increase. For the purpose of this study, the windows for the respective approach will be starting at a range of zero to 1/4 and increasing by 1/4 when moving to the next approach.

### 2.3.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this section was to conceptualize and operationalize aid generosity. In order to do this, I have used the distinction between radical, reform and liberal humanism in opposition to realism. For these four dimensions I have developed four quantitative policy indicators from the countries' overall macro level performance. These were aid volume, the financial terms (with grant-element and tying), the bilateral aid component and the main recipients. Next, I will apply this methodology to Sweden and France in order to be able to propose how generous their foreign aid is and which of the four approaches to aid best fits their aid system.

## 2.4 Comparative Analysis


**Table 2-III** Generosity of aid disbursements for Sweden and France\*. Sweden = S, France = F. Data from (Deutscher, 2010)

	<b>Financial conditions of aid</b>				
	<i>Volume of ODA in 2009 (in % of GNI)</i>	<i>Grant-element of bilateral ODA volume in 2008 (in %)</i>	<i>Degree of tying aid in percent of total bilateral ODA in 2008 (in %)</i>	<i>Bilateral aid component in 2008 (in % of total ODA)</i>	<i>Main recipients (as % share of bilateral ODA allocated to MICs)</i>
<b>DAC average</b>	0.31	83.7	12.5	73	<i>MICs</i>
<b>radical (humanism)</b>	S (1.12)		S (0.1)		<i>S (19)</i>
<b>reform (humanism)</b>		S (97.4)		F (59), S (66)	
<b>liberal (humanism)</b>	F (0.46)				<i>F (58)</i>
<b>realism</b>		<i>F (76.7)</i>	<i>F (18.1)</i>		

\* measured in basic quantitative features as indicators for Humane and Realist Internationalism (point of reference is the DAC average score for corresponding values).

The following represents a comparative analysis of Sweden’s and France’s aid generosity. The aim is to locate the two cases on the humanism-realism continuum from the methodological part using the four categories of their performance in foreign aid, as are aid volume, financial conditions, bilateral aid and main recipients. Table 2-III gives an overview over the results of the analysis.

### 2.4.1 Volume of ODA



**Figure 2.1** Comparison of French and Swedish ODA from 1999 to 2009 as percentage of GNI. Created based on data from (OECD, 2010c)

Sweden has established itself as the top aid provider measured in percentage of GNI within the OECD as can be confirmed looking at the time span of the last ten years. From 1999 to 2007, the Swedish aid volume was about three times higher than DAC average and saw an even sharper increase between 2008 and 2009 to almost four times the weighted DAC average of 0.31 per cent, while France’s was only one and a half times (see figure 2.1 above). In the same period, France’s share remained close to EU average and about 0.1 percentage points above DAC average. For France’s disbursements a slight upward trend can be seen from 0.38 per cent in 1999 to 0.46 per cent of GNI in 2009, however interrupted by two setbacks in 2000 and 2007 respectively. Sweden’s disbursements fluctuated around just below 0.8% in the period from 1999 to 2004 and underwent a sudden increase in 2005 to 0.94 per cent. In the following years Swedish ODA fluctuated around the new level of about one per cent of GNI reaching an all-time high of 1.12 per cent in 2009. The relatively volatile instrument of debt relief might explain the peaks in 2002 and 2005/2006, since in

those years donor countries undertook collective debt cancellation, for instance in the Paris Club package for Iraq and India. In short, both countries' generosity in terms of aid volume has improved in the examined time period while for France the increase took place more slowly but steadily, and Sweden's share saw a sudden leap in 2005. In the year 2009 Sweden gave with 1.12 percent of GNI a very large volume. Thereby its volume corresponds to radical humanism. In the same year France gave about 0.46 percent of its GNI, which brings it into the range of liberal humanism.

#### **2.4.2 Financial Terms**

Concerning the financial terms of development aid, Sweden has been giving continually since 1988 almost all her development aid as grants meaning that no repayment is required, thus under very favourable financial terms. France's financial aid terms also stayed stable with a grant-element of 91 per cent (OECD, 2010d). Tied aid as the DAC understands it, designates aid for which the associated goods and services should be procured in the donor country thereby reducing its concessional terms. In 2008, essentially none of Sweden's bilateral aid was tied (0.1 percent) making it again radical humanist in that category. France tied about 18 per cent, a very high percentage indicating realist tendencies. In a nutshell, as far as financial terms are concerned Sweden's development aid can thus be called very generous and France's rather moderate though above DAC average.

#### **2.4.3 Bilateral Aid**

The bilateral aid of both Sweden and France remained in 2008 below DAC average of 73 percent with 66 and 59 percent both within the range of reform humanism with a medium share. The DAC average might be relatively high because non-EU countries that do not contribute to EU foreign aid are also included, and thus have a lower share of multilateral aid. For France, the share of bilateral aid represents an *outlier* where it lies within the reform humanist range, interestingly scoring even lower than Sweden. This is likely due to France's lower aid volume as share of GNI, so that after the fixed multilateral contributions, less remains for bilateral aid than in the case of Sweden.

#### **2.4.4 Main Recipients**

France was a colonial power and still maintains strong ties to its former colonies. Given its colonial past, it prioritizes these countries for foreign aid, which should translate into its objectives and special agreements. Its distinct relationship with the 'Maghreb', for instance, was illustrated by the proposal of President Sarkozy to reform the EU's partnership with the Mediterranean countries and to rename it into Mediterranean Union. Sweden's approach to choosing recipients is quite different from France's. It is specifically stated by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, in order to save administration costs Sweden focuses on a few countries especially in Sub-

Saharan Africa and South-East Asia, and also developed a specific country strategy for Africa and Asia in 1998 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). However, the geographical location of recipients does not make a very strong case in terms of a distinction between humanism and realism, since countries from the same region do not all belong to the same income group. A better measure is the share of ODA distributed to MICs. According to the OECD in 2007 and 2008, while Sweden gave less than one fourth of its total aid to MICs, thus scoring radical humanist also for the recipients dimension, France distributed more than one half to those countries which corresponds to liberal humanism. France's priorities are thus clearly more favourable towards countries belonging to the middle income classification among developing countries. The bias could be due to France's colonial past and could explain the difference in the income categories of recipient countries between France and Sweden since former colonies are not necessarily the poorest countries. In fact, Cameroon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal, all francophone, former colonies and MICs are amongst the top ten French aid recipients are (OECD, 2010d).

