ࡱ> |( / 0LDArialؖ 0ؖ0ppL 0 ` .  @n?" dd@  @@`` x #j  T  K 72%  0AA@ʚ;ʚ;g4IdIdL L 0 ppp@ <4dddd<&) 0pL <4BdBd<H* 0p0___PPT10 ppv___PPT9XP?  O  =MV Changing Governance and Authority Relations in the Public Sciences Richard Whitley,WE  6(Manchester Business School, University of Manchester)77Summary of the Argument  (Major changes in the governance of higher education and the public sciences have taken place over the past 40 or so years in many OECD countries. These have affected the nature of authority relationships governing research priorities and the evaluation of results . In particular, the increasing exogeneity, formalisation and substantive nature of governance mechanisms, as well as the strength and extent of their enforcement, have altered the relative authority of different groups and organisations, as well as creating some new ones. These changes have occurred in different ways in different kinds of public science systems. As a result, the diversity of intellectual innovations and the coordination of research goals and outcomes have changed to different degrees in different countries.P3 Governance changes in the public sciences in the postwar period have involved substantial shifts in the authoritative mechanisms governing the establishment and evaluation of research priorities and results Changes in these mechanisms can be described in terms of nine dimensions of governance systems: @4 " J These dimensions distinguish five major types of coordination systems: KK  )Recent governance changes have involved: **KIncreasing exogeneity of authority over public science systems (PSS) Increasing formalisation of governance Increasing emphasis on procedural governance mechanisms of universities plus increasing substantive steering of strategies Attempts to establish pseudo-market signalling of success and failure in competitions for prestige and resources Increasing vertical communication of public policy priorities Increasing strength of enforcement of evaluations and priorities by both state agencies and scientific lites Increasing extent of enforcement of particular models of scientific research and performance standards across the sciences and countries Increasing difficulty of exit from institutional controls as resources and activities become tied to particular goals and performance auditing Increasing emphasis on public collective goods. LP  ; & '  < N6f  Three major kinds of shifts in authority relationships governing intellectual priorities and coordination have been associated with these governance changes: +Increased state steering of research goals and evaluations of the significance of results Increased state management of universities and other public research organisations (PROs) through competitive resource allocation and performance monitoring Enhancement of unified authority hierarchies in PROs ," ,    |In considering the impact of these changes on intellectual innovation and coordination, four changes in authority relations:}}EIncreased researcher dependence on scientific elites for project-based funding and reputations Increased influence of public policy goals and foundations on research funding and priorities Increased PRO strategic autonomy and capability Increasing opportunities for, and encouragement of, research commercialisation by PROs."F" PF  \Expected Effects of Changing Authority Relations on Intellectual Innovation and Coordination]] dExpected Effects of Changing Authority Relations on Intellectual Innovation and Coordination (cont.)ee   In summary: Governance changes in public science systems often combine characteristics of both substantive and procedural states, with varied consequences for intellectual innovation and coordination. Key mechanisms generating these consequences have been shifts in the influence of different groups and organisations governing research priorities and evaluating results. These shifts, and their outcomes, differ significantly between different kinds of PSS, with their greatest impact on state-shared ones. Their impact on intellectual variety and coordination in different sciences is mediated by the degree and rigidity of stratification of PROs and the diversity of funding agencies."  <   0` 33` Sf3f` 33g` f` www3PP` ZXdbmo` \ғ3y`Ӣ` 3f3ff` 3f3FKf` hk]wwwfܹ` ff>>\`Y{ff` R>&- {p_/̴>?" dd@,|?" dd@   " @ ` n?" dd@   @@``PR    @ ` ` p>> nf(    6s " `} s X Click to edit Master title style!! (  0lXs " ` s RClick to edit Master text styles Second level Third level Fourth level Fifth level!    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The strength of institutional enforcement The extent of enforcement over different actors and activities The difficulty of exit from institutional controls The extent to which the collective goods produced by the governance system are publicly available or privately appropriated. \    G "9 t'H  0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j( 0 ''P;'(  x  c $OdQ< d & M  #"2&cM  <Bd ?"`9 q  K0 @`  <Ld ?"` 9q  K0 @`  < d ?"`P q  K1 @`  <d ?"` P q  K1 @`  <x'd ?"` q  M0/1 @`  <L1d ?"` q  R Signalling   @`  <zd?9q  K0 @`  <d?q 9 K1 @`  <$d?P q  K0 @`  <d?q P  K1 @`  <d?q  K1 @`  <3d?q  ^Vertical communication @` R <@d?9   K1 @` Q <Hd? 9  M1/0 @` P <Pd?P   K0 @` O <ܒd? P  M0/1 @` N <D&?   M1/0 @` M < &?   S Substantive   @` L <x&?9   K0 @` K <&? 9  K1 @` J <y?P   K1 @` I <y? P  K1 @` H <Ԟy?   K1 @` G <y?   R Formalised   @` F <hy?9  K0 @` E <"y?9  K1 @` D < @y?P   K1 @` C < y?P  K1 @` B <PXy?  K1 @` A <y?  j"Exogeneity of governance to actors## @` @ < y?9? QNetwork @` ? <y??9 \Formal Association @` > <T9y?P ? ZIdealised Market @` = <-y??P  ZProcedural State @` < <$m?? fSubstantive Democratic State @` ; <Вm?? T   @` 6 <m?RF? ]Coordination System @` 5 <m?FR? WCharacteristics @` / <Dm?MF ECharacteristics of Governance Mechanisms in Five Coordination SystemsFF @``B } 0o ?MMZB ~ s *1 ?FFZB  s *1 ???ZB  s *1 ?ZB  s *1 ?  ZB  s *1 ?  ZB  s *1 ?  `B  0o ?`B  0o ?M`B  0o ?MZB  s *1 ?RFR?ZB  s *1 ??ZB  s *1 ?P ?P ZB  s *1 ??ZB  s *1 ?9?9ZB  s *1 ?q q ZB  s *1 ??H  0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j# 0 #"4J4"(  4o!| q  J4 #"."q  4 <Hm?   M0/1 @` 4 <m?&   M0/1 @` 4 < m?# &  K0 @` 4 < m? #  K1 @` 4 <m?   K1 @`  4 <m?q   i!Public nature of collective goods"" @`  4 <&m?   K0 @`  4 <m?&   M1/0 @`  4 <Dm?# &  K0 @`  4 <#? #  K1 @` 4 <x#?   K1 @` 4 <h#?q   YDifficult to exit @` 4 <*#?F  K0 @` 4 <3#?&F  K0 @` 4 <<#?# F&  K1 @` 4 <E#?F#  K1 @` 4 <l#?F  K1 @` 4 <#?qF  ]Extensive enforcement @` 4 <0P#?F K0 @` 4 <xR#?&F K1 @` 4 <0[#?# &F K0 @` 4 <]#?# F K1 @` 4 <D#?F K1 @` 4 <#?qF ZStrong enforcement @` 4 <#?s QNetwork @` 4 <L#?&s \Formal Association @` 4 <P#?# s& ZIdealised Market @` 4 <|#?s#  ZProcedural State @`  4 <ܩ#?s fSubstantive Democratic State @` !4 <#?qs T   @` "4 <\^#?Rzs ]Coordination System @` #4 < ?qzRs WCharacteristics @` $4 <D?qz ECharacteristics of Governance Mechanisms in Five Coordination SystemsFF @``B %4 0o ?qZB &4 s *1 ?qzzZB '4 s *1 ?qssZB (4 s *1 ?qZB )4 s *1 ?qFFZB *4 s *1 ?q  ZB +4 s *1 ?q  `B ,4 0o ?q  `B -4 0o ?qq `B .4 0o ? ZB /4 s *1 ?RzRsZB 04 s *1 ?s ZB 14 s *1 ?# s# ZB 24 s *1 ?&s& ZB 34 s *1 ?s ZB 84 s *1 ?s  74 0,  Gof which idealised models of the public sciences most resemble networksH 2? H 4 0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.jB 0 `B(  x  c $Xm m   c $#+ m  H  0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j 0 ;3p(  x  c $r'    c $0y+  $R`Pp  0X|6 I  < 2    <(QY k3The impact of these changes on the relative authority of key groups and agencies has varied between different kinds of PSS. Three ideal types of PSS can be distinguished in terms of the relative authority of different groups and organisations: State-shared, state-delegated, and employer-competitive 4=H  0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j# 0 '##2 "(   " TY>   #"6*   GTY> x  <Xa ?"`YT OLimited @` v  <  ?"` T OLimited @` t  < ?"