Consequences of the Relationship between International and European Law for the Study of these Disciplines: Confronting Perspectives and Combining Interests

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1. Introduction

European law is international law, albeit perhaps a special branch in which, in particular, the link with domestic legal systems is further developed and the states have shown a willingness to transfer some of their competences to an international organization. The fact that European law does not exist in isolation, but is very well connected to other areas and levels of international law has become more apparent over the years. Part of the reason is to be found in the development of the European Union’s so-called external relations, that is: the relations it has with non-EU member states and other international organizations. This development, which became even more apparent with the focus of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty on the role of the EU as a global actor,\(^1\) underlines two dimensions of the interface between international and European law.

The first one is the effect of international law on the EU legal order. While the idea of the ‘autonomy’ of the EU legal order is still seen as a cornerstone for its functioning\(^2\) – perhaps in particular when the application and interpretation of EU law is concerned\(^3\) – many studies focussed on the ways in which international law is received in the Union’s legal order (often applying domestic constitutional analogies involving terms such as monism and dualism), or on the hierarchical position of international law among other norms (often concluding that it was placed somewhere between primary and secondary EU law).\(^4\) The overall consensus seems to be that, as

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\(^1\) See for instance the various contributions to B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (Eds.), *The EU's Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension* (OUP, 2013); as well as, in particular, Arts. 3(5), 21 and 22 TEU.
\(^2\) Among the many publications on the autonomy of the EU, see for instance T. Molnár, 'The Concept of Autonomy of EU Law from the Comparative Perspective of International Law and the Legal Systems of Member States' (2015) *Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law* 433-459.
\(^4\) See for instance (and for further references) the contributions to E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and R.A. Wessel (Eds.), *International Law as Law of the European Union* (Martinus Nijhoff 2011); R.A. Wessel, *Close Encounters of the Third Kind: The Interface Between the EU and International Law after the Lisbon Treaty*, (Sieps Report 2013). See also V. Moreno-Lax and P. Gragl, ‘Introduction: Beyond Monism, Dualism, Pluralism: The Quest
a matter of principle, the EU’s order is open to international law, international commitments of the EU do have an effect internally and may even set aside secondary EU rules; and in some occasions the EU has simply no choice but the accept international law in exercising its role as a global actor among states.\(^5\)

The second dimension of the interface between international and European law is the influence of the EU on the international legal order (and on the domestic order of third states). Political science, in particular, has underlined and studied the role of the EU as a global normative actor,\(^6\) in particular in the promotion of its own values and by influencing global policy-making. Recently, the question of the external impact of EU rules and the ways in which these could form a legitimate source of international law, has also been picked-up by legal scholars.\(^7\) Legal studies furthermore addressed the question of the ‘Europeanisation of international law’, understood as dealing with the way in which international law is ‘Europeaniﬁed’ when it becomes part of the EU legal order (leading to questions on the emergence of a distinct European system of international law or the consequences of this ‘Europeanisation’ for the unity and coherence of public international law),\(^8\) as well as the normative aspects of making international law more ‘European’.\(^9\)

\(^{5}\) An example is formed by the ‘contracting-in’ strategy of the EU in international diplomatic law in relation to the functioning of its representatives abroad and the so-called Union Delegations. See further below, as well as J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2012, pp. 31-49.


\(^{8}\) See J. Wouters, A. Nollkaemper and E. de Wet (Eds.), The Europeanisation of International Law: The Status of International Law in the EU and its Member States (T.M.C. Asser Press 2008).

\(^{9}\) See, on the idea of the EU as a ‘model’ for the international legal order, for instance, A. Cassese, ‘Towards a Moderate Monism: Could International Rules Eventually Acquire the Force to Invalidate Inconsistent National Laws?’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, (OUP 2012), at 187; Slaughter and Burke-White, op.cit., at 327; M. Weller, ‘The Struggle for an International Constitutional Order’, in D. Armstrong (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of International Law, (Routledge 2009), 179-194, at 181. It has even been suggested that ‘the European example is now most often cited by international lawyers not by way of contrasting public international law regimes but by way of suggesting the probable or desired
While the mutual influence of international and EU law thus seems to be generally acknowledged, EU law remains special. After all, it is not just law between states, but also within states.\textsuperscript{10} It is characterised by a number of elements that are often absent in other branches of international law: \textit{inter alia}, primacy and direct effect, quite well-developed systems of political and judicial supervision, a directly elected parliament and, perhaps above all, a clear transfer of competences. All of this has turned the EU in something that is much more than a regular international organization and an entity that is increasingly assuming state-like functions.\textsuperscript{11}