#### **2.4.5 How Much Humanism; How Much Realism?**

Table III gives a summary of Sweden's and France's aid generosity using the distinction between humane and realist internationalism. The numbers in brackets indicate the corresponding country values. It becomes clear that Sweden can be located between radical and reform humanism. It displays an aid volume and a share of tied aid within the range of radical humanism. Its bilateral aid component and the grant element are more in line with reform humanism. As Sweden mostly gives aid to LDCs and only 19 percent to MICs, this tips the scales towards radical humanism. It can thus be assumed that Sweden's aid policy is strongly influenced by NGOs with idealistic purposes and officials with a strong responsibility for foreign affairs. France displays a liberal humanist aid volume and share of MICs. Its financial conditions in contrast are realist. Its medium bilateral aid component forms an *outlier* in reform humanism that pulls France's overall approach more toward liberal humanism. However, as explained above this might be due to its low overall aid volume (in percent of GNI). Influential actors in France's development aid can therefore be either economic pressure groups or high level political actors. At this point it is interesting to further examine which is actually the case.

### **2.5 Conclusion**

The quantitative comparison of Sweden's and France's aid disbursements showed that they indeed take two different approaches to foreign aid. As a result of the analysis, Sweden can be located between radical and reform humanism, however, being closer to radical humanism. All in all, it disburses aid very generously. France is situated somewhere between liberalism and realism, yet being closer to the former due to its outlying low bilateral aid share. Thereby, it is less generous with the allocation of

foreign aid than Sweden. The next chapter will look at the distribution of Sweden's and France's aid budgets to different major purposes.

# 3

## Major Budget Purposes

*This chapter compares the allocations of Sweden and France to major budget purposes in development aid. Two specific points in time are chosen in order to capture changes and priorities over time and to finally make a proposition about their coherence.*

### **3.1 Introduction**

In the previous chapter I have looked at aid generosity and found that Sweden can be situated between radical and reform humanism and France somewhere between liberal humanism and realism. In this chapter I will also look at their aid policy in a quantitative way using the again the humanism-realism continuum. However, I will more specifically concentrate on budget allocations to major development purposes within the last ten years. This is interesting because it shows the priority areas and how they have changed over time. It might also indicate something about their coherence. I will start with the methodological approach in order to then carry out the comparison.

### **3.2 Methodology**

As outlined in chapter 1 there is a direct link between national values and development objectives. An obvious way to find out about the coherence of objectives in foreign aid policy is to compare the budget allocations to different areas of spending. Naturally, those areas with higher priority get a higher budget share. Big differences in allocations between the two countries indicate incoherence, possibly task-dividing or potentially objective collision. The OECD publishes in their DAC Development Cooperation Reports donor commitments to 24 major purposes under the headings *Social and administrative structure*, *Economic infrastructure*, *Production* and *Other*. Two years will be chosen to illustrate the changes in priorities. The most recent data available is from the year 2008 (Deutscher, 2010). The second point in time will be 2001 because this leaves time for capturing potential changes in the national aid budgets after the major aid reforms in the EU. Again the humanism-realism continuum will be employed in order to make the analysis more convincing. Radical humanism favours relief or emergency aid while reform humanism tries to build long-term self-reliance. Both are investing into areas that foster social justice and equality. In liberal humanism, there is a preference for tied aid such as project and commodity aid, with investments especially into the economic infrastructure of the recipients.

### **3.3 Comparative Analysis of Two Member States**

Table I presents aid commitments to major purposes of Sweden and France in percentage of total bilateral aid in 2001 and 2008, marking changes within one country of more than five percentage points and differences between both countries of more than ten percentage points.

#### **3.3.1 Changes and Priority Areas**

France and Sweden both spent their biggest budget share on the *Social and administrative structure*. However, under that heading the distribution is very diverging. France spent the lion share on *Education* whereas Sweden favoured *Government and civil society*. In 2008, *Economic infrastructure* became another priority area of France, in which

especially *Transport and communications* were important. France also allocated a lot of aid to *Action relating to debt*, though decreasing its share in 2008. Sweden in turn gave a remarkably large share as *Emergency aid* though also decreasing in 2008. Lastly, it should be mentioned that Sweden's share of *Unspecified* aid went up considerably from 9.3 to 24.9 percent.

**Table 3-I** Aid commitments to major purposes\*

<i>Year</i>	<i>France</i>		<i>Sweden</i>	
	<i>2001</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2008</i>
<i>Sectors</i>				
Social and administrative structure	38.6	29.7	33.6	30.4
Education	<b>24</b>	<b>18.6</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.9</b>
of which Basic education	5.8	2.5	0.5	2.5
Health	4.7	1.9	2.2	4.8
of which Basic health	1.1	1.2	1.1	2.9
Population	0.3	0.1	1.6	2
Water supply and sanitation	2	3.8	4.9	2.4
Government and civil society	<b>0</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>14.6</b>	<b>14.8</b>
Other social infrastructure/service	5.8	3.8	6.6	2.4
Economic infrastructure	7.7	<b>20.1</b>	11.1	<b>6.3</b>
Transport and communications	4.8	<b>15.1</b>	5.9	<b>1.5</b>
Energy	0.8	2.2	2.7	2.1
Other	2.1	2.8	2.5	2.8
Production	8.3	5.7	5.2	5.3
Agriculture	7.5	5.6	4.5	3
Industry, mining and construction	0.7	0.1	0.4	1.3
Trade and tourism	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.9
Other sectors				
Multisector	9.9	10.6	10.9	9.2
Programme Assistance	3.8	<b>11.4</b>	3.6	4.9
Action relating to debt	<b>24.3</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.1</b>
Emergency aid	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>19.5</b>	<b>11.6</b>
Administrative expenses	5.4	4.3	6.2	7.1
Unspecified	1.7	<b>5</b>	9.3	<b>24.9</b>
Total	100	100	100	100
Food aid, total	2.5	0.8	0.8	0

\* by donor country in percent of total bilateral ODA in the years 2001 (Faure, 2003) and 2008 (Deutscher, 2010)

*italic*= decrease of more than 5%

underline= increase of more than 5%

**bold**= difference between France and Sweden of more than 10%

### 3.3.2 Evaluation

It is difficult to evaluate the degree to which France and Sweden foster social justice and equality, this owing to the nature of the data. A more detailed study would be needed for that. At the first glance it could be assumed that investments in *Education* as France undertook, have a positive impact on social justice and equality hinting at a reform humanist perspective. But a different picture emerges if one takes into account France's main aid recipients, mainly francophone former colonies, suggesting (as pointed out in the previous chapter) a strongly identity-based approach to development. In clear terms, this means that disbursements for education in truth do not serve to foster the above-mentioned humanist norms but rather strengthen *la francophonie* worldwide, a characteristic that fits well into realism. France's commitment to *Economic infrastructure* on the other hand points to a liberal humanism perspective. Concerning Sweden, it emerges from the comparison that Swedish policy tries to build up a better civil society with the increased percentage in *Government and civil society* and therefore pursues a strategy of 'help them help themselves' in correspondence with national domestic values. Its high share in *Emergency aid* hints at radical humanist stance. Thus, the comparison of major aid purposes is in line with the preceding analysis that situated Sweden between radical and reform humanism.