` T U Considerable  @` r  <, ?"`TT j Organisational scientific elites!! @` p  < ?"`TY`  T Considerable   @` n  <8 ?"` T`  T Considerable   @` l  < ?"`T `  OLimited @` j  <0 ?"`TT`  iResearch groups and individuals   @` h  < ?"`` Y  T Considerable   @` f  <> ?"` `   NMedium @` d  <(= ?"``  NMedium @` b  <A ?"`T`   v,National and international scientific elites-- @` `  </ ?"` Y NMedium @` ^  < ?"`  OLimited @` \  <t) ?"`  OLimited @` Z  < ?"`T  }3Commercial and other external stakeholder interests44 @`   <?TY iType of Public Science System @`   <pX?Y> T Considerable   @`   <ܐ? > NMedium @`   <N? > KLow @`   <?T> V PRO managers   @`   <ĉ?Y T Considerable   @`   <K?  OLimited @`   <TE?  OLimited @`   <k?T fResearch Funding Foundations @`   <:?Y OLimited @`   <?  NMedium @`   <s?  T Considerable   @`   <Y?T S The State   @`   <\b?Y ^Employer-competitive @`   <L?  YState-delegated @`   <?  V State-Shared   @`   <ػ?T `Relative Authority of: @``B   0o ?TYZB   s *1 ?TYZB   s *1 ?TYZB   s *1 ?TY`B   0o ?T>Y>`B   0o ?TT>`B   0o ?YY>ZB !  s *1 ?TYZB )  s *1 ?>ZB *  s *1 ? >ZB +  s *1 ?>ZB [  s *1 ?TYZB c  s *1 ?T Y ZB k  s *1 ?T` Y` ZB s  s *1 ?TTYTH  0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j 0 #$(  $x w5 $ #"*Mlt"q $ < ?"`_   [Reduced in most PSS @` $ <F ?"`m _  cReduced in state-shared PSS @` ~$ <$ ?"`- m  cReduced in state-shared PSS @` |$ < ?"` -  j Organisational scientific lites!! @` &$ <0?_   NVaries @` $$ <?m  _  u-Increased where agencies evaluate performance.. @` "$ <?- m  GIncreased, especially where funds are highly concentrated in one or twoHH @`  $ <? -  cResearch funding agencies @` $ <?_ 5 Q Increased   @` $ <|?m _5 CIncreased considerably in state-shared PSS, incrementally elsewhereDD @` $ <I?- m 5 `Increased in state-shared PSS where states implement mission contracts with them, less elsewhereaa @` $ <`? -5 V PRO managers   @`  $ <a?_0  QIncreased where this enables the state to implement priorities, reduced otherwiseRR @`9 $ <?m 0_  }Reduction of direct control in state-shared PSS, increased regulatory control in state-delegated and employer-competitive PSS~~ @`3 $ <|?-0m   wIncreased, especially where public funding is highly concentrated and there are few non-state research support agenciesxx @`  $ <lϓ?0-  gState ministries and agencies @`  $ <ғ?_0 ~4Enhancement of unified authority hierarchies in PROs55 @`$  $ <xܓ?m _0 fIncreasing state management of PROs through competitive resource allocation and performance monitoringgg @`  $ <hߓ?-m 0 IIncreasing state steering of research priorities and knowledge evaluationJJ @`  $ <~?-0 s)Changing Authority of Agencies and Groups** @` $ <h~?w ~2Major Governance Changes in Public Science Systems33 @``B $ 0o ?wwZB $ s *1 ?ZB $ s *1 ?00ZB $ s *1 ?  `B $ 0o ?55`B $ 0o ?w5`B $ 0o ?w5ZB !$ s *1 ?  ZB )$ s *1 ?--5ZB *$ s *1 ?m m 5ZB +$ s *1 ?__5ZB }$ s *1 ?  H $ 0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j1 0 @1(  @p E @ #"" D5* @ <x##?7p E nIncreased in state-shared PSS where they are able to pursue their own projects, reduced in state-delegated PSSoo @` @ <|? p 7E NVaries @` @ <BL? p E WIncreased in state-shared PSS where they are able to obtain research resources directlyXX @` @ <(NL?p E iResearch groups and individuals   @`  @ <SL?7p  [Reduced in most PSS @`  @ <h\L? 7p  cReduced in state-shared PSS @` @ <jL?  p  cReduced in state-shared PSS @` @ <\UL? p  j Organisational scientific lites!! @` @ <pyL?7 ~4Enhancement of unified authority hierarchies in PROs55 @`$ @ <P{L? 7 fIncreasing state management of PROs through competitive resource allocation and performance monitoringgg @` @ <L?   IIncreasing state steering of research priorities and knowledge evaluationJJ @` @ <@L?  s)Changing Authority of Agencies and Groups** @` @ <HL? ~2Major Governance Changes in Public Science Systems33 @``B @ 0o ?ZB @ s *1 ?ZB @ s *1 ?ZB @ s *1 ?p p `B @ 0o ?EE`B @ 0o ?E`B @ 0o ?EZB @ s *1 ?  EZB @ s *1 ?  