It is this 'specialness' of the EU that lies at the basis of the continued separation in the study of international and EU law. Let’s face it: in most educational programmes, international law and European law are taught in different courses. And in the event that they are combined, course outlines usually show different weeks for international and EU law. Textbooks in which international and EU law are combined in any conceptual fashion hardly exist.\textsuperscript{12} The same separation is visible in the research communities. International law scholars would generally be hesitant to teach EU law and \textit{vice versa}, even at a very basic level. And, at ESIL conferences the present author meets a completely different crowd than at FIDE conferences. While ‘EU external relations’ used to be the area where international and EU law would necessarily be combined, even that field has developed into subject area of its own, with its own circle of specialists that have become more focussed on EU case law and questions of competence division than on learning to combine insights from both disciplinary perspectives. Indeed, few fora allow for an exchange of thoughts between international and European law and only few journals would be interested to publish in both areas.

Yet, the links between the two areas are obvious. The European Union was established by a treaty concluded by sovereign states and many international law issues recur within the EU. One may think of methods for the interpretation of treaty provisions, questions on the legal personality of EU Institutions or agencies, or the need to respect commitments in good faith. Also other issues, such as the rules on the Stability Pact, the voting arrangements in the Council, the late implementation of EU legislation by Member States or the relatively limited competences of the European Parliament are understandable only with some knowledge of the nature and structure of the international system.

This paper therefore argues that – given the non-contested interrelationship between international and EU law – both disciplines could benefit from each other's insights. To better understand EU law, it would also make sense for students to be confronted with the interface with international law rather than with its mere ‘specialness’. Admittedly, the same holds true for other

\textsuperscript{10} See already the early statement that “the EU “cannot be fitted into traditional categories of international or constitutional law”; H.L. Mason, \textit{The European Coal and Steel Community: Experiment in Supranationalism}, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955, at p. 126.


\textsuperscript{12} To overcome this, the present author co-wrote a new Dutch textbook that was initially quite well used at Dutch universities offering a course on ‘international and European law’. After a few years, however, the integrated approach offered by the book proofed to be difficult to match the course outlines, which preferred to deal with the issues separately. See W.G. Werner and R.A. Wessel, \textit{Internationaal en Europese recht: Een verkenning van grondslagen en kenmerken}, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2011 (3rd ed.).
academic sub-disciplines. Thus, findings in national constitutional law should be compared more with global and European constitutional developments, and knowledge of private law helps one understand the logic of treaty law and the law of responsibility. Yet, the present paper will focus on international and EU law only. It will start by confronting the perspectives both disciplines have on each other (section 2). This will be followed by mapping a number of areas of potential common interest (section 3). Section 4, finally, will try and answer the question of whether it makes sense to study both disciplines in a more integrated fashion.

2. Mutual perspectives

2.1 An international law perspective on the European Union

As an international entity, the European Union can be studied from the perspective of international law. Yet, international law’s focus is mainly on states. Only states are vested with ‘original rights’ and hence are ‘primary subjects’ of international law. And even though other international actors accept that the Union takes at times a state-like position, “the EU is, under international law, precluded by its very nature from being considered a State”. At the same time, international law does deal with international organizations, and the EU can be classified as one. Nevertheless, the special relationship with its Member States is unique in the law of international organizations and even in that field, the EU is often set apart.

Indeed, is has been argued that the EU is “an international legal experiment”. Few would argue that the EU is a state; many would say that it is an international entity sui generis. International law, however, only works when it is applied across the board for certain categories of international actors. Its rationale is to offer clarity and set the conditions for a smooth cooperation between different subjects. At the same time, it is of course possible to create special rules for special entities. The clauses on Regional Economic Integration Organizations (REIOs) in some multilateral agreements are a good example.