#### 3.3.2.1 Coherence

It seems that over a relatively short period of seven years considerable changes have taken place in the budget allocations within Sweden's and France's bilateral aid structure. Focusing on those areas for which I saw a considerable difference between France and Sweden's budget share, most of these changes went into the same direction. For instance, in 2008 compared to 2002 there was a parallel increase in spending for *Government and civil society* as well as for *Unspecified aid*. There was a parallel decrease in the percentage spent for *Action relating to debt* and *Emergency aid*. Concerning spending on *Education* France and Sweden were moving towards each other, however maintaining a big difference of almost 15 percent. The only area where they were moving apart was *Economic infrastructure*.

It should be stressed that France and Sweden set budget priorities in very different areas: France in *Education* and *Economic infrastructure* and Sweden in *Government and civil society* and *Emergency aid*. For policy coherence this means Sweden and France practise very little collusion instead the continuing differences in the budget allocations indicate coexistence (informal), or the division of tasks (formal). However, both countries seem to have moved towards liberal humanism and the OECD model of development aid in the time span from 2001 to 2008. For France this is due to a considerable increase in the share allocated to *Economic infrastructure* and a big decrease in *Social and administrative structure*. For Sweden the move seems less drastically since it cut the share for *Social and administrative structure* only by three percent, leaving the heading of *Government and civil society* basically untouched. Furthermore, it decreased its

share for *Economic infrastructure*. The decrease in *Emergency aid* on the other hand indicates a shifting away from radical humanism.

### **3.4 Conclusion**

In this chapter I have looked at the major purposes in foreign aid and the specific budget allocations of Sweden and France to the same using data from the DAC Development Reports for the years 2001 and 2008. France's priority areas were *Education* in both years and more recently *Economic infrastructure*. Sweden spent its biggest share on *Government and civil society* as well as on *Emergency aid*. By this, results of the previous chapter were confirmed, locating Sweden between radical and reform humanism and France between liberal humanism and realism. In order to pinpoint both countries more, I will examine the specific foreign aid policies in the next chapters.



# 4

## Sweden's Development Policy

*This chapter provides the reader with an overview on Swedish development policy, describing first its policy making and implementation and then the main trends and changes in objectives over the last decade and its current objectives. It also reflects on some observations that stand out.*

## ***4.1 Introduction***

The previous chapter compared major budget purposes in Swedish and French ODA. This chapter will concentrate on Swedish aid policy. It first gives an account on how Swedish aid is governed. Then a timeline will be deduced from the objectives mentioned in the budget statements. Thereafter, the current objectives and the reasoning behind them will be explained in order to finish with some further observations.

## ***4.2 Aid management***

### **4.2.1 Policy-Making**

As is common among many donor countries, Sweden's development policy objectives are set by the government, specifically by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The government issues biannually a communication on Sweden's development policy. Additionally, there are the annual budget bills that lay down how much money should be spent for what and include special initiatives within the priority areas defined in the communications. Sweden's policy for global development is based on the Government Bill Shared responsibility: Sweden's policy for global development (2002/03:122) which was adopted by the Riksdag in December 2003. The aim of the policy is overall coherence based on the goal of fair and sustainable global development. A view towards social justice and the perspective of poor people also forms the basis of Swedish development policy. Relationships with countries with which Sweden undertakes long-term cooperation are governed by so-called country strategies or frameworks. They are prepared jointly by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and SIDA. To an increasing extent, they are also based on close dialogue with the partner country in question, both with the government and the civil society. In addition to the country frameworks, there are a number of special initiatives, both in states which have country framework cooperation with Sweden and in other countries. These initiatives are often short-term or of a more limited nature. They are, however, included in country strategies in the countries for which strategies are established. This type of assistance includes support for democracy and human rights, private-sector cooperation, support for economic reforms, special environmental initiatives, humanitarian assistance, research cooperation and support via Swedish NGOs (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2000).

### **4.2.2 Implementation**

The implementation is carried out by several governmental aid agencies amongst which the Swedish International Development cooperation Agency (SIDA) is the most important. It has been formed in 1995 by merging five existing development aid authorities. By means of a letter of appropriation stating how much money SIDA

gets and how it should be allocated to its different activities and setting for instance the size of budget support for a particular recipient, SIDA administers half of the ODA budget. SIDA distributes both long-term development aid and short-term humanitarian assistance for people suffering from armed conflicts or natural disasters. Five departments have been set up for different strategic policy areas reflecting its priorities:

- democracy, human rights and gender equality
- economic opportunities
- knowledge, health and social development
- environmentally sustainable development
- peace and security

Furthermore there are two secretariats, one for development and coherence and one for research cooperation. Both SIDA and the partner countries must draw up implementation reports. In addition to internal scrutiny carried out by this Secretariat, SIDA's operations are also reviewed by the National Audit Office and the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation, SADEV.

### **4.3 Objectives**

The following section first gives an overview of developments in Swedish aid objectives during the last decade in form of a timeline. Then, the current objectives will be presented as well as the reasoning behind the three main priorities.


#### **4.3.1 Development Aid over the Last Decade**

In search for the main trends in Swedish development objectives, I looked at the budget statements available from the budget bills from 2000 to 2009. They were browsed for keywords such as 'sustainable development', 'development objectives' and 'foreign cooperation' in order to find any statements on objectives concerning development aid. For a more tangible description of Swedish development over time, this section aims to identify the major trends. Looking at Figure 4.1 which shows objectives mentioned in the budget statements in a timeline, four main phases can be distinguished.

##### **4.3.1.1 Step-Up**

From 2001 to 2003 there was the only phase which mentioned the quantitative objective to raise ODA to at least one percent of GNI in order to give Sweden "*a strong voice in international cooperation for peace and sustainable development*" (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2002, p.4). Goals like the promotion of democracy and human rights were referred to as well in the budget statement of 2001, but more as a general objective of foreign policy and together with cultural diversity and the protection of the environment. Therefore, I will call this the step-up period. It was also stated that

Sweden should aim at making EU foreign aid more efficient (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2000-2003).