EZB @ s *1 ?77EH @ 0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j 0 1D(  DVp q< 0D #""< )D <L ?"`<D  q)Increased, especially in state-shared PSS** @` 'D <L ?"`] D  <Increased where peer review is dominant evaluation mechanism== @`Y %D <L ?"`] D  Increased where they are involved in science policy development and implementation, but less so where policy goals dominate resource allocation @` #D <L ?"`qD  v,National and International scientific lites-- @`  D <L?D < _Increased where PROs manage commercialisation of research, especially in employer dominated PSS`` @`  D <L?] D  VIncreased where competition and state policies encourage commercialisation of researchWW @`5 D <L?D ]  yIncreased where the state pursues economic growth goals through research priorities, especially in employer dominated PSSzz @` D <L?qD  t*Commercial and other stakeholder interests++ @` D <d?< ~4Enhancement of unified authority hierarchies in PROs55 @`$ D <|d?]  fIncreasing state management of PROs through competitive resource allocation and performance monitoringgg @` D < d?]  IIncreasing state steering of research priorities and knowledge evaluationJJ @` D <d?q s)Changing Authority of Agencies and Groups** @` D <&?q< ~2Major Governance Changes in Public Science Systems33 @``B D 0o ?q<ZB D s *1 ?q<ZB D s *1 ?q<`B D 0o ?q<`B D 0o ?qq`B D 0o ?<<ZB D s *1 ?ZB D s *1 ?] ] ZB D s *1 ?ZB $D s *1 ?qD <D H D 0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j 0  ((  (x ( c $hL L  ( c $42& L "p`Pp ( 0:&% )  < 2   ( <=&,A\TL___PPT9.& H can be expected to affect: The diversity and longevity of research projects The ease of establishing new scientific fields The degree of competition for scientific prestige in established disciplines The degree of national and international coordination of research goals and results, differently in different kinds of PSS. f!!( )u8XH ( 0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j 0 qiS,(  ,x , c $L L Ip q  R, #""%q  , <$a&?   9Increased for fields close to technological opportunities:: @` , <d@&?3   WIncreased where elite PROs have access to discretionary resources, esp. in emp-comp PSSXX @` , <d&? 3  t,Increased where state provides new resources-- @` , <,&?   7Reduced, except where there are diverse funding sources88 @` , < &?q   t*Ease of establishing new scientific fields++ @` , <`&?  WReduced except where it leads to endowment-type research support for long term projectsXX @`= , <ԕ&?3   Reduced in low prestige PROs, possibly increased in elite ones where funding is not concen-trated. Limited impact in emp-comp PSS @` , <X&?3  [Increased variety, especially in employer-competitive (emp-comp) PSS, but reduced longevity\\ @` , <ı&?  8Reduced, especially where funding is highly concentrated99 @` , <Ⱥ&?q  u+Diversity & longevity of research projects,, @` , <&? UIncreasing opportunities for, & encouragement of, research commer-cialisation by PROsVV @`  , <&?3  y/Increased PRO strategic autonomy and capability00 @`   , <&?3  NIncreased influence of public policy goals and foundations on research fundingOO @`  , <@&? ^Increased researcher dependence on epistemic elites for project-based funding and reputations __ @`  , <p&?q z0Expected effects on innovation and coordin-ation11 @` , <&?q jChanges in Authority Relations @``B , 0o ?qZB , s *1 ?qZB , s *1 ?qZB , s *1 ?q  `B , 0o ?q  `B , 0o ?qq `B #, 0o ? ZB %, s *1 ? ZB &, s *1 ? ZB ', s *1 ?3 3 ZB (, s *1 ? H , 0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.jU 0  $HU(  Hx H c $L L p q $H #""%q H <t&?  OReduced @`# H <t ?3  gStrengthened in low prestige PROs, esp. in PSS with strong evaluation systems & reputational monitoringhh @` H < ? 3  k#Reduced, especially in emp-comp PSS$$ @` H <`& ?  T Strengthened   @` H <0 ?q  ENational and international coordination of research goals and resultsFF @`  H <h9 ?  OReduced @`1  H <p; ?3   uIntensified in low prestige PROs where disciplinary elites dominate strong evaluation systems, weakened in elite onesvv @`  H <J ?3  8Reduced, unless funding is allocated through peer review99 @`  H <0L ?  