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13 See also Eckes and Wessel, op.cit. Some arguments in this section are derived from that paper.
15 CJEU, Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, para 156.
16 At best as a particular type of international organization that enjoys additional rights in certain contexts, a regional economic integration organization (REIO). See further below.
18 As noted above this was (for the first time) underlined by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13, para 156. Yet, it can be argued that there are close resemblances with federations; see further below.
20 A REIO is commonly defined in UN protocols and conventions as “an organization constituted by sovereign states of a given region to which its member states have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by […] convention or its protocols and [which] has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it [the instruments concerned].” See
To overcome the fact that the EU is more than a regular international organization, the term ‘integration organization’ is often used, implying that from the perspective of international law, the Union is an international organization that at times requires adaptation of the usual paradigms applied to international organizations and that the sovereignty of Member States has not been taken away but has adapted. The Union may not possess original sovereign rights, except for from its own perspective, but it has been successful in changing the international position and the self-conception of its Member States. Indeed, EU membership has transformed States into Member States, both internally and externally.

Irrespective of the difficulty to classify the European Union from the perspective of international law, there is agreement that as an international actor, the EU is subject to international law in its relations with third states and international organizations. It is bound by the international agreements to which it is a party as well as to customary international law. More recent developments show that international law is capable of taking the differences between states and international organizations into account. This is particularly relevant as in recent years, the EU has been taking up ‘state-like functions’ in more areas than before. This is partly due to the fact that the introduction of the European External Action Service (EEAS) led to a professionalization of the EU’s diplomatic network around the world. The EU’s physical presence through its delegations is based on Article 221(1) TFEU: “Union Delegations in third countries and at international organizations shall represent the Union.”

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22 See more extensively C. Bickerton, European Integration, Oxford University Press, 2012.
23 Respectively to be found at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf>; and <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_11_2011.pdf>. Obviously, the extent to which these instruments successfully take the complex position of international organizations into account may be subject to debate.
representations are increasingly blurred. Heads of Delegations de facto act as ‘EU ambassadors’, and the EU adapts international diplomatic law to be able to ‘play along’.27

The EU is also quite visible in international law as it regularly concludes international agreements with third countries, ie. non-Member States.28 It’s international legal personality was confirmed in the current Treaties.29 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union has succeeded the Community and taken over all international obligations flowing from the latter’s treaty making activities over the first decades.

This separate legal status in international law also confirmed a separate role of the EU in international institutions, mostly alongside its Member States. Thus, the EU is a full member of a number of international organizations, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)30 the Codex Alimentarius, as well as of most fisheries organizations;31 and an observer to many other international organizations. Indeed, its engagement with a large number of IO’s has made it a visible actor in the international legal order.32

Most problematic perhaps from an international law perspective is the complex division of competences between the EU and its Member States. The starting point is given in treaty law, pursuant to which an international organization may not invoke the rules of the organization as justification for its failure to perform a treaty (Art. 27(2), 1986 Vienna Convention). Article 46 (2) of the 1986 Convention adds that an international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organization regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance. Article 46(3) specifies that a violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State or any international organization conducting itself in the matter in accordance with the normal practice of States and, where appropriate, of international organizations and in good faith.33 Given the manifold international relations and the dynamic and extensive competences of the Union, the question comes up to what extent the division of competences should be objectively evident to other international actors. It has been argued that once this division is made known, the rules are no longer purely internal, but may form part of the international agreements, or at least form a source for interpretation.34

28 For an overview see: https://treaties.un.org./.
29 Article 47 TEU: “The Union shall have legal personality.”
30 Articles II (8)-(11) FAO Constitution.
33 This seems to have been accepted by the European Court of Justice as well. See for instance the cases France v. Commission (C-327/91, Jur. 1994, I-3641) and the PNR-cases in Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 European Parliament v. Council and Commission [2006] ECR I-04721.
The division of competences and its consequences under international law will return in some of the analyses below (section 3).

2.2 A European law perspective on the international legal order

EU legal scholars would generally see international law as less complex, less technical and perhaps even closer to politics than to law. They wonder what the ICJ judges are doing the entire day with so few cases to handle and how international law scholars spend their day without having to deal with events on a daily basis. Obviously, they deny the fact that law is not just about case law or legal instruments that are adopted on a constant basis, but also, or perhaps mainly about interpretation. And that is not so different from what they do in EU law. International law is based on many international agreements and on custom and apart from the ICJ there are many more tribunals involved in international dispute settlement. And, are treaty law, the law of responsibility, or international trade or environmental law – to name just a few – really less ‘technical’ and less complex than EU law?