**Figure 4.1** *Timeline of Objectives in Swedish development policy. Source: Budget statements 2000 to 2009 (Swedish Ministry of Finance)*

#### 4.3.1.2 Multilateralization

In 2005 and 2006, marks a changing point since there and in the subsequent year the reaching of the MDGs was stated as main impetus of objectives in development aid and more concrete objectives were formulated. The international community naturally had a big effect on Swedish development aid due to the signing of the MDGs. But there were also other changes, since for the first time debt relief and

the promotion of fair trade were mentioned, two areas only to be achieved in a multilateral effort. These areas also seem rather liberalist and not ‘traditionally’ Swedish like the concept of ‘help for self help’ that was also touched upon in 2005 (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2005-2006). This phase might thus best be described by multilateralization period.

#### **4.3.1.3 Reform**

Then, in 2007 and 2008, the budget statements stressed the need for a broader functional approach to combating poverty and at the same time the need of a better geographical focus, for instance, on poverty reduction in Africa. Priorities in 2007 were democracy and human rights, security and development, economic growth, sustainable development of the environment, trade and development, HIV/AIDS, women’s conditions and gender equality. Sweden also gave priority to humanitarian assistance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Finally in 2008, a reform of development policy was decided upon that streamlined development policy. The previous 65 objectives for global development hampered implementation, coherence and reporting and therefore have been replaced by only three focus areas with respective implementation targets tackling eight global challenges which will be described in more detail below (Ministry of Finance, 2007 & 2008).

#### **4.3.1.4 Crisis Alleviation**

The reform period had an impact on the 2009 budget statement in which the new focus areas were implemented. In the budget statement prioritized areas were outlined as democracy and human rights, environment and climate and gender equality and women’s role in development. However, a new aspect has been added. In a press release from 21 September 2009 by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Gunilla Carlsson stated that the aim was to cushion the impact of the global economic crisis in the short term and to create conditions for a good recovery in the longer term. The priorities in the development assistance budget therefore give high consideration to Africa, humanitarian assistance, certain UN organisations and support via Swedish civil society organisations. The crisis alleviation period presumably will continue this year and into the future if the new government does not change them because of the end of the electoral period in 2010 (Ministry of Finance, 2009).

#### **4.3.1.5 Conclusion**

In conclusion, the development policy objectives mentioned in the budget statements have followed a pattern of four phases in chronological order since 2001: the step-up period starting, the multilateralization period, the reform period and the implementation period which still continues. Of course, these phases are not without transitions or objectives that do not fit in the pattern (e.g. efficiency in EU foreign aid

would fit better into the multilateralization period rather than the set-up period) but, all in all, it seems to make sense.

### 4.3.2 Current objectives

I will now turn to the current objectives in Swedish foreign aid. The current objectives were extracted from the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For finding the reasoning behind the main priorities, speeches of Swedish ministers with a relevant content were chosen from the online database of the government offices.

Sweden's overall objective for development cooperation is to create conditions which enable poor people to improve their lives. Thus, a strategy centred on 'helping people to help themselves' (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2008). On their website the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2008) identifies the three priority areas for current development policy since the reform in 2008 as:

- Democracy and human rights focusing on
  - civil and political rights
  - the institutions and procedures of democracy and the rule of law
  - the actors involved in democratisation
- Environment and climate focusing on
  - adaptation to climate change
  - energy
  - environment and security
  - water
- Gender equality and women's role in development focuses on
  - women's participation in politics
  - women as economic actors
  - sexual and reproductive health and rights, including HIV and AIDS
  - women and security, gender based violence and human trafficking.

#### 4.3.2.1 Priority Number 1: Democracy and Human Rights

In a speech on the occasion of the European Development Days on 23 October 2009 Gunilla Carlsson, the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation, made it clear that from a Swedish perspective democracy and human rights play a crucial part in development cooperation. She also said that the lack of democracy is also a kind of poverty:

*“Poverty is not just about lack of material resources and lack of security and shelter, but about lack of freedom, choice and access to political power. If people living in poverty are denied their right to speak freely, to influence or change their living conditions, or the destiny of their communities*

*and countries, this is a sign of poverty. For us, this means that the fight against poverty must be conducted with both money and values.” (Carlsson, 2009)*

Furthermore, she stressed that democracy is not only an objective in itself but also a means for more effectiveness and combating corruption. She also mentioned that Sweden had initiated a process at EU level together with other member states in order to strengthen policy for a coordinated support to democracy building in EU’s external relations.(Carlsson, 2009)

#### **4.3.2.2 Priority Number 2: Environment and Climate**

Concerning the environment and climate, Mrs Carlsson made a speech on 19 August 2009 at the Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA). There she said that African countries should benefit from the experience of developed countries in measures for protection and the environment and the climate. Due to the already existing effects of climate change not only prevention but also adaptation is required. In her opinion, the joint responsibility of rich countries and African leaders for acting against climate change is deduced from the fact that the hardest hit, are poor people and among them, especially poor women and girls. Finally she stressed that the Swedish Government has made a special commitment to climate change for the fiscal year 2009. This includes a considerable increase in ODA allocation for adaptation and special recognition of their National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), for disaster risk reduction and risk transfer. The package amounts to almost 400 million Euros over four years.

#### **4.3.2.3 Priority Number 3: Gender Equality and Women’s Role in Development**

At the United Nations in New York on 03 March 2010 Nyamko Sabuni, the Swedish Minister for Integration and Gender Equality, held a speech about gender equality in development aid. She stated that one of the Swedish objectives it to reduce maternal mortality. Convinced of the need to spread the fact that women have the right to their own body and sexuality, she promised that Sweden will advocate safe an legal abortions, work towards increasing the number of midwives in developing countries and to improving their education and provide a better infrastructure for better access to health care (Sabuni, 2010).

### **4.4 Further Observations**

*How predetermined is Swedish foreign aid?*

Swedish development policy seems very institutionalized but at the same time open for civil society participation. It has been an important issue in election campaigns and plays a big role in public discourse. From the comment under the government bill of 2002 it can be assumed that not only parliament has made proposals for changes but also other organisations were asked to give comments on

the draft. Unfortunately, in spite of the Swedish principle of public access to official documents these annotations were not included in the English translation of the document. Another domain where civil society dialogue regularly takes place is in the drafting of the country strategies. In Sweden, participants in the process include popular movements, non-governmental organisations, the Swedish Trade Council, universities and individual experts. The Swedish tradition of civil society participation is thus not only a goal to be promoted in recipient countries but is also practiced within the policy making process itself.

