J. Soraker, MA

Department of Philosophy [Cubicus building, B228]

University of Twente

Postbox 217, 7500 AE Enschede

Office phone: +31 53 489 5603

Mobile: +31 6 4705 9544
Detailed CV: [pdf]

Blog: http://soraker.blogspot.com

Email: j.h.soraker /at/ utwente.nl
Linkedin: http://www.linkedin.com/in/metus

Current Teaching and Supervision

We Create Identity (Course code: 670061, Q1, fall 2009)

Graduate course on Computer Ethics (Course code: 161268, Q4, spring 2010)

Psychological and academic skills (Course code: 290325, Q3, spring 2010)

Ethics and Technology II (Course code: 161258, Q3, spring 2010)

Supervision, MA students in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society:

-	Richard Heersmink: “Ghost in the Machine - A Philosophical Analysis of the Relationship Between Brain-Computer Interface Applications and Their Users” (graduated Jan 8, 2009)

-	Tom Kruijsen, “Autonomy in Smart Surroundings” (graduated Dec 22, 2008)

-	Jaak Vlasveld, “On designing context-aware applications – Past the phenomenological perspective” (graduated Oct 30, 2009)

Background

Johnny Hartz Søraker is a PhD research fellow at the Department of Philosophy, University of Twente. He is a member of the VICI project on the Evaluation of the Cultural Quality of New Media, working on the sub-project “The Value of Virtual Worlds and Entities”.

Søraker received his MA degree (Cand. Philol.) in Philosophy from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). The MA thesis, entitled “Man vs. Machine – an exploration of the concept ‘continuity’”, was an inquiry into claims about the uniqueness of man, the prospects of artificial intelligence, the reducibility of conscious experience and the adequacy of third-person perspectives when explaining human behavior. Since then, Søraker has published papers and given numerous lectures related to computer ethics – especially on virtual reality, Internet regulation and moral status.

Research

Søraker’s research in the VICI project focuses on how the unique epistemological and ontological status of virtual worlds and entities determines its potential to be of value and/or conducive to human well-being. In approaching this question, the dissertation deals with both the theoretical nature of virtual worlds and entities, in particular how their mode of existence and epistemological status might differ from actual entities, as well as the possibility of virtual entities, experiences and activities that are of instrumental, inherent or intrinsic value similar or superior to those of the actual world. In evaluating the value of virtual worlds, the thesis also draws heavily on empirical research in ‘positive psychology’. The overall aims are to get a better theoretical understanding of virtual worlds and entities, a better practical understanding of their ability to change our lives – the ultimate goal being to propose and consider a framework for better normative analyses of how virtual worlds and entities might change our conception of value and well-being.

International, peer-reviewed publications

Søraker, J.H. (forthcoming): “Virtual Entities, Environments, World and Reality – Suggested definitions and taxonomy”. First published as part of Philosophy of Computer Games 2009 Conference Proceedings. Invited for publication in C. Ess and M. Thorseth, eds., Trust and Virtual Worlds: Contemporary Perspectives. Peter Lang Publishing.

2.	Søraker, J.H. (2010): “The Neglect of Reason – A Plea for Rationalist Accounts of the Effects of Virtual Violence”. In C. Wankel and S. Malleck, eds., Emerging Ethical Issues of Life in Virtual Worlds. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, pp. 15-32. ISBN: 978-1-60752-378-9

P. Brey and J.H. Søraker (2009a): “Philosophy of Computing and Information Technology”. In A. Meijers, ed., Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences. Vol IX in D. Gabbay, P. Thagard and J. Woods, eds., Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1341-1408. ISBN: 978-044-451-667-1

4.	Brey, P and Søraker, J.H. (2009b): “A Précis of Philosophy of Computing and Information Technology”. American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8(2): 15-16. ISSN: 1067-9464

5.	Søraker, J.H. (2008a): “Global Freedom of Expression within Non-Textual Frameworks”. The Information Society 24(1): 40-46. ISSN 0197-2243

6.	Søraker, J.H. and Brey, P. (2007a): “Ambient Intelligence and Problems with Inferring Desires from Behaviour”, International Review of Information Ethics, 8(1):7-12. ISSN: 1614-1687

Søraker, J.H. (2007b): “The Moral Status of Information and Information Technologies – a relational theory of moral status”, S. Hongladarom and C. Ess (Eds.), Information Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspectives, Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing, pp. 1-19. ISBN: 978-1-59904-310-4

Reprinted in H. Nemati (ed.), 2007, Information Security and Ethics: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. pp. 3829-3848. ISBN: 978-1-59904-937-3

8.	Søraker, J.H. (2006): “The Role of Pragmatic Arguments in Computer Ethics”, Ethics and Information Technology, 8(3):121-130. ISSN: 1388-1957

Conference proceedings and other publications

9.	Søraker, J.H. (forthcoming): “The relative value of virtual relationships: A critique of objective measures of quality of life in virtual communities” In Brey, P., Briggle, A. and Spence, E., eds., The Good Life in a Technological Age (invited chapter, in preparation).