It is well-known that EU legal scholars have a tendency to stress the ‘specialness’ (and related ‘autonomy’) of the EU. Obviously, the early case law of the Court had set a trend in that respect. We all remember the famous qualification by the Court in Van Gend & Loos of the Community as “a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields and the subjects of which comprise not only member states but also their nationals.” There has been some debate on whether Van Gend & Loos should be seen as a logical follow-up to choices made in the Treaties and earlier case law of the Court, or that it “should be understood as a decisive turning point in the history of the ECJ and of European law in general.” In the latter view “The judgment constituted at the most fundamental level an attempt to differentiate European law from what was perceived as traditional international public law. A process completed when the ECJ in the Costa v. E.N.E.L. judgment termed the European legal order merely as a ‘new legal order’”


40 Ibid. See on different analyses of the case also A. Tizzano, J. Kokott, S. Prechal (Eds.), 50th Anniversary of the judgment in Van Gend en Loos, 1963-2013, European Court of Justice, 2013.
With the continued integration process, the divide between international and EU law studies has even deepened. As one observer held: “even if the EEC did conform to the status of international organizations in its early days (which is unlikely) it has now moved well beyond that.”

While, as mentioned in the introduction, the EU is traditionally open to international law, EU scholars have increasingly made comparisons to ‘statehood’, rather than to ‘organizationhood’. Notions like the one by the Court in *Van Gend & Loos* that “[i]ndependently of the legislation of member states, community law […] not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage”, seem to have steered EU law scholarship in a that direction. Rather than viewing EU law as a special branch of international law, EU scholarship turned to state-like metaphors. Thus, analyses have assessed the EU as a confederation, or even in federal terms. The federative argument was for instance presented by Schütze when he argued in relation to the EU that: “Its formation was clearly international and its amendment still is. However, its international birth should not prejudice against the ‘federal’ or ‘constitutional’ status of the EC Treaty. […] The fact remains that the European legal order has adopted the ‘originality hypothesis’ and cut the umbilical cord with the international legal order. The Treaty as such – not international law – is posited at the origin of European law. Functionally, then, the European Union is based on a ‘constitutional treaty’ that assumes and stands on federal middle ground.” It has also been argued that “the EU has combined a confederal foundation with some crucial federate reinforcements in its constitutional superstructure.”

All in all, the debate in the EU has much more been on its nature and on the relations with its Member States (and the related division of powers) than on a comparison with international law. Since this original conception of permanently transferred sovereign rights, the Court and the Treaties, have hand in hand, pushed forward a process of fortifying the European construction.

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45 A. Cuyvers, *op.cit.*, at 712.
ultimate normative base within the European Union – its “originality hypothesis” or “Grundnorm” – is the Rome Treaty as such.”

3. Mutual interests

The purpose of the present paper is not to deny the above findings, but to map areas in which international and EU law can – nevertheless – learn from each other and where a dialogue should continue. The list below is by no means meant to be exhaustive; it merely aims to give an indication of possible mutual interests.

3.1 The nature of the legal system

One of the popular differences between international and EU law is the different nature of their legal orders (see also supra: law between states or (also) law within states). Yet, also international law has moved from just being inter-state law, to law that can have an effect on the relations between governments and their individuals. Obvious examples include human rights law and international criminal law. International law seems to have realised that many problems are domestic and that – in the words of Slaughter and Burke-White – “To create desirable conditions in the international system, from peace, to health to prosperity, international law must address the capacity and the will of domestic governments to respond to these issues at their sources. In turn, the primary terrain of international law must shift – and is already shifting in many instances – from independent regulation above the national state to direct engagement with domestic institutions.” These authors have argued that what international law needs is “a direct emphasis on shaping or influencing political outcomes within sovereign states in accordance with international legal rules” and a “European way of law” should be at the basis of a transformation of international law. In particular agreeing on objectives (in ‘Directives’), while leaving the (best form of) implementation to the states, would better help international law attain many of its goals. The authors look somewhat jealous to “the EU’s ‘soft’ intervention in the ‘domestic affairs’ of EU member states” on an almost daily basis. Furthermore, the EU is not seldomly mentioned as a blueprint for other regions in the world and comparisons with the African Union, ASEAN or MERCOSUR are often made to see whether the ‘European way of law’ could be helpful in other areas of the world as well. The EU itself has even claimed that these forms of integration “make an important contribution to a more orderly world.”