*Which concepts are recurring?*

It catches the eye that in Government communications continuously expressions like ‘global responsibility’ and ‘global challenges’ are used. This means that politicians and officials seem to be very aware of their responsibility to help developing countries. Furthermore, the objective to offer help for self-help is often stressed, which is likely due to Sweden’s traditionally strong civil society public participation. Coherence both within Swedish development policy itself and between different policy areas and development policy has been mentioned throughout the last decade as an important goal by all policy documents on foreign aid. Also Sweden’s close cooperation with the European Union and other multilateral donors was stressed. However, cooperation with other MS on bilateral aid has been omitted.

*Do the political priorities reflect the budget priorities found in the DAC reports?*

The priorities as published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not congruent with the headings for major budget purposes used by the DAC. However, the Government and civil society presented in chapter three, which was the biggest budget priority, covers measures under the first political priority of Democracy and Human Rights. Since the rest of the political priorities cannot be reflected in any of the DAC headings, it is not possible to make any further conclusions.

## **4.5 Conclusion**

Concluding, it can be said that Sweden’s development policy is very open to civil society dialogue and public discourse with many different actors participating in the policy-making. This is due to public officials with a strong sense for the responsibility of developed countries to help poor countries, so that NGOs with radical humanist views could gain a lot of influence. With human rights, democracy, the protection of the environment and gender equality, Sweden is currently prioritizing rather post-materialist values that emphasize self-expression and autonomy. The Swedish concept of ‘help for self-help’ also fits into that picture. The short period of multilateralization has introduced some liberal humanist objectives but these were dropped due to the reform in 2008 that aimed at streamlining Swedish aid policy and at concentrating on what Sweden can do best.

# 5

## France's Development Policy

*This chapter provides the reader with an overview on French development policy, describing first its policy making and implementation, the main trends and changes in objectives over the last decade and its current objectives. It also reflects on some observations that stand out.*

## ***5.1 Introduction***

France is a major actor in development aid. In absolute figures, in 2009, France was after the USA the second largest contributor worldwide of ODA in terms of volume and the leading European contributor. She was also the second largest contributor worldwide to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and to the African Development Fund (ADF) (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). However, in relative figures i.e. in terms of GNI share, while Sweden already had crossed the UN target long before the period of the analysis, the mere reaching of the EU intermediary target seems almost impossible for France unless it increases its share considerably in this year. But owing to the financial crisis France has reduced and postponed its aid pledges for the year 2010. The OECD estimates France's commitments for 2010 to be far below the target. However, France does not stand alone in lagging behind. In fact, the majority of member states except for Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands had neither reached nor exceeded the UN target in 2008 when the EU-27 average was 0.40 per cent (see Annex figure 3). It remains to be seen whether the worldwide financial and economic crisis in 2008 that induced budget cuts in most member states will further impede the achievement of the MDG target not only in France (OECD, 2010b).

In reference to the first chapter where France was identified as corporatist and where it was presumed that France could favour francophone recipients, this chapter will focus on two central questions: First, who is making the real decisions in French foreign aid policy? And second, which countries is French foreign aid focusing on and why? In order to answer these questions, the first part describes how French aid is managed, the second part describes French objectives, both over time as well as its current objectives. The chapter ends with some further observations and a conclusion.

## ***5.2 Aid management***

This section about aid management identifies the most important French actors in development aid. First the policy-making and then its implementation will be described in order to reach a conclusion.

### ***5.2.1 Policy-Making***

The strategies, objectives and geographical focus of French foreign aid are set biannually by the Comité interministériel de la coopération internationale et du développement (CICID)<sup>1</sup>, since France does not have a single ministry dealing with foreign aid issues at its disposal. The three partner ministries participating in the CICID meetings are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of

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<sup>1</sup> Interministerial Committee of International Development Cooperation

Economy and the Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Mutual Development (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 2009). Since 2005, the CICID has concluded partnership framework agreements with the recipient countries in France's priority zone for a period of five years replacing the former country strategies with a more concise and sector-based approach (MOFA, 2006). The president makes sensitive decisions himself, such as setting the percentage of GNI dedicated to ODA and gives new impulses, whereas the prime minister has more of an oversight and coordinating position, presiding over CICID meetings. The relevant consultative body for development aid was the Haut Conseil de la Coopération Internationale (HCCI). This institution was set up in 1999 in order to improve the civil society dialogue on development aid in France and was composed of politicians from the regional, departmental and national level as well as different societal actors who were nominated together with the HCCI president by the prime minister. The HCCI was, however, abolished in 2008 (MOFA, 2009). The parliament, except for approving the finance bills, does not seem to play a role in development aid. In 2002 the DAC advised France to improve the information flow about foreign aid to the parliament (CICID 2002). Not until 2005, a new law on the adoption of the budget allegedly improving the transparency and traceability of finances in foreign aid was passed (CICID 2006).

### 5.2.2 Implementation

The main implementing agency is the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), a relatively new institution founded in 1998 and which is supervised by the MOFA. The MOFA is also directly responsible for the allocation of development funds in some areas, thereby functioning simultaneously as both principle and agency. Between the AFD and the MOFA there is a division of tasks. The MOFA is directly responsible for fostering the rule of law, institutional reform and decentralisation, as well as support of la francophonie<sup>2</sup>, French education and cultural and scientific cooperation. The AFD directs aid flows to countries in the 'Zone de solidarité prioritaire' (ZSP)<sup>3</sup> in the sectors of education, water and sanitation, health and combat against Aids, infrastructural development, agriculture and food security, production, environment and biodiversity and the support of NGOs (MOFA, 2009). More generally, while the ministry is responsible for the political aspects of foreign aid, the AFD concentrates on basic human needs or the preservation of global public goods.

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<sup>2</sup> La francophonie designates the French-speaking community in its entirety. In this context it refers to the solidarity with francophone developing countries due to their cultural affiliation with France leading to a special consideration in French ODA.

<sup>3</sup> The Zone de solidarité prioritaire denotes a geographic area mainly consisting of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa on which French bilateral ODA is concentrated forming thus an area of preferential solidarity.

### **5.2.3 Conclusion**

This section about the management of development aid in France showed that policy-making is fragmented with responsibility being split up among different ministries. A ministry solely responsible for foreign cooperation as in Sweden is likely to be more efficient, but for France according to Cumming “*A single bureaucracy [...] may, however, be a long way off*” (1995, pp.398). The implementation process is also split up between two agencies, the MOFA and the AFD, creating further inefficiency. Even though both have their clear responsibilities, political aspects and global public goods are interrelated and could blend into each other. Such a division of tasks is thus not beneficial for the overall coherence among the different areas in national foreign aid. Lastly, it was illustrated that the MOFA carries out both policy-making and implementing tasks, which yields it a lot of discretion. This also means that France’s ODA management could be missing oversight.