LIntensified, especially where strong evaluation systems are discipline basedMM @`  H <^ ?q  o%Competition for disciplinary prestige&& @` H <_ ? UIncreasing opportunities for, & encouragement of, research commer-cialisation by PROsVV @` H <Li ?3  y/Increased PRO strategic autonomy and capability00 @`  H <r ?3  NIncreased influence of public policy goals and foundations on research fundingOO @` H <| ? ^Increased researcher dependence on epistemic elites for project-based funding and reputations __ @` H <Ȇ ?q z0Expected effects on innovation and coordin-ation11 @` H <t ?q jChanges in Authority Relations @``B H 0o ?qZB H s *1 ?qZB H s *1 ?qZB H s *1 ?q  `B H 0o ?q`B H 0o ?qq`B H 0o ?ZB H s *1 ?ZB H s *1 ?ZB H s *1 ?3 3 ZB H s *1 ?H H 0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.j 0  0(  0x 0 c $LY L H 0 0޽h ? 3380___PPT10.jrX~024:э-%c`6,% K'1Oh+'0 hp  Slide 1MBS MZYSSRDW5Microsoft Office PowerPoint@?#!@2Ej@l nGg   &WMFC0lxG 2 EMFJJ $F(GDICx!b $$==% % V0xx x % % $$AA" FGDICF(GDICrlwFGDICRp@ArialxArial%L @Arial 0 8y(O0?0U0%00(z#m0x(ș0Xаdv%    TTnq$AAqLP1 % ( F(GDIC 1FGDICRp@Arial~x(($B&0 ę(d$0 ?0U0%00!'0!Xtdv%    T$AA"LChanging Governance and Authority  % ( Rp@ArialoxArial7X @Arial 0 y( O0?0U0%00(z#!m0x(ș0Xаdv%    T !'$AA' LRelations in the Public Sciences % ( Rp@Arial4xArial7X @Arial 0 py(O0?0U0%00(z#m0x(ș0Xаdv%    T57f=$AA5=LlRichard Whitley % ( F(GDICCdFGDICRp@ArialVx(( $B&0ę(d$0?0U0%00'0Xtdv%    T'F|K$AA'KL(Manchester Business School,  % ( Rp@ArialIxArial:X @Arial 0 y(O0?0U0%00(z#m0x(ș0Xаdv%    T-NrS$AA-SLUniversity of Manchester) % (   x--$xx--'@Arial??-.  2 q1z."System-@Arial~??-. :2 "Changing Governance and Authority .-@Arialo??-. 72 ' Relations in the Public Sciences.-@Arial4??-. 2 =5Richard Whitley.-@ArialV??-. 32 K'(Manchester Business School, c.-@ArialI??-. -2 S-University of Manchester)o.-՜.+,0    $ [On-screen ShowManchester Business School'' ArialDefault DesignW Changing Governance and Authority Relations in the Public Sciences Richard WhitleySummary of the Argument 4 Governance changes in the public sciences in the postwar period have involved substantial shifts in the authoritative mechanisms governing the establishment and evaluation of research priorities and results Changes in these mechanisms can be described in terms of nine dimensions of governance systems: K These dimensions distinguish five major types of coordination systems: Slide 5*Recent governance changes have involved: Three major kinds of shifts in authority relationships governing intellectual priorities and coordination have been associated with these governance changes: Slide 8Slide 9 Slide 10 Slide 11}In considering the impact of these changes on intellectual innovation and coordination, four changes in authority relations:]Expected Effects of Changing Authority Relations on Intellectual Innovation and CoordinationeExpected Effects of Changing Authority Relations on Intellectual Innovation and Coordination (cont.)In summary: Governance changes in public science systems often combine characteristics of both substantive and procedural states, with varied consequences for intellectual innovation and coordination. Key mechanisms generating these consequences have been shifts in the influence of different groups and organisations governing research priorities and evaluating results. These shifts, and their outcomes, differ significantly between different kinds of PSS, with their greatest impact on state-shared ones. Their impact on intellectual variety and coordination in different sciences is mediated by the degree and rigidity of stratification of PROs and the diversity of funding agencies.  Fonts UsedDesign Template Slide Titles _'MZYSSRDWMZYSSRDW  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~Root EntrydO)Current UserSummaryInformation(PowerPoint Document('DocumentSummaryInformation8