While there are certainly lessons to draw from the way in which European law interacts with domestic legal orders, it is obvious why many of the starting point are hardly translatable to a wider context. The European Union started with a few states only and in a period in which more cooperation was not an option. Sixty years later, the limits of the project are becoming more visible.

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46 Schütze op. cit., at 1082.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. at 133.
3.2 Constitutionalism and effects on individuals

The nature of the two legal orders is closely related to another development which is prominent in both international and EU law: a constitutional approach. This approach, with a focus on checks and balances and rights of individuals, has of course been part and parcel of EU-studies from the outset. More recently it also no longer uncommon to view the international legal order in constitutional terms, and ‘international constitutional law’ has slowly become a special area of study. As in European Union law, the effect of rules and legislation on individuals also triggered this development in international law. The proliferation and law-making functions of many international organizations made us aware of the existence of – perhaps not the emergence of a world government\(^\text{51}\) – but at least of global governance ‘beyond the state’ in what is sometimes normatively framed in familiar ‘communitarian’ terms: a ‘world community’.\(^\text{52}\)

The trigger may very well have been formed by the sanctions regimes of the United Nations Security Council,\(^\text{53}\) but the study of the effects on individuals was much broader and has led to new areas such as Global Administrative Law.\(^\text{54}\) In general, where traditionally the ‘contractual’ relations between states were at the forefront, the ‘publicness’ of international law is gaining more attention.\(^\text{55}\) Obviously, this development raised new questions – for instance related to the constitutionalisation of the international legal order, the legitimacy of the decisions or the accountability of the actors.\(^\text{56}\) While ‘constitutionalism’ is a more general theme in current international legal discourse\(^\text{57}\) the increasing autonomy of international organizations (or at least


\(^\text{52}\) But see M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Subjective Dangers of Projects of World Community’, in A. Cassese (Ed.), *Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 3-13; as well as the other contributions in Part 1 of this volume under the heading ‘Can the World become a Global Community?’


\(^\text{54}\) Among the many publication in this area, one to mention is perhaps N. Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’, *EJIL*, 2006, pp. 262-274.


\(^\text{56}\) See also J. Klabbers, ‘Law-Making and Constitutionalism’, in J. Klabbers, A. Peters, and G. Ulfstein (Eds.), *The Constitutionalization of International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, at 12, arguing that non-state actors have “started to compete with states for the scarce resource of politico-legal authority (i.e. the power to set authoritative standards).” In general, the book discusses international constitutionalism as a framework within which further normative debate on a legitimate and pluralist constitutional order can occur (Klabbers, at 10). But see also J. Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel and J. Wouters, ‘When Structures Become Shackles’, *op.cit.*, where we have argued that the effects on legitimacy should not be overestimated as the traditional ‘thin state consent’ is replace by a ‘thick stakeholder consensus’.

the perception that this is the case) has triggered a new stream of literature, which basically aims to apply (variations of) constitutional and similar state-oriented notions related to the rule of law to international organizations.

This is where international law seems to be able to draw from the many experiences in EU law. Over the years, the EU developed quite sophisticated ways to allow individuals affected by EU law to address these issues, either before their domestic courts or before the European court. Sanctions case such as the Kadi cases,\(^{58}\) made clear that similar notions were needed at the international level.