## **5.3 Objectives**

The following section gives an overview of the evolution of objectives in French development policy during the last decade. Then, the current objectives will be presented from which I will extract the main priorities and depict the president’s and the secretary of state’s view on these main priorities using statements from speeches and interviews. Finally, under the heading of Further observations I will give a judgement about how predetermined French aid policy is, which concepts are recurring and whether the priorities are reflected in the budget.

### **5.3.1 Development Aid over the Last Decade**

In search for the main trends in French development objectives, I looked at the records available online from the conclusions of the CICID meetings starting in 2000 to 2009. The important aspects were extracted from the records to make a timeline with four phases (see figure 5.1). In the following the different periods will be explained.

#### **5.3.1.1 Establishment**

During the establishment period from 2000 to 2001, the CICID was still in its beginning since this institution was set up only in the year 1999, and therefore systemic reform first had to be fully implemented. Furthermore, the ZSP already then mainly composed of former French colonies was referred to as being subject to change. The records mention as overall objectives of French development assistance the combat against poverty and a sustainable development. Two priorities in French ODA which will later become more pronounced have already come to the fore. As in the discussion of the debt cancellation initiative, it is stated that free funds should be used for investments into the health and education sectors. Additionally, the CICID aims to promote the French offer to the ZSP for higher education abroad (CICID, 2000).

### **5.3.1.2 Expansion**

Starting with the CICID meeting in 2002, after the reforms had been fully established, French foreign aid expanded in respect of volume, recipients, forms of aid and objectives. Both in the records of 2002 and 2004, the aim was to raise the share of GNI reserved for ODA with reference to the MDGs and French international prestige. Although the ZSP should remain mainly concentrated on Africa, France wanted to extend the AFD's area of responsibility to the Mediterranean region and Indochina for strategic reasons. Furthermore, it was envisaged to give support to fragile states, helping them with institutional reconstruction and the basic human needs of the population prior to or after a crisis, and to emerging economies, helping them with strategies of growth that were not harmful to the environment. In 2002, the new sectors added to health and education were water and energy. Later on in 2004, these sectors of intervention were complemented by objectives partly adopted from the MDGs as are:




Figure 5.1 Timeline of Objectives in French development policy. Source: CICID from 2000 until 2009

1. Education: Primary education for everyone.
2. Water and sanitation: Halving the number of people without water and sanitation.
3. Health and combat against Aids: Mortality reduction and containment of contagious diseases
4. Agriculture: food security
5. Infrastructural development: Construction of regional infrastructures
6. Environmental protection: Protection of the forestal biodiversity.

The expansion period also contained reform elements, for instance, the CICID stated that instruments should be simplified and efficiency should be improved, and that the procedures among DAC countries should be harmonized. In the following meeting the division of tasks between the MOFA and AFD as described in the section about policy-implementation was laid down. Furthermore, with the partner framework documents aid became more performance-based. Decentralisation was a new topic as well as public awareness of development assistance in France itself, and debt cancellation and migration both have remained on the agenda (CICID, 2002 & 2004).

#### **5.3.1.3 Specification**

The CICID meeting in 2006 marked the beginning of the specification period. It defined specific means of reaching the objectives in the different categories of recipient countries. The priority for Africa was reconfirmed, however with a new approach. In order to make use of its economic potential, its natural and human resources, means inspired by liberal humanism such as building up the private sector and supporting SME were introduced. As far as the cooperation with the emerging economies such as China, India, Brasil, Chile, Mexico and South-Africa are concerned, the CICID envisaged the creation of elites in those countries and their increased scientific cooperation with France. Additionally, the objectives to fight against contagious diseases and climate change as well as to the preserve biodiversity were underlined. Furthermore, the ministers committed themselves to further increase ODA (CICID, 2006).

#### **5.3.1.4 Restructuring**

The last CICID meeting in 2009 restructured French ODA objectives into three challenges to be tackled. The first challenge was in the ministers' view, poverty alleviation which they hope to meet by raising the aid share to reach the target of 0.7 percent of GNI by 2015. Secondly, there is the challenge of economic growth which has been hampered due to the economic crisis which hit developing countries the hardest. As an alleviation measure France decided to allocate bigger sums to the IMF and to actions decided during the G20 summit. The third challenge was said to be the preservation of global public goods designating the previously already established sectors of health, education, agriculture and sustainable development. A new aspect of

the restructuring period was also that four country categories were defined and the means and objectives specifically for those were listed. The ZSP became the first category which as previously focuses on poor countries in francophone Sub-Saharan Africa with privileged ties to France already in place and aid coming at very concessional financial terms such as subsidies. In the records of the meeting it is stated that: “*Sub-Saharan Africa will be allocated of 60% of the resources from the aid budget*”<sup>4</sup> (CICID, 2009, 3.b). Furthermore, the document says that the ZSP will mainly concentrate on poor francophone countries in that region. The provisional list of recipients: “*Benin, Burkina Faso, Comores, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Senegal, Chad, Togo*”<sup>5</sup> indeed comprises exclusively francophone countries (CICID, 2009, Annex a). The French priority for francophone recipients becomes also evident once more looking at the EU Fast Track Initiative where France become lead facilitator in another four French speaking countries as are Cameroon, Central African Republic and Mali (Council of the European Union, 2009, Annex II). Returning to the CICID meeting 2009, the second country category, consisting of mainly MICs situated in the Mediterranean region were scheduled to receive economic support and technical assistance in order to reach convergence with their neighbouring countries. Further aims were to promote cultural diversity, elite-forming, stabilisation of the governance and environmentally sustainable development in the emerging economies of China, India, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and South Africa. In the fourth category are countries in crisis for which humanitarian aid is disbursed. However, only incidental references were made to democracy and human rights (CICID 2009).

### 5.3.1.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, France’s development policy can be divided into four phases since 2000: the establishment, expansion, specification and restructuring period. It is striking that these phases can be distinguished mostly in the wording of objectives and in the way they are presented. However, the actual objectives did not change. Throughout the last decade, the key priorities that were set in the education and health sector have remained the same with agriculture, sustainability and economic growth joining in later on. Step-by-step objectives were refined and equipped with means and subsequently different strategies were set up for different categories of recipient countries. Also the skewed recipient pool favouring francophone countries did not change over time. It seems that by presenting slowly improving precision and different frames for the same objectives, policy-makers want to make CICID records appear reform oriented, whereas in effect there has been little change.