10.	Søraker, J.H. (2009c): “Convergence and Divergence in the Future Information Society”. In Hamer, I., ed., Living the ICT Future, pp. 62-63. Enschede: CTIT. ISBN: 978-90-365-2963-1

11.	Søraker, J.H. (2009d): “Virtually Good? – What Can We Learn From the Argument from False Pleasures?”. In Bottis, M., ed., 8^th International Conference Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry, pp. 767-778. Athens: Nomiki Bibliothiki. ISBN: 978-960-272-654-9

12.	Søraker, J.H. (2009e): “Technological Singularity as Upgrading/Degrading Continuity”. In J. Vallverdu, ed., VII^th European Conference on Philosophy and Computing, p. 165. Barcelona: UAB. ISBN/DL: B-27978-2009

13.	Søraker, J.H. (2008b): “Lessons Learnt from ECAP”. In IACAP Newsletter 3(1): 3-6.

14.

Søraker, J.H. (2007c): “Real norms, Virtual Cases: A Rationalist, Casuistic Account of Virtual Rape”. In Hinman, L., Brey, P., Floridi, L., Grodzinsky, F. and Introna, L. (eds.), Proceedings of CEPE 2007 – The 7^th International Conference of Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry. Enschede: Center for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT), pp. 340-347. ISSN: 0929-0672

15.

Søraker, J.H. (2005): Menneske vs. Maskin – en utforskning av begrepet ’kontinuitet’ [Man vs. Machine - an exploration of the concept 'continuity' (Masters Thesis)]. In Filosofisk institutts publikasjonsserie, Vol. 47, Trondheim: NTNU University press [Synopsis in English]
ISBN: 978-829-105-550-3

Works in progress (in addition to dissertation)

“The relative value of virtual relationships: A critique of objective measures of quality of life in virtual communities”

On the opportunity costs of different virtual experiences and an analysis of the problems involved in assessing whether virtual experiences are conducive to the good life. Full paper presented at Internet Research 9.0 conference (Association of Internet Researchers), and invited for an upcoming anthology on The Good Life in Technological Age (Eds.: P. Brey, A. Briggle and E. Spence)

“Philosophy of Virtual Worlds: Reshaping the Old and Preparing for the Future”

In this paper I discuss how philosophy of virtuality relates to a number of traditional epistemological and ontological issues, and how consideration of these theoretical issues are relevant to examining the ethical and societal challenges posed by virtual worlds. Invited lecture for Philosophers’ rally.

“Upgrading and Degrading Continuities”
This paper has been long in the making, and is a reworking of a central topic in my MA thesis (cf. Søraker 2005). The general idea is to propose a conceptual framework for describing and analyzing the ways in which two kinds of entities (e.g humans and animals) can (come to) be seen as continuous, in particular how one domain or entity can confer or lose its value when seen as continuous with another. The paper relates this discussion to issues raised by the Sorites paradox, the argument from marginal cases, Hegelian dialectics and eliminativist/reductionist theories of mind. Presented at ECAP’09 and currently being prepared for journal submission.

“The Philosophy of Simulation: Not the Same Old Stew”

A response to Frigg and Reiss’ forthcoming Synthese paper entitled “The Philosophy of Simulation: Hot New Issues or Same Old Stew?” and a slight reworking of the first chapter of my thesis in which I discuss the peculiar and unique characteristics of computer simulations in general and virtual reality in particular. Presented at ECAP 2008. Still under development.

“Did the Sage of Königsburg Never Try VR? – Some Reflections on Virtual Reality in Light of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism”

On truth claims in virtual reality, especially in light of a Kantian coherentist theory of truth and his use of congruence and intersubjectivity criteria.

Presented at International Workshop: Kant Revisited in Light of New Technology. Still under development.