3.3 **Democracy and legitimacy**

Irrespective of these developments – or, indeed, as a result of them – another trend is visible as well: back to the state, as global initiatives are less easily accepted by citizens – as is exemplified by the debates on large regional trade and investment initiatives such as TTIP, CETA, but also by ‘Brexit’ (‘taking back control’). Fahey has argued that “the merger of sovereignty, territoriality and jurisdiction in a global world is an emerging matter for EU law”.\(^ {59}\) At the same time effects of ‘post-nationalism’ or ‘post-sovereignty’ increasingly lead to popular protest: “An aggrandizement of EU influence, competence, scope and even territory may increasingly score lowly in terms of social legitimacy, both inside and outside the EU.”\(^ {60}\)

Both international and EU law are currently struggling with keeping the populations onboard in the ongoing process of globalisation and Europeanisation. The idea of representing the people in parliaments at international organizations is of course best implemented at the EU, but also visible in a number of other international organizations.\(^ {61}\) More in general, the struggle for legitimacy is something that the EU and other international fora share and where best (and worst) practices may be shared.

3.4 **The autonomy of international organizations and international responsibility**

The already mentioned development in which international organizations have more and more become international actors in their own right,\(^ {62}\) also leads to questions that have been part of EU legal doctrine. The division of competences between the EU and its Member States is a fact that has to be recognised by third parties, both when they wish to conclude international agreements and when issues of international responsibility emerge. As the 2011 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) reveal, a division of competences between IOs and their member states has become a more general issue. The complexity of the division of competences between the EU and its Member States remains unique, but at the same time other international organizations (including the UN) have shown difficulties to establish a clear line of demarcation when questions of international responsibility occur.

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\(^{59}\) Fahey, *op.cit.*, at 12.

\(^{60}\) *Ibid.* at 15.

\(^{61}\) See http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/international-parliamentary-assemblies

3.5 Statehood, territoriality and legal personality

As mentioned above, the EU is assuming more and more state-like functions. At the same time, as a non-state actor there is only so much the EU can do to stretch its competences. Yet, even territorial questions do seem to come up even in EU law and a connection with doctrinal issues on that point seems helpful as notions of territory and jurisdiction are central in international law. Indeed, state sovereignty implies that states are the sole rule makers and rule enforcers within a jurisdiction that is closely linked to their territory. The question of whether in the case of international organizations one may speak of a ‘territory’ is somewhat unsettled in international law. During the process of drafting the Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Law Commission had difficulties in accepting the existence of a ‘territory of the organization’. Despite its ‘state-like’ characteristics, the case of the European Union is not too different. At the same time, its competences to make and enforce rules within a given ‘territorial space’ are undisputed. These days we are witnessing an extension of that ‘territorial space’. Obviously also as a consequence of the enlarged membership of the EU, but more importantly because of the ‘global reach’ of EU law, and its extra-territorial effects.

The many references to ‘territory’ in the EU Treaties are mainly related to the Member States’ territories. Nevertheless, one may find some hints at the possible existence of an ‘EU territory’, in particular in relation to ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’, which intends to view the territories of the Member States as a whole. With regard to third country nationals (TCNs), the EU’s common immigration policy (Art. 79 TFEU) provides other arguments to start viewing the territories of the EU Member States as one ‘EU territory’. More in general, the internal market rules seem to point to the, at least ‘virtual’ existence of a common EU territory. More clear notions of a possible ‘EU territory’ can be found when the ‘territorial application’ of the Treaties are considered.

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63 Article 29 (on the ‘Territorial scope of treaties’) of the 1986 Vienna Convention basically copied Article 29 of the 1969 Convention and provides: “Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty between one or more States and one or more international organizations is binding upon each State party in respect of its entire territory.” It is interesting to note that, while international agreements concluded by international organizations are included, the obligations are imposed on “each State party” only.

64 The 1982 ILC Commentary explains this choice in the following terms: “Is it possible to imagine a parallel provision concerning the obligations of international organizations? Despite the somewhat loose references which are occasionally made to the ‘territory’ of an international organization, we cannot speak in this case of ‘territory’ in the strict sense of the word. However, since this is so and since account must nevertheless be taken of the variety of situations which the multiple functions of international organizations may involve, it seemed preferable to avoid a formula which was too rigid or too narrow. If the draft articles said that, in the case of an international organization which is a party to a treaty, the scope of application of the treaty extended to the entire territory of the States members of that organization, the draft would diverge from article 29 of the Vienna Convention by raising the question of the scope of application of a treaty, which is not expressly covered by that Convention.”