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<sup>4</sup> translated from French by the author

<sup>5</sup> translated from French by the author

### 5.3.2 Current objectives

I will turn now to the current objectives in French foreign aid. The most recent publication on development objectives is the report on 'The G8 and Development French action 2010' published by the MOFA. It presents twelve sectors in which French development policy is currently active, their combination being in effect since the Action Plan 2007:

- Education
- Health focusing on
  - the vaccination of children against contagious diseases
  - maternal health, reduce mortality in projects in the ZSP
  - co-financing of projects combating Aids, malaria etc
- Economic growth focusing on
  - support for SME in Africa (since 2008)
- Agriculture focusing on
  - food security (president 2008: global partnership for food security)
- Water and sanitation (since 2003 G8 Summit)
- Debt cancellation
- Environment and energy focusing on
  - sustainable forest management
- Democratic governance focusing on
  - transparency in natural resources management (supporting EITI since 2005)
- Peace and security focusing on
  - peace keeping operation training to African soldiers

In comparison to the Swedish objectives, these are quite numerous. Therefore, it is necessary to extract from them the most important priorities. This will be done inter alia through the screening of recent speeches and interviews with a relevant content given by the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy and the Secretary of State for Cooperation and Francophonie, Alain Joyandet.

#### 5.3.2.1 Number 1 Priorities: Education and health

Emerging from the analysis over time in the previous section, it can be assumed that Education and Health are important priorities in French development aid since they have remained on the CICID agenda throughout the last decade. Furthermore, Joyandet stressed in an interview on the occasion of the UN Development conference

in Doha that the sectors of education and health will by no means be affected by any restrictions in ODA due to the economic crisis (Joyandet, 2008).

### **5.3.2.2 Priority Number 2: Economic growth**

Concerning economic growth, more recently in connection with the economic crisis, growth seems to have become an important priority in French development aid representing thus a move towards liberal humanism. In the above-mentioned interview, Joyandet claimed that *“The best way of achieving the Millenium Development Goals [...] is to stoke up growth”* He also stresses that new loans made possible through debt cancellation are a powerful means for economic development (Joyandet, 2008). In his speech at the Doha round Sarkozy pointed out the importance of fostering private investment and supporting microcredit especially in Africa in the French approach for more growth (Sarkozy, 2008).

### **5.3.2.3 Priority Number 3: Agriculture**

Sarkozy alleges that agriculture is another important priority to eliminate hunger that has worsened with rising food prices. He is convinced that *“The world can feed itself”* (Sarkozy, 2008). Joyandet, also stressed that regarding the objective to boost food crops in Africa, however, in order for agricultural investments to be effective African farmers should not be exposed to global competition (Joyandet, 2008). According to Sarkozy, the European Union has already made an important contribution to that by abolishing tariffs on agricultural products from LDCs (Sarkozy, 2008).

## **5.4 Further Observations**

### *How predetermined is French foreign aid?*

French, in contrast to Swedish foreign aid is neither very institutionalised nor is it very open for non-governmental actors. To begin with, there is no single ministry responsible for development cooperation. However, the most important actor is the MOFA combining both policy-making and implementation responsibilities. Other institutions like the AFD and the HCCI were set-up only quite recently. The HCCI was suspended in 2008 before it could fully establish itself working for less than a decade, allegedly because it was not economical and flexible enough. The abolition of the only consultative body where civil society dialogue could have taken place reconfirms that French foreign aid policy is not open to non-governmental actors. The MOFA claims that some civil society actors play a role in policy-making such as NGOs carrying out projects in the partner countries, migrant associations, the départements and regions, research institutes etc. (French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2010b). However, in contrast to the president's or prime minister's contributions their inputs are never mentioned in the records of the CICID meetings. High level politicians especially the president and the prime minister play a dominant role. The prime minister, who presides over the CICID meetings, has coordination responsibilities

between the different ministries involved and also has agenda-setting power at his disposal (Agence Francaise de Developpement, 2009). He can appoint candidates for positions of high level officials in foreign aid such as the president of the HCCI (CICID 2002, p.6). According to records of the meetings the president is regularly informed by the Secretary of State about the quantitative and qualitative achievement of the objectives (CICID 2004, p.1). Furthermore, financial impulses and impulses for new objectives to a great extent come from the president, for instance, the debt cancellation for LDCs not eligible for multilateral initiatives being a prime example (CICID 2002, p.4). Both politicians have a lot of discretion in development aid.

*Which concepts are recurring?*

One concept which has been mentioned both by the president in his speeches and in the CICID meetings but which has not been included in the official list of objectives, is 'co-development'. Co-development considers migrants to be a developing factor for their countries of origin. For Sarkozy this means that developing countries should benefit from the skills and savings of migrants in France (Sarkozy, 2007). Connected to migration policy is also the French idea to build-up elites in the ZSP. In his speech in Doha, Sarkozy justified the fact that migrants from developing countries studying in France are not allowed to stay longer than for a couple of years, this avoiding brain drain and the dissolving of elites (Sarkozy, 2008). Another important concept in French aid is 'la francophonie'. It can be seen from government documents as well as in practice that French solidarity concentrates on francophone developing countries. In other words France's development policy is not so much about helping poor people but about helping poor 'French' people. La francophonie thus points again towards a realist perspective based on a strong national linguistic identity. At first sight this is contradicted by Sarkozy's appeal to change the international institutions to better represent the interests of developing countries, which is more typical for a reform humanist perspective. However, he is demanding change of the world without giving concrete propositions. He even gives the motivation for demanding change in his speech, where he states that realpolitik is static. Thus, by asking for change he marks himself as a politician who pursues humanist instead of realist objectives (Sarkozy, 2007). On the other hand, Joyandet said in an interview with La Tribune that "French aid mustn't be set in stone" (Joyandet, 2008), adding that if France would stick to the previewed degree of aid in the form of subsidies this could jeopardize reaching the target of 0.7 percent in 2015. In line with the result of the analysis over time, French aid policy-makers strive to appear innovative but at the same time call for more flexibility in the targets.

*Do the political priorities reflect the budget priorities found in the DAC reports?*

The political priorities at least partially reflect the budget priorities. This is especially true for the sectors of education and economic growth which receive a big proportion of funds as was the result of chapter 3. The importance of the agricultural

sector in the budget, however, has declined and only a minor proportion of funds is allocated to health.

## **5.5 Conclusion**

In conclusion, it can be said that the institutional set-up of France's foreign aid policy reflects the dual motives of humanitarian vs. political goals. This means that whereas the CICID and the AFD are representing the humanitarian goals, the prime minister, the president and the MOFA stand for the political goals.