67 Thus, Article 3(3) TEU refers to the Union’s objective to “promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.” At the same time “It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”. References like these are meant to create some unity while preserving the diversity, and the objective of ‘territorial cohesion’ has merely been the driver behind the allocation of the so-called cohesion funds aimed at “reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.” (Art. 174 TFEU).
in concerned. First of all, the Treaties apply to the EU Member States (which are all mentioned by name).\textsuperscript{68} This is further specified in relation to the so-called countries and territories overseas, which leads to an extension of the territorial scope of the EU.\textsuperscript{69} At the same time, the existence of overseas territories may have territorial implication under, for instance, the law of the sea, in particular where these territories may result in an additional economic exclusive zone (EEZ) to be used for fishing and possible mining activities. Thus, while Greenland is not part of the EU, it’s location does lead to an interested of the EU in debates on the future of the arctic area.

Finally, the present author’s – admittedly – mild obsession with the notion of legal personality,\textsuperscript{70} warrants a few lines on that issue. While, indeed, international law perspectives have been used in EU law scholarship to answer the question of the EU’s own legal personality or the legal status of its agencies, more recently the EU also seems to give its own interpretation to the notion. A recent case in point is the \textit{Frente Polisario} case,\textsuperscript{71} which dealt with the territorial application of a trade agreement between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco.\textsuperscript{72} Indeed, the case has “fascinating international law aspects”.\textsuperscript{73} In the case, the question of the standing of the Polisario Front – a national liberation movement (NLM) that claims sovereignty for Western Sahara – as a natural or legal person under Article 264(4) TFEU came up as the claimants argue that its legal personality derives from public international law as recognized by the UN General Assembly Resolution in 1979. The General Court held that even though an entity does not have a legal personality according to the legal order of a Member State or a third country, due to its own constituting document, it has a fixed internal structure that “enables it to act as a responsible body in legal relations” that has participated in UN negotiations and signed an internationally recognized peace agreement.\textsuperscript{74} Yet, the general Court also relies on internal EU arguments to define the legal personality of the Front Polisario. It refers to its own case-law\textsuperscript{75} in arguing that an “entity which does not have a legal personality under the law of a Member state or of a non-member State may nevertheless be regarded as a ‘legal person’ within the meaning of Article 263, 4.”\textsuperscript{76} In addition, the

\textsuperscript{68} Art. 52 TEU.
\textsuperscript{69} Art. 355 TFEU.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Case T-512/12, Frente Polisario v. Council}, 2015
\textsuperscript{72} 2010 EU-Morocco Agreement on agricultural, processed and fisheries products,
\textsuperscript{74} At par. 44. The agreement was concluded with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Case C-229/05P, PKK and KNK v. Council}, 2007.
\textsuperscript{76} Polisario Case, at par. 52.
European Parliament has mentioned the Front Polisario in various resolutions. In his Opinion for the subsequent case before the CJEU, Advocate General Whatelet also recognized the legal personality of the Polisario Front as a legal subject able to bring the case before the EU court. Although his arguments flowed from both EU and international law, a separation was made between legal personality as required for standing before the Court and legal personality under international law. In the further definition and development of international legal personality, both EU and international law scholarship will find new material in cases like these.

3.6 Citizenship and nationality

There is a clear link between territory, nationality and citizenship. While nationality is usually related to a particular state, citizenship can also be granted to others living on the territory of that state. European citizenship is a key element of the process of European integration. Art. 30(2) TFEU inter alia provides: “Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have […] the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”. Indeed, the territory of all Member States; the rights of European citizens have largely been harmonised and European citizenship is frequently used by the Court of Justice of the EU to rule on extensive rights for individuals. Citizenship has thus become an essential element in the right to seek or accept jobs, to start a business or to provide cross-border services. At the same time, European citizenship entails “the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State […]”. Hence, outside the EU a European citizen may rely on the help of another EU Member State. Thus, the traditional national diplomatic and consular assistance is extended to an EU-wide system of protection of European citizens abroad. Links with international diplomatic and consular law become ever more visible.

While, currently, the idea of ‘supranational citizenship’ can most easily be seen as a dimension of the European integration process, it has been argued that the existence of the phenomenon could allow for a more general separation between states and (single) citizenship: “This belonging to a polity, expressed in purely legal terms, is the real novelty of the European model, replicable in other geographical areas or global organizations – which could generate - one day - their one partial citizenships - and it opens the door to multiple and cumulative citizenships, not conflicting among each other, to communities partially overlapping.”

At the same time, it is clear that EU citizenship does not endow the EU with competences states would generally have under international law to protect their nationals. In international diplomatic and consular law, the notion of nationality remains crucial. New developments in EU diplomacy reveal at least an ambition of the EU to act on behalf of its Member States in situations

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77 Ibid. at paras. 57-59. See also Ricardo Passos, ‘Legal Aspects of the European Union’s Approach to Western Sahara’, The European Approach Towards Western Sahara 142 (2017).
79 Art. 23 TFEU. Emphasis added.
of diplomatic protection and consular assistance. This clearly highlights the parallels between being a national of a state and a European citizen.  

3.6 Legal instruments and the hierarchy of norms

A classic difference between EU and international law is perceived to be found in the availability of legal instruments. Under EU law, ‘legally binding’ decisions can be taken, that – in most cases – can even be enforced before a Court of law. International law would have to rely on politics and persuasion rather than on legal instruments. Obviously, this is a caricature of both EU and international law. Large parts of the European integration process are based on ‘softer’ instruments, including all kinds of ‘green or white papers’ of the European Commission, resolutions by the European Parliament, Declarations by the European Council or instruments such as the ‘open method of coordination’. The main source of international law, on the other hand is formed by the thousands of treaties concluded between states and international organizations; and quite a few international organizations have the competence of enacting binding decisions. While enforcement possibilities indeed differ, one can hardly maintain that the daily practice in the EU is based on legally binding instruments and the daily practice in international law is not. Both international and EU law have a variety of (legal) instruments at their disposal and – given the above-mentioned similar questions they are faced with – it does not make sense to study the use and effects of these instruments in complete isolation.

A different, yet related, question concerns the hierarchy between international, EU and domestic legal norms as well as their inter-relationship. While the principle of ‘primacy’ of EU law over the law of its member States is rightfully seen as a cornerstone of the EU’s legal system, in practice the difference with international law norms may be less clear. It is easy to point to some differences (e.g. under EU law domestic courts seem to have to accept the primacy of EU law even within their own legal order), but it is perhaps more interesting to assess some of the parallels (e.g. international law is also binding on states and, domestically, they may also be forced find solutions to square possibly conflicting national and international norms). Moreover, in finding solutions for potentially conflicting norms in a situation of ‘multilevel regulation’, both EU and international law use similar techniques, such as ‘treaty conform interpretation’ or ‘consistent


interpretation’ to allow for norms at different levels to coincide without conflict. A comparison of the practical application of these principles in EU, international and domestic law may very well lead to new insights in the way in which legal norms have an effect in different legal orders.

4. Conclusion: towards a more integrated study of international and EU law?

The aim of this paper was to draw attention to a number of areas in which the study of both international and EU law should remain to be aware of doctrinal developments. True, it is hardly possible in any of these two areas to remain a generalist, given the advanced and often quite complex and technical details that by now characterise most sub-disciplines in international and EU law. A plea to try and even go beyond that may be wishful thinking and perhaps even result in far too superficial analyses. The aim of this paper is therefore more modest. Noticing a deepening of the divide between international and EU law scholarship and the reflection of this is our educational programs, the question was whether we could indicate issues in one discipline of which it makes sense to be included in analyses of the other. While there are certainly exceptions, it is quite strange that in EU law programs hardly any attention is paid to treaty law, statehood, the law of international responsibility, international organizations law or (these days) diplomatic law. Similarly, why do courses on the law of international organizations mostly continue to exclude the EU and the institutional developments in that organization? And, why do we hardly see a comparison to EU enforcement mechanisms, negotiations and decision-making, institutional solutions, democratic experiments or variations of legal acts in general course on international law?

This short paper mapped a number of areas in which international and EU law can continue to learn from each other and both the study of the further institutionalisation of the international legal order and the study of the internal and external relations of the EU may benefit from that exchange of thoughts. The mutual influence of international and EU law on each other’s development seems to be getting more attention in recent academic research. This may form a logical momentum to get reacquainted and renew the dialogue.