Although the AFD is directly involved in the implementation of foreign aid it has nowhere been mentioned in the documents as playing even a consulting role in decision-making. As was shown in the analysis of the timeline the CICID only pretends that they are innovative by proposing changes that are no real reforms in their meetings. Presumably they are strongly influenced by the prime minister who presides over their meetings and who can steer the discussion. In reference to the introduction's first central question dealing with who takes the decision in foreign aid, it seems that together with the MOFA, the prime minister and the president are the most influential actors and make the real political decision. Due to the low degree of institutionalization and civil society dialogue, they have a lot of discretion in doing so. Turning now towards French objectives in foreign aid, the priorities of education, health and agriculture have remained unchanged over time. However, they were supplemented by the new priority of economic growth in 2009, indicating a shift from realism towards more liberal humanism. Concerning the second central question, this chapter showed that French aid is traditionally focused on francophone developing countries since solidarity is strongly identity-based. France follows with co-development a specific policy whose purpose is to cultivate political influence and not just humanitarian goals in those francophone developing countries. Taken together, this means that on the humanist-realist continuum, France's aid policy is closer to realism. Humanitarian goals play a role but the first priority remains political influence. They only matter as long as they do not impair political goals.

# 6

## Concluding remarks

*This chapter gives some concluding remarks, providing the reader with a summary of the results from this study. It makes some propositions about the coherence of France's and Sweden's foreign aid, then places their policies into the European context and finally gives an outlook into the future of development aid.*

## **6.1 Introduction**

This research is aimed at answering the question ‘to what extent are objectives in the bilateral foreign aid of Sweden and France in coherence with one another?’ The point of departure was the argument that different patterns of norms across MS matter for foreign aid policy, thereby affecting both actual coherence among national aid policies and cooperation at the European level. In order to illustrate these differences Stokke’s categories of radical, reform and liberal humanist- as opposed to realist internationalism were employed. These categories can be distinguished mainly in their perspective on foreign aid i.e. by having different objectives and interests. This becomes apparent in their generosity at which they give aid because countries in the three humanist subcategories generally give aid more generously than the realist perspective.

## **6.2 Findings**

The quantitative comparison of Sweden’s and France’s aid generosity showed that Sweden’s aid policy can be located between radical and reform humanism, however, being closer to radical humanism; and France is situated somewhere between liberalism and realism, yet being closer to the former due to its outlying low bilateral aid share. The analysis of the major purposes in foreign aid found that France and Sweden have prioritized different aid sectors, namely that France’s priority areas were *Education* and more recently *Economic infrastructure*, while Sweden spent its biggest share on *Government and civil society* as well as on *Emergency aid*. In the previous two chapters Sweden’s and France’s aid policies were examined more closely. As could be demonstrated, France and Sweden have very different aid policy systems creating a potential for conflict. While Sweden’s system is very open and institutionalized and took up a reform humanist perspective, France’s is closed and little institutionalized and adopted a realist stance on development aid. Thus, as a result of this research, France and Sweden have very diverging national policies in foreign aid.

### **6.2.1 Coherence in the national context**

These national differences could lead to incoherence of national aid policies. In order to recapitulate the operationalisation of coherence, collusion meant at least a partial overlap of objectives. In coexistence there is no overlap but objectives may also not run contrary to one another. Finally, objectives were defined as colliding when they are irreconcilably far apart. At first glance, it seems that in terms of coherence French and Swedish priorities in aid objectives coexist because being in totally different sectors they do not overlap so that collusion can be excluded. However, the second condition of co-existence that objectives should not run counter to each other is more difficult to exclude, even for non-congruent objective priorities. If, for instance, with the help of France a recipient country has built up a French education system but the

administrative organization is based on the Swedish system this could lead to trans-sectoral norm collision because donors transfer their own values directly or indirectly via institutions which they set up. Assuming that in a francophone developing country where France is highly involved in the education system, children are exposed to authoritarian education and then are confronted with an administration that values civil society dialogue, this does not very likely lead to a functioning society. The hypothesis made at the beginning of the thesis that there will mainly be collusion of aid objectives between France and Sweden could therefore only partially be confirmed. This study found mainly coexistence. A new study would be needed in order to evaluate exactly whether trans-sectoral collisions between different aid sectors exist.

### **6.2.2 Coherence in the European context**

From the results of this study, inferences can be made concerning the coherence at the European level. The developments at the European level in terms of coherence are ambiguous. There is the European Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy and its implementing document the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness concluded in 2007 and 2009 respectively. Although the Code of Conduct, by propagating consistent country systems and technical cooperation led to the use of common instruments and thus to a certain collusion among MS; coexistence has actually been stimulated with regards to aid objectives. The reason for this is the European strategy of a division of labour and the Fast Track Initiative. By these European strategies it should be understood that donors limit themselves to those sectors in which they have a comparative advantage and concentrate on fewer recipient countries (Council of the European Union, 2009). Thereby they are supporting the specialization of MS in those sectors in which they are best at respectively. In the cases of Sweden and France these were sectors that their respective national aid policies have traditionally encompassed. As could be expected, objectives in France and Sweden have changed little as regards content compared to the situation before the Code of Conduct and international frameworks like the Paris declaration and Accra Agenda for Action were concluded. Except for economic infrastructure added by France, all current objectives have been there since the beginning of the analysis. However, in the case of Sweden an increased prioritization and streamlining has taken place.

It can be argued that the European approach is inconsistent because on the one hand it demands sector specification thereby increasing the number of donors per recipient and on the other hand with the Fast Track Initiative on the division of labour it supports country concentration which means decreasing the number of donors per recipient country. Furthermore, it could happen that some sectors are not covered because the choice is up to the donors. Through habit or out of prestige they might not be willing to cover other important sectors. Those objectives that Sweden and France are currently concentrating on, democracy and human rights as well as

education and economic infrastructure, are very important but these needs are still secondary compared to the most basic human needs like water, food and shelter.

In spite of the European efforts for a division of labour, a process of convergence has taken place between Sweden and France. Both countries have included more liberal humanist tendencies over the course of the last decade, moving thus closer to the OECD model of foreign aid. This has in a sense narrowed the gap between them but might also bring problems in the future, when the point arrives when they are both concentrating on the same sector e.g. infrastructural development. The tendency towards liberal humanism could be associated with the recent economic crisis and therefore can probably be generalised to the majority of MS. A follow-up study with more cases would provide more evidence. In the long term, on the basis of more collusion, not only in instruments, but also in objectives, there might be scope for more delegation of foreign aid to the EU level. However, in the short term, taking into account the still diverging national policies in foreign aid, EU level negotiations processes will only succeed in achieving more cooperation in the form of coexistence.

### ***6.3 Outlook***

However the prospects for truly achieving development objectives of any kind are bleak as long as the EU concludes agreements like Cotonou with reciprocal trade access which offset all development efforts, since developing countries are not prepared for EU products entering their markets.

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